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I declare that I am the sole author of the original material (Chapters 1 -2) and of the 
entire portfolio of published work (Chapters 3 -10) which constitutes this thesis, and that 
six of these eight published papers have appeared in refereed books or journals. 
Signed 
Please note that the portfolio of published work is presented in the same format as the 
original material. Because the eight papers were published separately, there is inevitably 
some repetition. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of a critical review of a portfolio of eight journal articles and book 
chapters on normative aspects of decision making in education and social security 
(Chapter 1); an overview of the most important research on procedural fairness and 
administrative justice that I have undertaken (Chapter 2); and the portfolio of papers 
referred to above (Chapters 3 -10). Chapter 2 develops a socio -legal approach to 
procedural fairness, which sees it in terms of the `trade -offs' that are made between a 
number of competing conceptions of administrative justice, and illustrates its power by 
outlining empirical research on the computerisation of social security in the UK, 
discretionary decision -making in Scottish prisons, the assessment of special educational 
needs in Scotland and England, and the aims and consequences of computerisation of 
social security in 13 OECD countries. 
Chapters 3 =5 are concerned with education and are based on a programme of research on 
the socio -legal and policy implications of parental choice legislation in Scotland which 
concluded that it had not produced an optimal balance between the rights of parents to 
choose schools for their own children and the duties of education authorities to promote 
the education of all children of school age. Chapter 3 outlines an alternative approach 
which takes choice seriously but avoids some of the adverse consequences of the 
existing legislation. Chapter 4 puts forward a set of institutional changes which would, 
it is argued, produce a better balance between the legitimate concerns of all the 
interested parties by involving teachers in the process of deciding which school would 
best facilitate a given child's learning and thus promote that child's interests. Chapter 5 
provides some critical reflections on the programme of research, reviews subsequent 
policy developments, and considers how further research could respond to them. 
Chapters 6 -10 are concerned with social security. Chapter 6 gives a critical account of 
Titmuss' analysis of the relationship between rights and discretion in social security; 
develops an alternative approach; and suggests that the problem which needs to be 
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solved is one of achieving a balance between rules, discretion and rights. This approach 
is applied to analysing the shifting balance between these three principles in the social 
security system since the publication of Titmuss' article in 1971, and to criticising 
proposals for reforming the system of adjudication set out in a recently -published 
consultation paper. Chapter 7 examines these proposals against the background of the 
`Change Programme', which aimed to cut the Department of Social Security's 
administrative costs by 25 per cent over a three -year period. Chapter 8 contrasts the 
Labour Government's decision to end the long tradition of lay membership of appeal 
tribunals in social security with the previous Conservative Government's proposals to 
remove the requirement that all appeal tribunals should have legally -qualified chairmen, 
and considers the wider implications of this change. Chapter 9 examines the 
relationship between substantive justice and procedural fairness in social security; 
reviews empirical evidence relating to changes in substantive justice and procedural 
fairness since 1979; and concludes that reductions in the level of social security benefits 
relative to average incomes and in the extent of procedural protection afforded to those 
who depend on social security weakened their rights as citizens. The final chapter, 
Chapter 10, contrasts Ferge's analysis of different normative models of social protection 
schemes with my analysis of the different normative models of how they should be mn. 
It concludes that her preference for `messy contracts' based on a plurality of principles 
has much in common with my preference for administrative procedures that attempt to 
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A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE WORK SUBMITTED 
HOW THE WORK WAS SELECTED 
Two principles have guided the selection of work included in this thesis. The first 
principle is that the publications had to form `a coherent body of work'.1 My main 
concern for many years has been with two related issues - procedural fairness and 
administrative justice - and, in a series of research projects, I have attempted to study 
the justice inherent in routine administrative decision -making in a number of 
different settings. In light of this, I have written a paper in which I have attempted to 
locate my work and outline the ways in which it has developed. That paper appears 
as Chapter 2 and should be read in conjunction with this chapter because they both 
seek to identify `the aims, objectives, methodology, results and conclusions'2 of the 
research on procedural fairness and administrative justice that I have undertaken. In 
addition, I have reproduced a selection of my publications that are concerned with 
the normative aspects of administrative decision -making. My publications on this 
subject have covered aspects of education (in particular, parental choice of school 
and the assessment of special educational needs), social security (mainly on decision - 
making and appeals) and penal policy (almost exclusively on prisons). However, 
because my publications on imprisonment are largely derivative on one of the studies 
outlined in Chapter 2,3 they have not been included in this portfolio. The 
publications that have been included, and are reproduced as Chapters 3 -10, cover two 
policy areas: parental choice in education and decision -making and appeals in social 
security. 
The second principle is that I had to be the sole author of the work. This could have 
created a problem because my most important and original publications have all been 
jointly authored. Because empirical research is expensive in terms of time and 
resources, I have been very dependent on external funding.4 The grants I have 
obtained have made it possible to employ researchers to work with me and, over the 
years, I have been extremely fortunate to have worked with some outstanding 
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colleagues.5 Although I have set the research agenda, in that the proposals have 
reflected my interests and concerns, prepared the grant applications, and been 
responsible for the end -of -grant reports that were submitted to the funding bodies, 
my colleagues have made invaluable contributions to the development and the 
successful accomplishment of the research, to the interpretation of research findings, 
and to the resulting publications. This is why their names appear on all (or nearly 
all) the publications that arose from these projects. 
To the extent that it is my work that is being assessed here, because it is sometimes 
very difficult to distinguish my contributions to jointly- authored publications from 
those of my collaborators, I decided not to include any of them.6 However, the paper 
reproduced as Chapter 2 does describe the research on which those publications were 
based in some detail. 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
The first broad aim of Chapter 2 is to demonstrate that procedural fairness is an 
important component of overall justice and that what lies at the heart of justice, 
namely that `everyone should receive what is due to them', applies just as much to 
procedures as to outcomes. In support of this claim, reference is made to research, 
which shows that people attach importance to procedural fairness whether or not the 
procedures work to their advantage and independently of their assessment of the 
justice of the outcome. The second broad aim is to apply this distinction to 
administrative justice and to demonstrate the need for procedures that are put into 
place internally in addition to external forms of accountability. This involves 
outlining and developing an approach to administrative justice, which sees it in terms 
of the `trade -offs' between a number of competing conceptions of procedural 
fairness. This approach has informed a number of the empirical studies I have 
undertaken and the third broad aim of the chapter is to illustrate its power by 
outlining four studies that have examined the fairness of administrative procedures. 
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The chapter is in five parts. Part 1 is philosophical. After analysing the concept of 
justice and some of its subdivisions, it explores the relationship between procedural 
fairness and substantive justice. It analyses a number of different approaches and 
concludes that, although procedural fairness can contribute to substantive justice, it is 
not best understood in an entirely instrumental way because it can be justified 
independently. Justice applies to process, i.e. to the way in which people are treated, 
just as much as it applies to outcomes, i.e. to what they end up with. Part 2 is 
psychological. It reviews some early research, which showed that perceptions of 
procedural fairness exercise an independent effect on responses to favourable and 
unfavourable outcomes and on perceptions of distributive justice, and some more 
recent empirical research, which uses a more sophisticated categorisation of 
procedural fairness and demonstrates that the early fmdings are not specific to 
courtroom settings and can be generalised to other encounters with the legal system. 
It concludes by attempting to rebut claims that these conclusions are invalid because 
the theoretical framework which informs the research on which they are based 
assumes what it purports to demonstrate, namely that procedures have their own 
normative foundation and that people assess fairness primarily on that basis. Part 3 
is institutional. It outlines and contrasts internal and external approaches to the 
achievement of procedural fairness. Although external approaches are well - 
established, it concludes that internal approaches are equally, if not more, important 
because they focus on the myriad of first- instance decisions rather than the much 
smaller number of decisions that are the subject of an appeal or complaint, and 
because they deal with first- instance decisions directly rather than at one remove. 
An analytic framework which embraces internal as well as external mechanisms for 
achieving procedural fairness and analyses administrative justice in terms of `trade- 
offs' between a number of competing conceptions of procedural fairness, is outlined 
and developed. Part 4 is empirical and refers to four studies that have been informed 
by this analytic framework. It outlines research on the impact of computerisation on 
social security in the UK, on decision -making in the Scottish prison system, on the 
assessment of special educational needs in England and Scotland, and on the 
computerisation of social security in 12 countries. Part 5 is classificatory. It 
distinguishes four key modes of legal scholarship, law in action, doctrinal or `black- 
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letter' law, legal, political and social philosophy, and socio -legal studies, and 
attempts to demonstrate that the approach advocated in the chapter exemplifies the 
socio -legal paradigm. 
PUBLICATIONS ON EDUCATION 
The papers reproduced as Chapter 3 -5 derive from an ESRC - funded programme of 
research on the socio -legal and policy implications of parental choice legislation in 
Scotland. The project itself was in five parts and covered the events that led up to 
parental choice legislation in England and Wales as well as Scotland in the early 
1980s; the implementation of the Scottish legislation by three Scottish local 
authorities; a survey of parents that was designed to ascertain their responses to the 
legislation and whether, and how, they took advantage of it; detailed studies of case 
level decision making and the operation of the appeals machinery; and fmally a study 
of the impact of the legislation on admissions to primary and secondary schools. The 
research was written up as a book8 and the main findings are summarised in each of 
the three papers. The first of these papers (reproduced as Chapter 3) is a Briefing 
prepared for and published by the National Commission on Education.9 Arguing that 
the Scottish legislation had not produced an optimal balance between the rights of 
parents to choose schools for their children and the duties of education authorities to 
promote the education of all children for whom they were responsible, the main 
concern of this paper was to outline an alternative approach to parental choice which 
takes choice seriously but seeks to avoid some of the more unacceptable 
consequences of recent legislation. This paper drew quite extensively on the second 
paper (reproduced as Chapter 4), in which the alternative approach was set out at 
greater length and defended against criticisms that had been levelled at it.10 Of 
particular importance to the arguments put forward in Part 3 of Chapter 2 are the 
proposals to involve teachers as well as parents in selecting schools for children. The 
third paper (reproduced as Chapter 5) provides some critical reflections on the 
programme of research, reviews subsequent policy developments, and considers how 
research could best respond to this." 
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The provisions of the Education (Scotland) Act 1981 were in many ways similar to 
those of the Education Act 1980. Thus, in Scotland as in England and Wales, parents 
were given the right to request that their children be admitted to a particular school; 
education authorities were expected to comply with parental requests unless a 
statutory exception to this general duty applied; dissatisfied parents were given the 
right of appeal to a specially- constituted educational appeal committee and, if the 
latter found in favour of the parents, its decision was to be binding on the authority; 
and education authorities were required to provide parents with information about 
their allocation procedure and the criteria for admitting children to over - subscribed 
schools, about the school to which their child had been allocated and about any other 
school on request. However, there were also some important differences between the 
two pieces of legislation. 
In three respects, the Scottish legislation gave parents stronger rights, and restricted 
the powers of authorities more than its English counterpart.12 First, while the 
statutory exceptions to the authorities' duty to comply were broad and general in 
England, they were much more specific in Scotland. In England, the primary 
exception, which applied when compliance with parents' requests would `prejudice 
the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources' 13, enabled an 
authority to justify a refusal by referring to conditions in schools other than the one 
requested by the parents or to conditions in their schools generally. By contrast, in 
Scotland, where the primary exceptions applied when compliance would entail either 
the employment by the authority of an additional teacher, or significant extensions or 
alterations to the school, or `be likely to be seriously detrimental to the order and 
discipline at the school or the educational well -being of the pupils there',14 the 
authority could only refer to conditions at the school requested by the parents. 
Second, whereas parents in Scotland could appeal against an adverse decision of an 
appeal committee to the sheriff,15 parents in England had no further right of appeal. 
This is particularly important, not only because it gave parents a second chance to 
appeal but also because it requires the authority to convince a judge that it has 
grounds to refuse the parent's request. Third, where an appeal is upheld in Scotland, 
the authority is required to review the cases of all parents in similar circumstances 
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who have not appealed and, if the decisions are unchanged, it has to grant the parents 
a further right of appeal.16 There is no comparable provision in the English 
legislation. However, in one other respect, not referred to in any of the papers, the 
English legislation gave parents stronger rights than they were given in Scotland. 
While the English legislation gave parents the right to state their reasons for 
requesting a particular school'', the Scottish legislation made no reference to the 
giving of reasons. As explained below, this difference is of considerable 
significance. 
In the book we wrote, we distinguished an authority -wide from a child- centred 
approach to school adrissions.18 Under the authority -wide approach, the main 
concern of the authority is to pursue its policy goals and the circumstances of an 
individual child are relatively unimportant. These may involve trying to ensure that 
each school contains a sufficient number of pupils to deliver the curriculum, that no 
school should contain so many pupils that its facilities and /or teaching staff are 
overburdened, and that the number and distribution of the pupils is commensurate 
with the efficient organisation of the school. In addition, many authorities have 
adopted neighbourhood school policies that seek to promote links between schools 
and the communities they serve and give priority in school admission to children 
who live in the school's catchment area, while some authorities try to ensure that 
each school contains a reasonably balanced academic and social pupil mix. 
In contrast, the main concern in a child centred -approach is with the matching of 
individual children to particular schools, while the pursuit of collective policy goals 
is correspondingly less important. This matching of individual children to particular 
schools can be achieved in one of two ways. In selective school systems, experts 
assess the child's ability and aptitude and then match the child to the school that can 
offer the most appropriate course of education. Alternatively, in non - selective school 
systems, parents can be given the opportunity for deciding which school their child 
should attend. Both approaches assume that schools are different in significant ways 
and that one school may be more suitable for a given child than another.19 They 
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differ in terms of who (an expert or the parent of the child) is best placed to identify 
the child's needs. 
Each of the two approaches to school admissions described above reflects a more 
general orientation to policy implementation. Thus, the authority -wide approach 
reflects a collective -welfare orientation (which focuses on the achievement of 
collective ends, is primarily concerned with the overall pattern of decision -making, 
develops rules and procedures to achieve the programme's ends, and recognises the 
necessity for trade -offs between the various ends the policy is trying to achieve) 
while the child- centred approach reflects an individual -client orientation (which 
focuses on each individual case, respects individual autonomy and assumes that 
individuals are capable of deciding and acting for themselves, allows individuals to 
challenge unfavourable decisions and precludes the possibility of trade -offs). 
The two approaches to school admissions (and likewise the two general orientations 
to policy implementation) are ideal types and, as such, are not exemplified by any 
one authority. However, because they are always present to some degree, they help 
to explain the nature of decision -making in all authorities. They can, in fact, be 
mapped on to the first three models of administrative justice outlined in Part 3 of 
Chapter 2 above. Thus, the authority -wide approach to school admissions (which 
enables education authorities to prevent overcrowding and under- enrolment, deploy 
resources in an efficient manner and pursue their own conception of social justice) 
maps onto the bureaucratic model, the first variant of the child- centred approach (in 
which professional assessments of ability and aptitude are all -important) maps onto 
the professional model, while the second variant of the child- centred approach (in 
which parents decide what is best for their children and priority is given to their 
concerns) maps onto the legal model. Under the selective system of secondary 
school admissions that was in the ascendancy until the mid 1960s, the bureaucratic 
and professional models were in the ascendancy and the legal model was not much in 
evidence. Following the reorganisation of secondary education along comprehensive 
lines, the importance of the professional model declined while that of the legal model 
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gained in importance. However, the influence of the bureaucratic model remained 
strong. 
The research demonstrated that, in all three authorities, the administration of school 
admissions was not greatly affected by the 1981 Act. Each of them continued to use 
the procedures for admissions that they had used before the legislation took effect. 
Parents were notified of their child's allocation to their `district school' and given an 
opportunity to request a non -district school. Most parents accepted the allocation to 
their `district school'20 and, for those parents who requested a place at a non -district 
school, most of their requests were granted. 
The two changes introduced by the 1981 Act involved the standards used by 
authorities to decide parents' placing requests and the availability of appeals to the 
appeal committee and the sheriff. As a result of the legislation, the circumstances in 
which authorities could refuse requests were very limited. This produced a 
substantial decrease in the number of refusals in one authority and stimulated the 
number of request made by parents in all three authorities. Thus, the 1981 Act 
clearly strengthened the ability of parents to obtain a place for their child at a non- 
district school. As a result of the legislation, they could also challenge a decision by 
the authority to refuse their request. However, because the authorities granted most 
requests and because the appeal committees were generally supportive of the 
authorities' generally very limited attempts to impose admission limits on over- 
subscribed schools, appeal committees did not play a significant role in school 
admissions. Appeals to the sheriff played an even more limited role because they 
tended to be supportive of the authority and, where this was not the case, e.g. in some 
other authorities, the authority would routinely concede the case before the hearing 
began.21 However, it is likely that the existence of the right of appeal to an appeal 
committee and, from there, to the sheriff has discouraged authorities from construing 
the statutory grounds of refusal too broadly or ignoring parents rights in determining 
school admissions. 
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The evidence from our research suggests that appeal committees did not require 
authorities to justify their admission limits in response to challenges by parents and 
either assumed that the limit was justified or that a few extra children could be 
admitted in excess of that limit. Sheriffs, on the other hand, usually ignored the 
authorities' arguments for admission limits and instead required them to show how 
the admission of one more child would cause serious detriment to education at the 
school concerned.22 Thus, neither appeal committees nor sheriffs provided an 
effective review of the authority's decision to impose an admission limit. The 
evidence from our research also suggests that appeal committees were very poor at 
balancing the concerns of individual parents against those of the authority. This was, 
in part, due to the fact that, unlike the English legislation, the Scottish legislation did 
not give parents the right to state their reasons and, in these circumstances, 
authorities formulated policies for admitting children to over - subscribed schools in 
terms of `objective' criteria, e.g. having a sibling at the school in question or the 
distance from home to school. Authorities believed that objective criteria were less 
open to manipulation and that they were fairer than subjective criteria because the 
latter inevitably put some parents at an advantage over others. However, one 
consequence of this was that the process of allocating children to schools took very 
little account of individual circumstances. Thus, in spite of granting rights of school 
choice to parents, the legal model of administrative justice was little in evidence and 
the bureaucratic model remained very dominant. This was very frustrating for those 
parents who wished their child to attend an over - subscribed school because they 
liked some aspect of the school or thought that their child would do better there since 
the admissions and appeals procedures took little account of such considerations. 
The papers reproduced as Chapters 4 and 5 outline an attempt to achieve a better 
balance between the interests of those concerned. One way of doing so would be to 
tilt the balance in favour of parents by strengthening their rights, e.g. to state their 
reasons and have these taken into account. However, our research indicated that, in 
choosing schools for their children, parents were influenced more by geographical 
and social factors, i.e. by the location of the school and the social backgrounds of the 
pupils at the school, than by educational considerations, e.g. by the curriculum, 
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teaching methods or (even) examination results, and that they relied on rather limited 
and second -hand information about the reputations of the schools concerned. Thus, 
simply strengthening parents' rights could lead to increased social segregation and, 
in this and other ways, could well be contrary to public policy. 
An alternative approach starts from the premise that more thought needs to be given 
to the interests that the right of school choice is trying to protect. At present, the 
legislation seeks only to protect parents' interests in choice. However, because 
parents act as agents of their children but are not all equally effective in this regard, it 
is important to consider children's interests directly. As schools already differ in 
many ways, and would differ even more if the proposals set out below (and more 
fully in Chapters 3 and 4) were enacted, this would entail efforts to ensure that 
children attend those schools that are best suited to their particular personalities and 
talents. Teachers and parents will often have different views as to what these are: it 
is therefore important to find some means of involving them both in decision - 
making. If all schools were required to produce genuinely informative prospectuses; 
if parents and pupils were encouraged to visit all the schools concerned (rather than 
discouraged as is often the case at present); and if discussions were to take place 
between teachers, parents and, in the case of older pupils, the pupils themselves, this 
would enable teachers, parents and pupils to examine each other's reasoning, to 
decide what the child's interests were and how they could best be furthered. 
The four main components of an alternative approach to education policy which 
takes choice seriously but seeks to achieve a better balance between the interests of 
education authorities, teachers, parents and pupils are as follows: 
Over and above the common core curriculum, schools would be encouraged 
to develop particular curricular strengths, for example in music, the arts, 
sports, modern languages or technology, and to advance their own particular 
teaching styles, institutional ethos and extra - curricular activities. Although 
schools already differ in all these respects, they would be encouraged to be 
more explicit about these differences than they are at present. 
10 
 In order to ensure the widest possible access to a range of schools with 
different characteristics, all barriers to school admissions, in particular school 
catchment areas, would be abandoned. No child would be allocated to a 
school simply on the basis of where they lived and active consideration 
would be given to identifying the most appropriate school for every child, not 
just for a minority of children as is currently the case. 
Decisions about school allocation should seek to promote children's interests 
(rather than parental preferences) and would involve teachers and older pupils 
as well as parents. Where the number of applicants for a school is greater 
than the number of available places, priority would be given to those whose 
cases are most strongly supported. 
Local authorities would be expected to formulate admissions policies for 
schools. These would include admission limits on `popular' schools, which 
would provide a measure of protection for `vulnerable' schools that would 
otherwise experience difficulty in delivering the curriculum. 
The approach outlined above has some features in common but differs in a number 
of important ways from the proposals for school reform in England that have recently 
been outlined by the government.23 Under these proposals, 50 per cent of English 
secondary schools would become specialist schools and would be able to select up to 
10 per cent of their pupils according to aptitude. They have aroused a great deal of 
criticism24 on the grounds that they would be very divisive - the specialist schools 
would qualify for extra funding and would undoubtedly be regarded as superior in 
status - and because the allocation procedures would be very unfair - since most 
pupils would be admitted to a specialist schools on the basis of residence or parental 
choice while other pupils, who might benefit more from such a school, might not be 
admitted or might not apply. 
The proposals outlined here would suffer from neither of these defects. In addition, 
they would ensure a better balance between the bureaucratic, professional and legal 
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models of administrative justice, and between the different interests of education 
authorities, teachers, parents and pupils. Education authorities would be responsible 
for ensuring an appropriate degree of diversity among their schools, for setting intake 
limits on some schools to ensure that intakes to all schools were viable, and for 
formulating policies relating to the gender, class or ethnic composition of schools. 
Attention would be given to the needs and circumstances of every child. However, 
parents would no longer be the sole arbiters of their children's interests and teachers 
would, once again, have a role to play in this assessment. This is very important and 
would go some way towards ensuring that children's interests are safeguarded. If 
parents and teachers are unable to agree on what school would be best for the child, 
the parent's view might still prevail although, in the event of the school being over- 
subscribed, less weight would be attached to it. 
The paper reproduced as Chapter 5 was published in 1997, 10 years after programme 
of research on parental choice was completed. It subjects this research to some 
criticisms -in particular for its parochialism and its failure to adopt a comparative 
perspective - and then reviews policy developments in Scotland and England since 
that time, describes the then current policy agenda and indicates how further research 
might respond to this. It concludes that the key policy issue to which research should 
now be addressed is the relationship between choice and diversity and argues that 
this should be studied comparatively across a number of different educational 
systems through research which seeks to investigate the implications of each for the 
other and for other societal values. The change of government in May 1997 did not 
lead to any major reversals in education policy in England but devolution has 
resulted in a growing divergence between education policies north and south of the 
border. In light of this, the conclusions in this paper still stand. 
PUBLICATIONS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 
The origins of many of the papers that are reproduced as Chapters 6 -10 can be traced 
back to the Richard Titmuss Memorial Lecture, which I delivered at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem in November 1996.25 The first of these papers (reproduced 
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as Chapter 6) is based on that lecture.26 It gives an account of Richard Titmuss' 
attempt to analyse the relationship between rights and discretion in social security in 
a celebrated and controversial paper published in 1971.27 It then develops an 
alternative approach, which distinguishes bureaucratic rules from claimants' rights 
and suggests that the problem that needs to be solved is one of achieving a balance 
between rules, discretion and rights. This balance reflects the view, outlined in Part 
3 of Chapter 2, that the achievement of administrative justice involves finding a 
proper balance between normative conceptions of decision making based on 
bureaucracy (in the case of rules), professionalism (in the case of discretion) and 
legality (in the case of rights). This approach is then used to examine the shifting 
balance between these three principles in the social security system over the 25 -year 
period since the publication of Titmuss' article, and to criticise proposals to reform 
the system of adjudication which the Government had set out in a recently -published 
consultation paper.28 These proposals would, inter alia, have strengthened 
bureaucratic control over first -tier decision -makers and restricted claimants' rights of 
appeal to a tribunal. 
This paper is followed by two shorter ones. The second paper (reproduced as 
Chapter 7)29 examines the Government's proposals against the background of the 
Department of Social Security's `Change Programme', which aimed to cut 
administrative costs by 25 per cent over a three -year period. It concludes that, since 
the government's own estimate of the savings resulting from the implementation of 
its proposals was a paltry £50 million per annum `over the longer period' and since 
this would have been a small price to pay for maintaining the existing levels of 
procedural protection enjoyed by recipients of social security, which were one of the 
few compensations for the steady decline in benefit levels, the measures proposed 
could neither be explained nor justified in terms of their contribution to 
administrative savings. The third paper (reproduced as Chapter 8)3° seeks to explain 
the Labour Government's decision to end the long tradition of lay membership of 
appeal tribunals in social security.31 This was an entirely different outcome to the 
one envisaged by the previous (Conservative) Government, which had proposed to 
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remove the legally qualified chairmen,32 and the paper seeks both to explain how this 
policy U -turn came about and to consider the wider implications of this change. 
The fourth paper (reproduced as Chapter 9)33 examines the relationship between 
substantive justice and procedural fairness in social security. After considering 
whether this is a theoretical or an empirical issue, and concluding that it is an 
empirical matter, it analyses developments in the UK social security system since 
1979.34 It reviews empirical evidence relating to developments in substantive justice, 
focusing on changes in the extent of poverty and in patterns of inequality over the 
period, and concludes that there was a fairly consistent trend towards increased 
poverty and greater inequality between 1979 and 1992.35 It then provides a critical 
assessment of developments in procedural fairness over the same period. It focuses 
on the 1980 reforms (under which the model of adjudication that had formerly been 
used in national insurance and related benefits was extended to cover supplementary 
benefit, and a single system of adjudication applied across the board); the 1986 
reforms (under which supplementary benefit was replaced by a simplified income 
support scheme and a cash -limited, discretionary social fund with its own pattern of 
adjudication, and a dual system of adjudication re- emerged); and the recent reforms 
to the system of adjudication outlined above. Finally, it explores the implications of 
these changes in substantive justice and procedural fairness for the citizenship of 
those who depend on social security. It concludes that reductions in the level of 
social security benefits relative to average incomes and in the extent of procedural 
protection afforded to those who were dependent on social security had doubly 
disadvantaged them. The former not only weakened their social rights but also had a 
knock -on effect on their civil and political rights, making it considerably harder for 
them to participate in the life of society as full citizens; while the latter not only 
curtailed their civil rights still further but also had a knock -on effect on their social 
rights, making them less secure than they would previously have been. 
Although Chapter 9 examines the relationship between substantive justice and 
procedural fairness in social security, it does not employ a discourse matrix 
analogous to the one that Brian Longhurst and I developed in our study of day -to -day 
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administrative decision -making in the Scottish prison system (this is outlined in Parts 
3 and 4 of Chapter 2 below). This discourse matrix combined the discourses of 
substantive justice (or `ends discourses') with the discourses of procedural fairness 
(or `means discourses') that existed in the Scottish prison system at the time. 
Applying this approach to social security, I noted in my Inaugural Lecture36 that the 
dominant conceptions of substantive justice in social security, were associated with 
employment, social insurance and social assistance - the first being exemplified in 
various `welfare to work measures', the second with contributory benefits and the 
third with means- tested benefits paid for out of taxation - and that the dominant 
conceptions of procedural fairness were associated with bureaucracy, 
professionalism and legality.37 I argued that each of these conceptions was 
associated with a distinctive form of discourse and that the two sets of discourses 
could be combined. I also noted that the individuals, groups and institutions 
associated with each of the cells in the matrix (numbered 1 -9 in Table 1 below) 
could, in principle, be identified. Unfortunately, I had not carried out any systematic 
research and was not in a position to do this. 
Table 1: Discourse Matrix for Social Security 
Employment Social Insurance Social Assistance 
Bureaucracy 1 2 3 
Professionalism 4 5 6 
Legality 7 8 9 
However, by relying on material in the public domain, I was able to associate rows 
ands columns in the matrix with key players. In the case of substantive justice, 
which embraces the broad aims of social security, I noted that a tremendous power 
struggle was taking place between Frank Field and Gordon Brown. Frank Field had 
been appointed Minister of State for Welfare Reform after the 1997 General Election 
and given general responsibility for outlining a radical reform of the social security 
system. His enthusiasm for social insurance, on the grounds that it encourages 
savings and thrift, and his opposition to means testing were both well known. On the 
other hand, Gordon Brown, Labour's powerful Chancellor of the Exchequer, was not 
only the driving force behind `welfare to work measures' but was also committed to 
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system. His enthusiasm for social insurance, on the grounds that it encourages 
savings and thrift, and his opposition to means testing were both well known. On the 
other hand, Gordon Brown, Labour's powerful Chancellor of the Exchequer, was not 
only the driving force behind `welfare to work measures' but was also committed to 
`targeting' resources on those with greatest needs. This did not make him into an 
enthusiast for means testing in the same way as his Conservative predecessor (Peter 
Lilley) - he has, for example, introduced a series of tax credits to provide in -work 
benefits to those in employment - although he is not as implacably opposed to 
means -tests as Frank Field.38 
When Frank Field's Green Paper39 was published in March 1998, it was generally 
regarded as a disappointment. In `thinking the unthinkable', he does not appear to 
have been able to secure the support of other powerful interests, not least Gordon 
Brown and the Treasury. A few months later, Frank Field resigned. According to 
Will Hutton,40 the power struggle between Frank Field and Gordon Brown involved 
a clash between two alternative visions for the future of social security, between `a 
social democratic model', based on universal benefits and social insurance, with a 
government committed to managing the economy to ensure that there is work for 
everyone and people able to do it, and `a neo- conservative model', based on means - 
tested benefits, paid out of general tax revenues, and a government committed to low 
levels of taxation. Although this characterisation is correct up to a point, it ignores 
Gordon Brown's (and the Government's) primary and over -riding commitment to 
employment as the best means of providing social security, at least for those who are 
capable of work. However, the important points to note are that this power struggle 
was decisively won by Gordon Brown and that his vision of social security has come 
to be the dominant one. He even managed to ensure that Harriet Harman's successor 
as Secretary of State41 was none other than his own Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 
Alistair Darling. 
In the case of procedural fairness, which deals with how social security should be 
administered, I identified the powerful supporters of the three normative models of 
decision making that were in play: the Benefits Agency supported bureaucracy, the 
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supported professionalism and became an increasingly important `player' as Welfare 
to Work programmes were developed. Any conflict that might have been expected 
to emerge between these various institutional actors was muted, first, by introducing 
greater controls over the Independent Tribunal Service (which was renamed the 
Appeals Service) and abolishing the Central Adjudication Service; and, second, by 
joining the Employment Service, which ran Jobcentres, with those parts of the 
Benefits Agency that dealt with people of working age, in a new organisation known 
as `Jobcentre Plus', which is accountable to Alistair Darling (who became Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions) in the second Labour Government. In a 
development which is highly reminiscent of earlier developments in the Scottish 
Prison Service, the fusion of professionalism (in this case associated with the former 
Employment Service) and bureaucracy (in this case associated with the old Benefits 
Agency) is likely to strengthen a new form of managerialism which will be 
associated with `Jobcentre Plus'. The combination of a dominant form of substantive 
justice (work for those who can, increasingly means- tested benefits for the rest) with 
a dominant form of procedural fairness ( managerialism) reflects the surprising (and 
no doubt temporary) absence of serious debate about the future of social security in 
the four years since Frank Field's resignation in 1998. 
The analysis that has been sketched here is not intended as a definitive exploration of 
recent developments in social security policy but is, rather, intended to illustrate the 
ways in which the approach to analysing procedural fairness and substantive justice 
which is outlined in Chapter 2 can be applied to analysing the development of policy. 
The final paper (reproduced as Chapter 10)42 was written for a conference to mark 
the 70t birthday of a very distinguished Hungarian sociologist of social policy, 
Professor Zsuzsa Ferge, and seeks to make a connection between her analysis of 
different normative models of what social protection schemes aim to achieve and my 
analysis of the different normative models of how they should be run. In a recent 
paper,43 Zsuzsa Ferge distinguishes between four patterns of access to resources - 
charity, reciprocity, redistribution and the market. In each case, she describes the 
relationship between the giver and the receiver, and then compares different forms of 
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social protection in terms of these principles. She argues that `messy contracts' 
based on a plurality of principles, are always preferable to `pure contracts' based on a 
single principle because `they can serve complex social purposes' and `incorporate 
opposed interests'. On these grounds, she extols the virtues of social insurance in 
general and public, earnings- related, pay -as- you -go schemes in particular and asserts 
their superiority over forms of social protection based on a single principle, e.g. 
social assistance (based on charity), mutual aid (based on reciprocity) and private 
insurance (based on market principles). This approach has much in common with 
my analysis of competing, nonnative models of administrative justice and the trade- 
offs that are made between them; and my preference for administrative procedures 
which attempt to achieve a balance between a plurality of these models and the 
principles they embody, rather than those which reflect a single, dominant model, 
with the result that the principles which are associated with it are not effectively 
challenged by any others. 
AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
It is my contention that the body of work, which is summarised in Part 4 of Chapter 2 
and reproduced in Chapters 3 -10, constitutes `a coherent body of work [which] 
contributes significantly to the expansion of knowledge'.44 Although my research 
has focused on a small number of policy areas, the approach it has sought to develop 
and the understanding of behaviour it reflects are both of wide general application. 
Central to this approach has been the idea that that there are a number of competing 
conceptions of procedural fairness and that each of them is associated with a 
different model of administrative justice. The characteristics of procedural fairness 
encountered in a given context reflect `trade -offs' that are made between individuals 
and groups who seek to promote these different models of administrative justice. 
Since each of these models is indeed `coherent and attractive', it follows that, other 
things being equal, the procedural fairness which results from balancing a plurality of 
models of administrative justice is usually preferable to that which results from one 
dominant model of administrative justice which is not effectively challenged by any 
others. 
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I have attempted in my research to develop and apply a socio -legal approach to the 
analysis of procedural fairness and administrative justice. This means that, in 
contrast to more conventional legal approaches, it has employed concepts and 
categories derived from the social sciences; it has focused on routine, first- instance 
decision -makers rather than on the leading cases that are decided by courts and 
tribunals; and has been informed by philosophical analysis. It has utilised 
theoretically -informed empirical research to address a range of normative as well as 
positive questions. Thus, it has not only attempted to explain why administrative 
justice is as it is but also how it could be different. It has tried to integrate an 
understanding of structure with an understanding of agency by adopting (and 
developing) a model of behaviour in which individuals and groups are seen to further 
their particular conceptions of the principles that guide their behaviour. The struggle 
for control between these individuals and groups does not take place in a vacuum but 
is constrained by a set of contextual factors which structure power relations and 
shape the outcome of power struggles. It has, in my view, thrown light on a set of 
problems that are concerned with what it means for the organisations of the welfare 
state to treat people fairly, which have not hitherto been given the attention they 
deserve. However, how successful it has been is, ultimately, for others to judge. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A SOCIO -LEGAL APPROACH TO PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
INTRODUCTION 
The aims of this chapter are, first, to demonstrate that procedural fairness is an 
important component of overall justice and that what lies at the heart of justice, 
namely that `everyone should receive what is due to them', applies just as much to 
procedures as to outcomes. In support of this claim, reference is made to research, 
which shows that people attach importance to procedural fairness whether or not the 
procedures work to their advantage and independently of their assessment of the 
justice of the outcome. The second aim is to apply this distinction to administrative 
justice and to demonstrate the need for procedures that are put into place internally in 
addition to external forms of accountability. This involves outlining and developing 
an approach to procedural fairness, which sees it in terms of the `trade -offs' between 
a number of competing conceptions of administrative justice. This approach has 
informed a number of empirical studies I have undertaken and the third aim of the 
chapter is to illustrate its power by outlining four studies that have examined the 
fairness of administrative procedures. 
PART 1: THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE 
The Meaning of Justice 
According to David Miller, `the subject matter of justice is the manner in which 
benefits and burdens are distributed among men [and women] whose qualities can be 
investigated' 1 and `the just state of affairs is one in which each individual has exactly 
those benefits and burdens which are due to him by virtue of his [or her] personal 
characteristics and circumstances'.2 Although there is much argument about the 
scope of justice claims and the priority that should be given to them, justice is widely 
recognised as a principle of wide application and considerable importance. Some 
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scholars contend that it is all- important. John Rawls, in particular, asserts that it is the 
primary criterion by which the basic structure of society should be judged, `the first 
virtue of social institutions, just as truth is of systems of thought' .3 
Rawls distinguishes between the concept of justice, which refers to `a proper balance 
between competing claims', and competing conceptions of justice, each of which 
expresses a different set of `principles for identifying those considerations which 
determine this balance'.4 The coexistence of a single concept and several competing 
conceptions suggests that justice is, like many other important social and political 
ideals, essentially contested.5 As such, it can be defined in a fairly uncontroversial 
way (in this case as `a proper balance between competing claims') but the terms in 
which it is defined (i.e. what constitutes `a proper balance' and even what are to count 
as `claims') are the subject of considerable disagreement. These disagreements are 
not random but are associated with differences in personality, gender, class, culture 
and ideology, and vary across time and space. 
Legal Justice and Social Justice 
It has become commonplace to distinguish between different subdivisions of justice in 
terms of their fields of application. Thus, Honoré points out that, while restorative 
justice is concerned with compensation for harm or injury (in civil matters), punitive 
justice is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing (in criminal matters).6 
Together they comprise legal justice, which is a major concern of the legal system, 
i.e. of litigation and the courts. Social justice, on the other hand, is concerned with 
the distribution of benefits and burdens among individuals and groups in society. As 
such, social justice is the subject matter of social, economic and fiscal policy, which 
are concerned with the distribution of `primary goods' such as income, wealth, health 
and education. It is a major concern of government, in particular of those government 
departments that are responsible for taxation and programmes of public expenditure. 
Other institutions in civil society, such as private and non -profit organisations, are 
also concerned with social justice but are not dealt with here. 
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Two caveats need to be made at this point: 
Because punishments have been included in the domain of legal justice, the 
burdens which are included here refer to disadvantages other than 
punishments, e.g. to the taxes that are needed to finance the public provision 
of benefits and services. 
Although social justice usually refers to the allocation of material benefits and 
burdens, the `primary goods' with which it is concerned also include intangible 
(non -material) resources, e.g. consideration and respect. 
Although social justice can be distinguished from legal justice, some of the same 
moral considerations apply to them both. Likewise, although legal justice is obviously 
bound up with the legal system, it is important to recognise that this is also true of 
social justice - legal justice and social justice are merely concerned with different 
aspects or areas of law. 
Procedural Fairness and Substantive Justice 
A distinction can also be made between procedural fairness, which is synonymous 
with procedural justice, and is concerned with `process', and substantive justice, 
which is concerned with `outcomes'.' Procedural fairness focuses on how individuals 
are treated while substantive justice focuses on what they end up with. Both the sub- 
divisions referred to above, i.e. legal justice and social justice, have procedural and 
substantive dimensions. In the case of legal justice, procedural fairness includes 
the rules of evidence and procedure which govern proceedings in the criminal 
and civil courts, while substantive justice refers to the outcomes of criminal and 
civil actions; in the case of social justice, procedural fairness includes the 
administrative rules which govern decision making by government departments 
and other official bodies while substantive justice refers to allocation of benefits, 
the delivery of services, the award of licenses and so on. 
It is, of course, possible to take issue with the distinction made above on the grounds 
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that treating people fairly should itself be regarded as an outcome of the decision - 
making process.8 However, if it is an outcome, it is clearly a different kind of 
outcome from those outcomes that the procedures are established to achieve. If the 
latter are referred to as primary outcomes, the former may be referred to as a 
secondary outcome. The primary outcome of criminal procedures in the courts is to 
determine guilt and court procedures can be judged by how effectively they do so, i.e. 
by the proportion of guilty people who are acquitted and the proportion of innocent 
people who are convicted. Likewise the primary outcome of administrative 
procedures is to regulate activities, impose obligations and confer entitlements, and 
they may likewise be judged by the proportion of false negatives and false positives 
they produce. Criminal courts and administrative agencies should both aim to treat 
people fairly but that is not their primary purpose. Thus, even if treating people fairly 
is regarded as an outcome, a distinction must be made between the justice of the 
outcomes that the procedures are intended to deliver and the fairness of the ways in 
which the procedures deal with people. 
The idea of procedural fairness suggests that a concern with `ensuring that everyone 
receives their due' can be applied to procedures and that a procedurally just state of 
affairs is one in which individuals are treated in a manner that reflects what is due to 
them in terms of their personal characteristics and circumstances. 
There have been various attempts to specify the requirements of procedural fairness. 
Thus, in legal justice, reference is made to a fair trial (in the case of criminal 
prosecutions) and to fair proceedings (in civil matters). In a criminal prosecution, the 
procedural requirements reflect the rights and duties of the accused and the state. 
What these ought to be are matters of ongoing debate but there is wide agreement 
that accused persons should be entitled to know the case against them, to be legally 
represented, to plead not guilty and, if they do so, to be treated as innocent until 
proven guilty. The evidence against them must stand up and the case for the 
prosecution must be established `beyond reasonable doubt'. Similarly, in a civil 
action, where the outcome is decided `on the balance of probabilities', there are 
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procedural requirements which reflect the rights and duties of the parties in dispute, 
and these are likewise matters of ongoing debate. 
Procedural considerations are also an important component of social justice and how 
administrative agencies should treat individuals is not a settled matter. However, 
there would appear to be a fair measure of agreement that, in applying policies to 
individuals, like cases should be dealt with alike, policies should not be applied 
retrospectively (unless it is to the advantage of the individuals concerned to do so), 
people should be shown respect, their circumstances should be investigated 
thoroughly, and their claims should be decided impartially and expeditiously 
irrespective of the outcome. 
The Relationship between Procedural Fairness and Substantive Justice. 
There are basically two approaches to understanding the relationship between 
procedural fairness and substantive justice. The first approach, which is clearly an 
instrumental one, asserts that fair procedures can be identified in terms of their 
contribution to the outcome of the decision. Thus fair procedures are those which 
lead to correct, and in that sense, just decisions. The second, non -instrumental 
approach asserts that fair procedures are important for their own sake, because they 
reflect and protect beliefs about how people should be treated, whether or not they 
result in just outcomes.9 
Procedural fairness is instrumental to substantive justice 
The first approach emphasises the link between process and outcome. Thus, 
assuming it is possible to identify a `correct' outcome, a given procedure is justified to 
the extent that it results in such an outcome. However, as Genevra Richardson points 
out, there are a number of problems with this approach.10 First, there may be no 
uniquely correct outcome - while the facts may be agreed, the precise implications of 
law or policy in relation to them may be hotly contested. Second, even if there is a 
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uniquely correct outcome, it may be very difficult to specify those procedures that are 
most likely to deliver it. Third, procedures are not free and, if efficiency is taken into 
account, the optimum level of procedural protection will be that which minimises both 
the costs of the procedure (direct costs) and the costs of reaching an incorrect 
decision (error costs). While the identification of direct costs may be relatively 
straightforward (since it involves identifiable items like the salaries paid to those 
involved and associated overhead costs), the calculation of error costs (the cost to the 
individual of a wrongful prosecution, of failure in an action where they had a 
legitimate claim or of wrongly denying someone what they are entitled to) can be 
exceedingly difficult. This problem will be revisited later in the chapter. 
Substantive rights call for procedural protection 
Ronald Dworkin introduces another element into the calculation of error costs." 
Using the criminal law as an example, he distinguishes between two types of harm, 
bare harm and moral harm. The innocent suspect who is mistakenly convicted and 
punished suffers bare harm in being sent to prison. In addition, he or she suffers 
moral harm in being wrongly deprived of the right not to be punished when innocent. 
These additional moral costs stem from the infringement of a right and, according to 
Dworkin, justify greater expenditure on procedures designed to avoid wrongful 
convictions than on procedures designed to avoid wrongful acquittals. For Dworkin, 
having a substantive right triggers a secondary right to procedural protection. This 
does not only apply in relation to the criminal law but applies equally in relation to 
civil law12 and, by extension, to administrative law. Although the distinction which 
Dworkin makes enhances the attractiveness of the instrumental approach, the 
downside is that, where there are no substantive rights, it would seem to follow from 
his argument that individuals have no enforceable claim to any specific form of 
procedural protection, and that procedural fairness is essentially a matter of policy. 
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Perfect, imperfect and pure forms of procedural justice 
In dealing with the relationship between procedural fairness and substantive justice, 
Rawls makes a distinction between perfect, imperfect and pure forms of procedural 
justice.13 
Perfect procedural justice has two characteristic features. First there is an 
independent criterion for determining what a fair division is and, second, it is 
possible to devise a procedure that is certain to have this result. 
Imperfect procedural justice has only the first of these features. While there is 
an independent criterion for determining what the outcome should be, there is 
no way of specifying a procedure which will always produce this result. 
However, some procedures may be regarded as more likely than others to 
produce the right outcomes in the majority of cases. 
Pure procedural justice has neither of these features. There is no independent 
criterion for determining the right outcome: instead there is a correct or fair 
procedure such that the outcome of applying it, whatever that may be, should 
be regarded as correct or fair provided that the procedure has been properly 
followed. In this kind of procedural justice, the justice of any outcome is 
founded on the fairness of the institutional arrangements from which it arises. 
Since procedures which always lead to just outcomes can rarely, if ever, be devised, 
perfect procedural justice has little practical relevance. Imperfect procedural justice is 
exemplified by existing criminal, civil and administrative procedures, although there 
will always be arguments about whether or not they actually minimise the number of 
false positives and false negatives and thereby facilitate the attainment of correct 
outcomes.14 Pure procedural justice is exemplified by a lottery or a `free market', 
although Rawls, in developing his contractual theory of justice - based on the 
principles of justice people would choose if they chose them `under a veil of 
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ignorance', i.e. ignoring everything they already know about themselves and the 
society in which they happen to live, - argues, in effect, that just outcomes will result 
from the adoption of fair procedures.15 
Procedures are primarily instrumental but also reflect authoritative standards 
According to Galligan, procedures are purposive and the first and primary concern of 
procedures is to lead to desired outcomes. However, a second concern is to ensure 
that what he calls `contextual values' are respected. While one sense of fairness 
consists in achieving the outcomes required by law, a second sense of fairness is 
linked to these other values and is satisfied when they are respected.16 Within 
different legal procedures (Galligan lists dealing with a matter according to legal 
standards, deciding as an official thinks best, reaching agreement between the parties, 
investigating a situation and reporting on the results, and adopting a framework based 
on participation where no precise standards are laid down in advance), Galligan claims 
that there are authoritative standards based on tiers of values which constitute the 
standards of fair treatment, so that a person treated in accordance with them is treated 
fairly and the procedures are fair to the degree that they have this result.17 The first 
tier consists of the standards of the particular area of criminal law, civil law or 
administrative law, which dictate the basic legal objectives that apply in the case in 
question and are directed towards achieving particular outcomes. The second tier 
comprises standards from cognate sources, e.g. the common law, neighbouring 
statutes or policy imperatives, which qualify, modify or augment the first tier of 
outcome -based standards. The third tier is even more general and draws on social 
principles, which include but go beyond legal principles. Some standards have an 
impact on outcomes, directly or indirectly, others place constraints on the course of 
action that leads to outcomes, while a few may be entirely independent of outcomes.'$ 
Procedures are thus contingent on serving some end, purpose or value and are 
therefore neither intrinsically fair nor intrinsically unfair. 
Procedures reflect values which are independent of outcomes 
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The claim is often made that the need to provide procedural fairness springs from the 
obligation to respect a person's dignity and autonomy as a human being.19 However, 
Bayles argues that process values are not derived solely from the dignity and 
autonomy of individuals but are what `rational persons would accept for use in a 
society in which they expected to live'.20 Examples of such values are participation, 
equal treatment, intelligibility, timeliness and confidence in the decision - making 
process. Although some of the procedures which give effect to these values may 
promote accuracy, Bayles argues that they should be assessed independently of such 
effects. It follows that procedures should not be evaluated solely in terms of the 
extent to which they minimise the sum of direct costs plus error costs (arising from 
false positives and false negatives) but should also take into account process benefits, 
i.e. the positive benefits which follow from giving effect to process values.21 He also 
argues that procedural principles are not relevant across the board and that their 
appropriateness depends on the characteristics of the decision -making process in 
question. He distinguishes between adversary adjudication, bureaucratic 
investigation, directorship, professional service and negotiation, specifies when each is 
appropriate, and identifies which principles of procedural justice apply in each case.22 
Although there is much to commend in Bayles' approach, not least his acceptance of 
the relative autonomy of procedural values and his contention that principles derived 
from adversarial proceedings in front of the courts may not be appropriate in all 
contexts, there are clearly problems with it. It is not clear, in the same way as it is not 
clear with Rawls' account of the `original position', why rational people would all 
choose the same set of principles. And, even if they did, it is not clear that they would 
order them in the same way. Bayles does not deal with the issue of ordering and this 
is a major shortcoming since many of the principles are competitive, i.e. the more you 
have of one, the less you can have of another. This can be illustrated by means of an 
example. The greater the emphasis on participation, the harder it will be to reach 
decisions timeously; on the other hand, the greater the emphasis on timeousness, the 
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less likely that individuals will be able to participate fully in the decision -making 
process. The principles of procedural justice not only compete with each other but 
have a price tag attached to them, which means that they compete with other 
principles such as efficiency. Unfortunately Bayles does not consider such issues. 
Although it can be argued that considering a principle like efficiency involves 
appealing to a concept unrelated to justice, it is clearly unrealistic to ignore the issue 
of costs. Allocating additional resources to the decision- making process can be 
expected to enhance the probability of achieving a correct outcome but no society can 
be expected to devote all its resources to enhancing its decision -making procedures. 
Trade -offs are required. 
Conclusions 
It has been argued in this section that procedural considerations apply to social justice 
in the same way as they apply to legal justice. The relationship between process and 
outcome, i.e. between procedural fairness and substantive justice has been examined, 
and a number of different positions identified. Some of the problems associated with 
a purely instrumental view of procedures were identified and Dworkin's view that 
substantive rights call for procedural protection considered. Although it constitutes 
an important advance, I do not think it goes far enough Two non -instrumental views 
were then considered: Galligan's view that, although the primary function of 
procedures is to lead to desired outcomes, a secondary function is to reflect 
`authoritative standards based on tiers of values' which include but go beyond legal 
principles, and Bayles' view that process values, which are independent of outcomes, 
and are what `rational persons would accept for use in a society in which they 
expected to live' provide the basis for evaluating procedures. Although there are 
differences in emphasis between these two views, they both recognise that, although 
procedural fairness can contribute to substantive justice, it does not only have 
instrumental value but can be justified in its own terms. Moreover, they both 
recognise that a uniform set of procedural principles does not apply across the board 
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and that the appropriateness of any set of procedural principles depends on the 
characteristics of the decision -making process in question. 
PART 2: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Early Studies: Thibaut and Walker 
Some 25 years ago, the American social psychologists, John Thibaut and Laurens 
Walker attempted to define and clarify the nature of procedural justice through the 
application of social psychological methods to courtroom disputes.23 They 
hypothesised that litigants' satisfaction with dispute resolution outcomes would be 
independently influenced by their assessments of the fairness of the dispute resolution 
process. 
Thibaut and Walker distinguished between process control (control over the 
opportunity to present evidence) and decision control (control over the final decision), 
and used experimental methods to test their hypothesis. Their results showed that the 
method of reaching a decision, as well as the outcomes from it, is important in 
determining perceptions of fairness and satisfaction, and that adversarial procedures 
are preferred to inquisitorial ones, mainly because they give the parties greater process 
control over the decision -making process. On this basis, they concluded that 
procedures that are high in process control should be used in disputes dominated by 
conflicts of interest because, in spite of the fact that information gathering is biased, 
such procedures are most likely to ensure the consideration of individual 
circumstances that is needed to maximise fairness. 
Subsequently another American social psychologist, Gerald Leventhal, using an 
approach based on `equity theory', put forward a model which can be applied to a 
wide range of non -legal contexts.24 He identified six justice rules (consistency, bias 
suppression, accuracy of information, correctability, representation and ethicality) 
and, although he did not carry out any empirical research himself, subsequent research 
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confirms the importance of four of them, namely consistency, accuracy, bias 
suppression, and representation, indicating that there are four potential underlying 
dimensions of procedural justice. 
In the course of a review of social psychological studies of procedural justice, Lind 
and Tyler claim that Leventhal overestimated the impact of favourable outcomes and 
distributive justice on judgements of procedural justice and conclude that the most 
serious inaccuracy in his work was his belief that procedures are of less importance 
than outcomes in determining judgements of overall fairness.25 
Recent Studies: Tyler 
More recently, Tom Tyler set out to test the importance of criteria of procedural 
justice which he derived from the theories of Thibaut and Walker, and Leventhal.26 
As he points out, Thibaut and Walker's two categories (process control and decision 
control) map on to Leventhal's representation category but Leventhal's other 
categories do not have any equivalents in Thibaut and Kelly's study.27 His research 
set out to test the importance of a composite set of categories and to determine 
whether Thibaut and Walker's empirical findings are specific to courtroom settings or 
can be generalised across a wider range of contacts with legal authorities, whether 
they apply when the contact is voluntary as well as when it is involuntary, and 
whether the meaning of fairness varies with sex, age, race, education, income and 
'liberalism'. 
Tyler's sample comprised 652 persons who had personal experience of the police 
and /or the courts in the previous 12 months. Process control was measured in terms 
of how much opportunity respondents had to present their problem or case to the 
authorities before decisions were made; decision control by how much control they 
had over the decision made by the authorities. Consistency involved comparisons 
with previous experience, prior expectations, what they thought happened to others 
or the experiences of friends, family or neighbours. Impartiality was measured by 
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combining responses to two questions: whether the authorities did anything that was 
`improper' or `dishonest' and whether officials had lied to respondents, and also by 
asking respondents how hard the police or judge had tried to be fair. Accuracy was 
also measured by combining the responses to two questions: whether the authorities 
had the information they needed about how to make good decisions and how to 
handle the problem, and whether they had tried to bring the problem into the open so 
that it could be solved. Correctability was measured by asking respondents whether 
they knew of an organisation to which they could have complained about unfair 
treatment. Finally, ethicality was measured by combining responses to two questions: 
whether the authorities had been polite to the respondents and showed concern for 
their rights. Respondents were also asked how fair the procedures used by the 
organisation were and how fairly they had been treated, with both answers rated on a 
four -point scale. The results were as follows: 
Process and outcome, i.e. procedural fairness and substantive justice, were 
strongly related. 
Seven aspects of process made an independent contribution to assessments of 
procedural fairness: the effort of the authorities to be fair; their honesty; 
whether their behaviour is consistent with ethical standards; whether 
opportunities for representation are given; the quality of decisions made; 
whether opportunities to appeal decisions exist; and whether the behaviour of 
authorities shows bias. 
Contrary to expectations, consistency between the ways in which they are 
treated their previous experiences, prior expectations, and their perceptions of 
the ways in which others are treated, was not important; but ethicality was. 
The criteria used to assess the fairness of an experience were similar to those 
used to assess the fairness of the authorities involved. In both cases, the effort 
to be fair, ethicality, honesty, and representation were important. 
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 Individuals judge procedural fairness by using a variety of positively inter- 
related criteria. Factor analysis suggests that there are two underlying factors: 
the first factor includes assessments of the nature of the experience itself (i.e. 
opportunities for representation, impartiality and the quality of the decisions 
made); the second factor includes assessments that compare the experience to 
external standards (i.e. consistency and ethicality). 
In different situations (voluntary vs. involuntary contact, favourable vs. 
unfavourable outcomes), individuals judge the fairness of procedures using 
different criteria. 
There was no evidence that different types of people judge the fairness of 
procedures differently. 
Tyler concludes that his findings strongly support previous research in demonstrating 
that a key determinant of reactions to encounters with legal authorities is the person's 
assessment of the fairness of the procedures which are used.28 As far as the meaning 
of procedural fairness is concerned, people's judgements are clearly complex and 
multifaceted. Although people pay attention to seven criteria, the major ones are 
linked to outcome (ethicality, honesty and the effort to be fair) rather than consistency 
with other outcomes, and Tyler speculates that this may be because people lack the 
information to make judgements of consistency. Representation is only one of a 
number of concerns that influence people's judgements and how hard authorities try 
to be fair appears to be the key overall factor. However, concern with ethicality 
(politeness and a concern with rights) is also important. 
Galligan's Critique 
Galligan has subjected Tyler's study to some strong criticism, on the grounds that 
Tyler misunderstands the relationship between procedures and outcomes and fails to 
appreciate that the primary significance of procedural notions (like hearing and bias) is 
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in upholding normative expectations relating to outcomes.29 Galligan concedes that 
procedures are particularly salient where normative expectations regarding outcomes 
are uncertain. However, he goes on to say that, even in such circumstances, 
procedures are still justified as a means to the achievement of certain outcomes, and 
to argue that empirical research should take account of this, since failure to do so 
leads to the unwarranted conclusion that procedures have their own normative 
foundations and that people assess fairness in terms of these norms. 
Galligan concludes that Tyler's research, and that of other psychologists, is based on 
an unsatisfactory theoretical framework and a misunderstanding of the relationship 
between normative expectations in relation to procedures and normative expectations 
in relation to outcomes.30 He claims that the theoretical framework which informs 
these studies assumes what it purports to demonstrate, namely that procedures have 
their own normative foundation and that people assess fairness primarily on that basis. 
According to hire, empirical research based on such a framework is defective and 
conclusions that are derived from it must therefore be questioned. He then goes on to 
outline an alternative approach which seeks to identify, within a given context, 
standards of fair treatment without insisting on a strict division between those relating 
to outcomes and those relating to procedures. The result of such research would, he 
claims, point to a cluster of values and standards of different kinds, each of which 
contributes an element to an overall sense of fair treatment. It follows from this that 
fair procedures are simply those procedures that lead to fair treatment according to 
authoritative standards. 
Is Galligan's criticism fair? I think not. Tyler's findings, and those of others who 
work in the same tradition, are, of course, shaped by their a priori theorising about 
the relationship between process and outcome, and thus between procedural fairness 
and substantive justice. However, the models that inform their work are not 
especially prescriptive and the conclusions from Tyler's study, and, indeed from other 
studies, that people assess the fairness of procedures independently from the fairness 
of outcomes, are based on the results of carefully documented empirical research. As 
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Lind and Tyler demonstrate, Thibaut and Walker's early research findings have been 
replicated in other studies31 and the gist of subsequent work has been that procedure 
and process per se are more important and outcomes less important than their theory 
indicates.32 Lind and Tyler go on to claim that the picture that seems to be emerging 
is that people are rather more concerned with their interactions and rather less 
concerned with the outcome of their interactions than one might have supposed.33 
Moreover, they point out that more recent studies have broadened the scope of 
procedural justice research to include the study of allocation procedures and that such 
research indicates that procedural concerns are important when allocation decisions 
are being made and when organisational policies are being determined.34 Against the 
weight of empirical evidence that perceptions of procedural fairness exercise an 
independent effect on responses to favourable and unfavourable outcomes and on 
perceptions of distributive justice, it is not clear how damaging Galligan's criticisms 
are or how much weight should be given to them. 
Conclusions 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the body of social psychological 
research reviewed above. First, empirical research in a variety of settings has 
repeatedly demonstrated that perceptions of procedural fairness exercise an 
independent effect on responses to favourable or unfavourable outcomes and on 
perceptions of distributive justice. Second, people use different criteria to judge 
procedural fairness in different decision -making contexts. However, notwithstanding 
the reference to recent research on allocation procedures, it should be noted that the 
studies on which these conclusions are based were all carried out in the field of 
criminal justice. Whether or not they apply to other areas of law, i.e. to civil and 
administrative law, has still to be demonstrated. 
It is, of course, important to ask whether procedural fairness and substantive justice 
can be studied in ternis of the perceptions of those who are subject to official 
decision -making, and what studies of perceptions of justice tell us about justice itself. 
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The well-known maxim justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be 
done' suggests that perceptions of justice are very important. In addition, although 
the research referred to in this section of the chapter does not settle the matter, it 
provides strong support for the claim that procedural fairness should not be seen in 
purely instrumental terms. Procedural fairness can contribute to substantive justice35 
but is also important in its own right. 
PART 3: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL APPROACHES TO PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS 
Two approaches to procedural fairness 
One approach to the achievement of procedural fairness emphasises principles that are 
imposed on the administration by institutions that are external to it, in particular by 
the courts but also by agencies like `ombudsmen', as a result of an individual 
challenging an administrative decision. Another approach emphasises principles that 
are put into place internally, i.e. by the administration itself, perhaps as a result of 
some internal monitoring of administrative decisions. The distinction is an analytic 
one and, in practice, the two approaches may be combined. Each of them is 
considered in turn. 
External Approaches 
Procedural Protection for `Adjudicative' Decisions 
As Harlow and Rawlings note, there has been a general tendency for the courts to 
model the administrative process in their own adjudicative image.36 Lon Fuller 
identified the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication as being to confer `on the 
affected person a peculiar kind of participation in the decision, that of presenting 
proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favour'.37 This implies that, for a 
decision to be adjudicatory, certain procedural constraints must be placed on the 
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decision -maker. The model of procedure which facilitates the presentation of `proofs 
and reasoned arguments' is exemplified by the criminal and civil courts, but it is also 
found in other settings, such as tribunal proceedings, which share some of the same 
features. Actual decision -making may have all or some or none of the characteristics 
of adjudication and Harlow and Rawlings conceive of a sliding scale - the closer to 
the ideal type outlined above, the more judicialised the process and the more the 
courts will insist on applying the rules of natural justice (the unwritten rules of the 
common law which include the so -called `rule against bias' and the right to a hearing); 
the further away, the less judicialised the process and the less the courts will insist on 
applying such principles.38 
The Donoughmore Committee, reporting in 1932, sought to distinguish three 
categories of decision -making, namely `judicial', `quasi - judicial' and `administrative' 
decision -making, each of which was based on a different type of dispute, but their 
thinking was crude and their arguments circular.39 The Committee's approach has 
some attractions for `green light theorists', who assume that the state is the only 
effective guarantor of individual freedom and emphasise the role of legislation and 
regulation rather than the use of the courts, because it serves to insulate administrative 
decisions from legal scrutiny. However, it has been criticised on the grounds that it 
has proved to be very difficult (if not impossible) in practice to separate these three 
types of functions, and because one effect of applying it would be to deprive large 
numbers of decisions of any procedural protection on the grounds that they are 
`administrative'. The Committee's approach had little attraction for red light 
theorists, who assume that the state is a threat to the freedom of the individual and 
favour a strong role for the courts in scrutinising the legality of administrative 
decisions." 
More flexible approaches 
Exponents of `flexible' protection claim that it provides a way round the problems of 
classifying disputes, of applying the rules of natural justice to those that are classified 
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as `adjudicatory' and offering no protection at all to those that are classified as 
`administrative'. Mullan argues that different types of decision -making have different 
procedural requirements, that the more closely they resemble `straight law /fact 
determinations resulting in serious consequences for those concerned, the more 
legitimate is the demand for procedural protection, while the more closely they 
resemble broad, policy orientated decisions, the less they are in need of such 
protection'.41 Although this approach avoids the problems of classification, and 
claims to recognise that different types of decision require different forms of 
procedural protection, it operates with only one model of procedural fairness and 
cannot provide any protection for decisions that involve the application of policy. A 
further problem is that the optimum degree of protection is not instantly recognisable 
and that a fair measure of discretion is required. 
This position has led Harlow and Rawlings to question how far it is the court's job to 
pursue the optimum form of procedure for different kinds of decision.42 They doubt 
whether judges have the information or the expertise needed to determine the 
particular form of procedural protection that is appropriate for different types of 
decision and, even, whether such an activity is consistent with the rule of law. 
Leaving these normative issues aside, they claim that there has been a measure of 
increased activism and of greater flexibility of response.43 However, such 
developments still leave broad swathes of `administrative' decisions unprotected by 
the courts. 
Disputes between the citizen and the state are more likely to be heard by a tribunal 
than by a court and, in 1957, the Franks Committee enunciated three principles that 
were to apply to tribunal decision- making.44 According to Franks, these principles 
were openness, fairness and impartiality: openness requires publicity for the 
proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decision; fairness 
requires the adoption of clear procedures which enable the parties to understand their 
rights, present their case fully and know the case which they have to meet; while 
impartiality requires freedom from the influence, real or apparent, of departments 
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concerned with the subject matter of their decisions.45 However, it should be noted 
that these principles apply to tribunals which hear appeals from first instance 
administrative decisions and not to the decisions themselves and that, in any case, they 
represent `good practice' and are not enforceable. Although the role of the Council 
on Tribunals, set up under the Tribunals and Enquiries Act 1959, is to keep the 
constitution and working of tribunals under review, its powers are very limited.46 
In spite of these shortcomings, judicial review can obviously make a difference for the 
individual who uses it to redress a grievance. As a result, it can have an effect on 
policy and legislation. However, its impact on routine administrative decision making 
is more problematic.47 Because judicial review is used relatively infrequently, because 
first -instance decision makers may not know about relevant court decisions or feel any 
commitment to applying these decisions, let alone the principles underlying them, it 
does not provide a very effective check on routine administrative decision making.48 
Tribunals hear many more cases but they also have a rather limited effect on first - 
instance decision makers. In a study of decision making in social security,49 just over 
half (52.6 per cent) of adjudication officers claimed that, in making decisions, they 
were not at all influenced by a tribunal's likely response to an appeal. This compares 
to a quarter (25.0 per cent) of officers who claimed that tribunals had a procedural 
effect in that the prospect of an appeal led them to be more thorough and document 
their decisions more fully.5° 
Procedural Protection for `Administrative' Decisions 
The first Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (or Parliamentary 
Ombudsman) was appointed in 1967 to deal with grievances from individuals who felt 
they had suffered an injustice arising from maladministration by a central government 
department against which there was no available remedy. `Maladministration' was 
not defined in the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 that established the PCA, 
although the Leader of the House of Commons (Richard Crossman) described it as 
including: 
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bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, 
terpitude, arbitrariness and so on.51 
subsequently, a Parliamentary Commissioner (Sir William Reid) elaborated on 
Crossman's list by giving more examples of what the term covers.52 
rudeness (though that is a matter of degree); 
unwillingness to treat the claimant as a person with rights; 
refusal to answer reasonable questions; 
neglecting to inform a complainant on request of his or her rights or 
entitlement; 
knowingly giving advice which is misleading or inadequate; 
ignoring valid advice or overruling considerations which would produce an 
uncomfortable result for the overruler; 
offering no redress or manifestly disproportionate redress; 
showing bias, whether because of colour, sex, or any other grounds; 
omission to notify those who thereby lose a right of appeal; 
faulty procedures; 
failure by management to monitor compliance with adequate procedures; 
cavalier disregard of guidance which is intended to be followed in the interest 
of equitable treatment of those who use a service; 
partiality; and 
failure to mitigate the effects of rigid adherence to the letter of the law where 
that produces manifestly unequal treatment. 
`Injustice' was likewise not defined in the Act but, for a complaint to be upheld, the 
PCA must conclude that the individual suffered some kind of loss that would 
otherwise not have occurred. Thus, in light of the distinction made in Part 1 above, it 
is clear that the PCA adopts an instrumental rather than a non -instrumental approach 
to procedural fairness since redress is only available if maladministration has a 
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deleterious effect on the outcome of administrative decision making.53 
A number of other ombudsmen were subsequently established to deal with complaints 
about services in the public sector that fell outside the PCA's remit. They include the 
Health Services Ombudsmen for England and Wales and for Scotland; the 
Commissioners for Local Administration (CLA) for England and Wales and for 
Scotland; and the Police Complaints Authority. In addition, some public services, e.g. 
the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, the Prison Service (in England and Wales, 
and in Scotland), and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) have 
appointed independent adjudicators to consider complaints against the organisation. 
There are also ombudsmen covering various private sector services such as banking, 
broadcasting, building societies, estate agents, funerals, insurance, investments, legal 
services and pensions but, with the exception of the Legal Services Ombudsmen for 
England and Wales and for Scotland, and the Pensions Ombudsmen, these do not 
have statutory powers.54 
Ombudsmen use inquisitorial methods to investigate allegations that maladministration 
has given rise to injustice. Where a complaint that maladministration has given rise to 
injustice is upheld, they may impose remedial action on the organisation that was the 
subject of the complaint; award compensation to the complainant; or instruct the 
organisation to issue an apology.55 Thus, in addition to providing remedies for those 
who complain, ombudsmen may order the organisation complained of to modify its 
administrative procedures. However, although an organisation may wish to do so to 
avoid more complaints in the future, there is, in general, no systematic check on 
whether or not it has done so. 
Ombudsmen are independent of the organisation against which the complaint is made, 
no legal (or other) representation is required, and complainants are not subject to any 
charges. Independence should, in theory, guarantee impartially but this may be 
compromised in practice by the fact that the ombudsman's staff is often drawn from, 
and sometimes returns to, the organisation which is the subject of the complaint. In 
45 
addition, there are often barriers which have to be surmounted before a complaint can 
be made to an ombudsman and, except for the CLA in Northern Ireland, 
ombudsmen's remedies are not legally enforceable.56 
A successful complaint to an ombudsman, like a successful application for judicial 
review, can make a difference for the individual who uses it to redress a grievance. 
However, because ombudsmen are used even more sporadically than judicial review, 
because their decisions usually relate to quite specific sets of circumstances and 
because they do not carry the force of precedent, they provide a rather feeble check 
on routine administrative decision making. 
Internal Approaches 
Mashaw's approach 
While most people have looked to courts and tribunals, and to other forms of 
accountability, such as ombudsmen, which are external to the locus of organisational 
decision making, as the means of achieving procedural fairness, the available evidence 
does not suggest that this approach is very effective. It is for this reason that Jerry 
Mashaw has argued that additional safeguards, such as internal quality controls and 
quality assurance systems, are needed to ensure that the process of decision -making is 
fair.57 
In his pioneering study of the American Disability Insurance (DI) scheme,5$ Mashaw 
detected three broad strands of criticism leveled against it: the first indicted it for 
lacking adequate management controls and for producing inconsistent decisions, the 
second for not providing a good service and for failing to rehabilitate those who were 
dependent on it, and the third for not paying enough attention to `due process' and for 
failing to respect and uphold the rights of those dependent on it.59 He argues that 
each strand of criticism reflects a different normative conception of the DI scheme, 
i.e. a different model of what the scheme could and should be file. The three models 
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are respectively identified with bureaucratic rationality, professional treatment and 
moral judgment. 
Mashaw defines administrative justice (the procedural fairness inherent in routine 
day -to -day administration) in terms of `those qualities of a decision process that 
provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions'.60 Two points of clarification 
are called for here: by `acceptability', it should be assumed that Mashaw means 
something like `legitimacy' and by `decisions' that he is referring to procedures rather 
than outcomes. The importance of administrative justice is that it can legitimate 
administrative procedures. 
It follows from Mashaw's definition that each of the three models he described is 
associated with a different conception of administrative justice. Thus, there is one 
conception of administrative justice based on bureaucratic rationality, another based 
on professional treatment and a third based on moral judgment. According to 
Mashaw, each of these models is associated with a different set of legitimating values, 
different primary goals, a different organisational structure and different cognitive 
techniques.ó1 These are set out in the Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Three Normative Models of Administrative Justice 
























moral judgment fairness conflict resolution independent 
Although this is very helpful, the association of fairness with one of the models (the 
moral judgment model), and the implication that the two other models are `unfair', is 
unfortunate. Mashaw's approach suggests that each of the three models he described 
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is associated with a different conception of fairness. In addition, his characterisation 
of the three models reflects an exclusively internal approach to administrative justice 
in that it makes no reference to external mechanisms for redressing grievances. With 
this in mind, I have revised Figure 1 to produce Figure 2. This renames the three 
models (it refers to them as a bureaucratic model, a professional model and a legal 
model), alters the ways in which they are characterised,62 and highlights redress 
mechanisms that include external as well as internal procedures for achieving 
procedural fairness. This is important because internal and external procedures should 
not be seen as alternatives and it is important to recognise that, in practice, they are 
often combined. 
Figure 2: Three Normative Models of Administrative Justice 
[based on Adler and Longhurst (1994: 44)] 
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Mashaw contends that each of the three models is coherent, plausible and attractive. 
He also argues that the three models are competitive rather than mutually exclusive.63 
Thus, they can and do coexist with each other. However, other things being equal, 
the more there is of one, the less there will be of the other two. His insight enables us 
to see both what trade -offs are made between the three models in particular cases and 
what other trade -offs might be more desirable. His approach is a pluralistic one, 
which recognises a plurality of normative positions and acknowledges that situations 
that are attractive for some people are unattractive for others. 
Mashaw's pluralism can be contrasted with the communitarian version of pluralism 
adopted by other writers on justice, most notably by Michael Walzer.64 Walzer 
accepts that `the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form [and that] 
48 
different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with 
different procedures, by different agents.65 However, he also claims that `the meaning 
of the goods in question determines their distribution' and argues that `if we 
understand what it is, what it means for those for whom it is a good, we understand 
how, by whom, and for what reasons it ought to be distributed'.66 Although Walter 
accepts that social meanings are historical in character and that what is regarded as 
just and unjust changes over time, he nevertheless assumes a degree of normative 
consensus in a given community, which stands in stark contrast with Mashaw's 
assumption of normative conflict. 
The trade -offs that are made, and likewise those that could be made, reflect the 
concerns and the bargaining strengths of the institutional actors who have an interest 
in promoting each of the models, typically civil servants and officials in the case of the 
bureaucratic model; professionals and 'street level bureaucratsi67 in the case of the 
professional model; and lawyers, court and tribunal personnel and groups representing 
clients' interests in the case of the legal model. 
These trade -offs vary between organisations and, within a given organisation, between 
the different policies delivered by that organisation and between the different stages of 
policy implementation. They also vary over time and between countries. In the case 
of the (American) DI scheme, Mashaw concluded that, in the early 1980s when he 
carried out his study, bureaucratic rationality was the dominant model and it is, at 
least, arguable that, notwithstanding variations within and between countries, 
bureaucracy is, and always has been, the dominant model as far as the administration 
of social security is concerned. However, the professional model may be dominant in 
other policy fields, e.g. the administration of health care. And, although the legal 
model has always been extremely important in countries with a strong rights culture, 
such as the USA, it is now beginning to mount a serious challenge to the dominant 
bureaucratic and professional models in many European welfare states.68 
Mashaw's approach is a very attractive one. Although, as shown in Part 1 above, 
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Bayles and Galligan69 both recognise that a uniform set of procedural principles does 
not apply across the board, and that the appropriateness of any set of procedural 
principles depends on the characteristics of the decision - making process in question, 
their approaches to procedural fairness are less sophisticated than Mashaw's in that 
they assume that the different forms of decision making are sui generis. The great 
strength of Mashaw's approach is his recognition that different models of decision 
making co -exist with each other and that each of them is associated with a different 
conception of administrative justice. The administrative justice of any given instance 
of decision making is not represented by the procedural principles associated with the 
single model that best describes that form of decision making but by trade offs 
between each of the models for which there is some evidence. 
Mashaw's approach has, however, been subjected to a number of criticisms. Although 
he contends that the three models described above, and only these three models, are 
always present in welfare administration, this claim can be disputed. The 
bureaucratic, professional and legal models have, in many countries, been challenged 
by a managerial model associated with the rise of new public management,70 a 
consumerist model that focuses on the increased participation of consumers in 
decision making71 and a market model that emphasises consumer choice.72 
A second criticism is that, in assessing the relative influence of the three models, 
Mashaw ignores their absolute strengths. Consider two situations in which the 
strengths of three models are given weights of 30, 20 and 10 units and 3, 2 and 1 units 
- although they are identical in a relative sense, they are quite different in absolute 
terms and clearly refer to what are, in reality, very different situations'. `Strong' 
balances are very different. from `weak' balances in ways that Mashaw's analysis does 
not bring out very well. 
A third criticism is that Mashaw takes the policy context for granted.73 However, just 
as different approaches to administration, i.e. to how programmes should be run, can 
be understood in terms of a number of normative models which are in competition 
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with each other, so different approaches to policy, i.e. to what programmes aim to 
achieve, can also be understood in this way. As shown in Part 4 below, Adler and 
Longhurst74 have demonstrated that Mashaw's approach can be applied to competing 
models of policy as well as to competing models of administration. Each of the 
models of policy may, in theory, be combined with each of the models of 
administration. The resulting `two -dimensional' model is necessarily more complex 
but its characteristics are similar in that it not only enables us to see what trade -offs 
are made between different combinations of policy and administration in particular 
cases, but also to consider what different sets of trade -offs might be more desirable. 
Since, in the terminology used in this paper, the models of policy refer to outcomes 
while the models of administration refer to process, the two -dimensional model 
provides a way of combining procedural fairness with substantive justice. 
In addition, Mashaw's approach would not commend itself to those, like Galligan, 
who associate administrative justice with the legal model of decision making and 
assert its moral superiority. Galligan claims that the great range of administrative 
processes can be divided into three groups: processes of a routine nature, decisions 
requiring distinct elements of inquiry and judgement, and discretionary processes of a 
policy kind.75 At one end of the spectrum, routine administration involves the almost 
mechanical application of a set of standards to a simple and easily established set of 
facts; at the other end of the spectrum, decisions about how to treat an individual 
involve the exercise of strong discretion and are substantially governed by policy 
considerations; but, within the middle ground, two normative models of decision 
making compete with each other. He calls the first of these models bureaucratic 
administration and the second administrative justice and the association of this term 
with one of these models is particularly significant. According to Galligan, the goal of 
bureaucratic administration is to maximise the common good by means of `accurate 
and proper' decision making and `individual cases are significant only as elements in 
achieving acceptable aggregates'. On the other hand, administrative justice seeks to 
treat each person fairly. In this model, the accurate and proper application of 
authoritative standards is still important but the emphasis is on fair treatment of the 
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individual, i.e. on the accuracy and propriety of the individual decision, not just of 
decisions in the aggregate. Although Galligan accepts that the bureaucratic 
administration model is the `natural and dominant' model, he argues that efforts 
should be made to curb its natural hegemony in order to support the (morally 
superior) administrative justice model. His approach is not followed here because of 
its normative commitment to one, among several, competing conceptions of 
procedural fairness and because of its failure to recognise the opportunity costs 
associated with its realisation. 
Developing Mashaw's approach 
In light of the criticisms made above, some modifications of Mashaw's analytic 
framework are clearly called for. First, it is important to recognise that, in addition to 
the bureaucratic, professional and legal models identified by Mashaw, some 
additional models of administrative justice need to be considered. Three such models 
are a managerialist model, a consumerist model and a market model,76 although they 
are not necessarily all present in every administrative system. Second, account needs 
to be taken of the absolute as well as the relative strengths of these models. Third, 
the approach can be applied to competing normative models of outcomes, i.e. to 
substantive justice, as well as to competing normative models of process, i.e. to 
procedural fairness, and used to analyse the interactions between them. 
An extended analytic framework, involving six normative models of administrative 
justice, is set out in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: Six Normative Models of Administrative Justice 
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A brief explanation of this extended analytic framework is called for. Most public 
welfare services in the post -war period were shaped by the bureaucratic and 
professional models outlined above although the trade off between them varied from 
one policy domain to another. However, by the mid -1980s this pattern of 
administration had come under attack. It was variously criticised for lacking 
neutrality and being biased against certain groups; for its failure to contain the 
growing demand for cost savings; for having a vested interest in the maintenance and 
expansion of existing empires and not promoting the `public interest'; and, as a 
`monopoly provider' for being insulated from competitive pressures to become more 
efficient and more responsive to the demands and preferences of consumers. New 
and better forms of management were championed as the most appropriate response 
to these criticisms. Managerialism, as this approach came to be known, challenged 
the powers and prerogatives of bureaucrats and professionals in the name of managers 
who demanded the `freedom to manage' the attainment of prescribed standards of 
service. It gave priority to achieving efficiency gains, introduced different forms of 
financial and management audit to assess how well the prescribed standards of service 
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had been met, rewarded staff who performed well and, in theory at least, sanctioned 
those who did not.77 Inevitably, the introduction of these new managers frequently 
led to struggles for power and control within welfare organisations. Managerialism 
can thus be characterised in terms of managerial autonomy, the pursuit of efficiency 
gains, the use of performance indicators to assess accountability, and the possibility of 
drawing attention to the fact that prescribed standards have not been met as a means 
of putting pressure on management to improve their standards. 
Consumerism has, likewise been a central reference point in the drive for public sector 
reform from the mid -1980s onwards.78 Like managerialism, it has been taken up as a 
response to criticisms of the bureaucratic and professional and the reshaping of 
welfare services around consumer choice has been visible in a number of reforms, in 
particular in the introduction in the UK of the `Citizen's Charter'.79 Consumerism 
emphasises the role of the service user who is seen as an active participant in the 
process rather than a passive recipient of bureaucratic, professional or managerial 
decisions. It can thus be characterised in terms of the active participation of 
consumers in decision making, consumer satisfaction, the introduction of consumer 
`charters', and the use of `voice',80 together with the possibility of obtaining 
compensation where the standards specified in the charter are not met as available 
remedies. 
Markets constitute the final model in the extended analytic framework and have many 
of the characteristics of the managerial and consumerist models (although the reverse 
is not necessarily the case). Decision making in the market involves the matching of 
demand and supply and is made with reference to the price mechanism. Users are 
viewed as rational economic actors who choose the organisation that best satisfies 
their wants or preferences. The legitimating goal of the organisation is profit making, 
while the prevailing mode of accountability is to the owners or shareholders. In 
contrast to consumerism, where the consumer can use `voice' as a remedy and can 
obtain compensation through the consumer charters if the specified standards have 
not been met, markets provide the possibility of `exit'.81 In addition, an aggrieved 
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individual may be able to raise a court action for compensation where he or she 
suffers some measurable loss from the action or inaction of the administration. 
Internal or quasi- marketsß2 have some but not all of the characteristics of the market 
model just outlined. 
It may seem a little strange to refer to some of these models, in particular, the market 
model, as models of justice. After all, markets are often regarded as threats to justice 
which undermine its achievement in practice. However, this strangeness is more 
apparent than real and results from equating the concept of `justice' with substantive 
justice rather than with procedural fairness. One of the aims of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that procedural fairness is an important component of overall justice and 
that the idea that `everyone should receive what is due to them' applies just as much 
to procedures as to outcomes. How people should be treated is very dependent on 
context and, as the discussion above tries to make clear, different conceptions of 
procedural fairness are associated with different types of decision making. 
Consider the case of a lottery. Everyone who takes part has a legitimate expectation 
that they will be treated in exactly the same way (without any reference to their 
personal circumstances or characteristics) and have exactly the same chance of 
winning as everyone else. However, even if they invest a lot of money in lottery 
tickets or play the lottery for a long period of time, they cannot increase the 
probability that any particular ticket will hit the jackpot. Although the lottery 
generates a set of winners and losers, this is (or ought to be) a chance outcome and 
there is no underlying logic to it. If lottery outcomes are judged in terms of any one 
principle of distributive justice, or any combination of principles, they will no doubt be 
considered unjust. However, this is not the case for lottery procedures which may, or 
may not, incorporate the principles underlying the legitimate expectations referred to 
above. A similar argument applies to markets. 
In a market, consumers can legitimately expect to have the opportunity to express 
their wants in terms of their preferences and the freedom to choose. %3 Likewise, 
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producers can legitimately expect to be able to respond to consumer choice and 
produce goods and services up to the point where the value to the consumer of his 
(her) marginal purchase just exceeds the cost of supply - beyond that point the 
consumer will not be interested in purchasing the service and it will not pay the 
producer to go on producing it. The price mechanism stabilises as well as controls 
these transactions - where there are shortages, higher prices act as an incentive to 
economise but, where the market is flooded, prices will fall and this will encourage 
consumers to buy more - while the profit motive should make supply responsive to 
demand, and encourage technological innovation and progress. Competition should 
lead to greater efficiency - successful producers will thrive (and make big profits) 
while unsuccessful ones will go to the wall. Thus, the market, like the lottery, 
generates winners and losers. However, since market theorists tend to treat the initial 
distribution of resources as an exogenous variable, assessing the final distribution of 
resources in terms of any one principle of distributive justice, or any combination of 
principles, will usually conclude that, like the lottery, they are not just.S4 This is 
because the market and the lottery both exemplify pure procedural justice.85 But, 
although market outcomes are almost always not just, and it follows that markets do 
undermine attempts to achieve substantive justice, market procedures may incorporate 
the principles underlying the legitimate expectations referred to above and may thus 
be fair. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that it does make sense to talk about 
the market as a model of justice. 
Normative theorising 
One of the attractions of Mashaw's approach is that it enables us to see both what 
trade -offs are made between the various justice models in particular instances and 
what different sets of trade -offs might be more desirable, not merely for the 
institutional actors who have an interest in promoting each of the models in play but 
for all concerned, i.e. in some overall sense. However, the attempt to arrive at a 
`better' balance between the different models in play and identify a different set of 
trade -offs that will enhance `the public interest' raises a number of problems. Since 
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there is no `magic formula', this exercise necessarily involves the exercise of 
judgement. Of course, this does not make it an arbitrary exercise. It is one which 
can, and should, be informed by empirical data. In this connection, performance 
measures of various kinds and audit data are important and, to the extent that the 
primary justification for public services is that they should serve the public, it can be 
argued that the results of user surveys and public opinion data are especially 
important. 
Conclusions 
By adopting a relativistic approach to administrative justice, Mashaw's position, and 
that of others who have attempted to develop his approach, challenges the view that 
there are any invariant principles of procedural fairness that apply in all contexts.86 
This may, at first, seem surprising but, on reflection, should not be since it is generally 
agreed that this is true of substantive justice. Procedural fairness is no less a 
contested concept than substantive justice in that, although it can be defined in a fairly 
uncontroversial way (as `a proper balance between competing claims to procedural 
protection'), the terms in which it is defined (i.e. what constitutes `a proper balance' 
and even what are to count as `claims') are the subject of considerable disagreement.87 
Compared to the external approaches to procedural fairness considered above, two of 
the advantages of an internal approach are that it focuses on the myriad of first - 
instance decisions rather than the much smaller number of decisions that are the 
subject of an appeal or complaint and that it focuses on them directly rather than at 
one remove and through a `legal prism'. However, this is not to suggest that external 
mechanisms for achieving procedural fairness can be ignored. Although they are not 
all- important, they are certainly not unimportant. The two approaches to the 
achievement of procedural fairness need to be combined and one of the great 
strengths of the analytic framework outlined above is that, by embracing external as 
well as internal mechanisms for achieving procedural fairness, it recognises this fact. 
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PART 4: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
The approach to administrative justice outlined in Part 3 above has informed my 
research on the impact of computerisation on social security in the UK and on 
decision -making in the Scottish Prison system. It also provides the theoretical 
underpinning for comparative research on the assessment of special educational needs 
in England and Scotland and on the computerisation of social security in 12 countries. 
Although it is not for me to judge how successful it has been, and those with less at 
stake are clearly better placed to do so, an informed assessment calls for some 
familiarity with the research in question. This research is summarised below. 
The Impact of Computerisation on Social Security in the UK 
The three main aims of the Operational Strategy,88 the massive programme to 
computerise the entire social security system that the Department of Social Security 
(DSS) attempted to put into place in the 1980s, were: 
to improve operational efficiency, reduce administrative costs and increase the 
flexibility of the operational system to respond to changing requirements; 
to improve the quality of service to the public, e.g. by treating customers in a 
less compartmentalised benefit -by- benefit manner and more as `whole persons' 
with a range of social security business, and to improve the provision of 
information to the public; 
to modernise and improve the work of social security staff. 
Of these aims, the first reflected the interests of the organisation, the second reflected 
the interests of the claimant and the third reflected the interests of the staff 
By 1989, the Operational Strategy had run into deep trouble - the costs had escalated 
so steeply that, unless improvements in quality of service were taken into account, it 
was clear that the future of the programme was in doubt. Against this background, 
Roy Sainsbury and I were commissioned by the DSS to undertake some research on 
58 
`quality of service' and, in particular, the on `whole person' concept, the idea people 
should be treated in a less compartmentalised, benefit -by- benefit manner as `whole 
persons' with a range of social security business to transact.89 Using a consultative 
procedure known as the Delphi Method,90 four panels of experts (drawn from DSS 
staff, welfare rights officers and representatives of pressure groups, academics and 
researchers, and persons with backgrounds in comparator organisations or from 
overseas social security systems) were invited to comment on the desirability and 
feasibility of a number of different conceptions of quality of service and of the whole 
person concept, and on a number of different models of organisation. But, in addition 
to these questions, we were interested in studying the effects of computerisation on 
administrative justice, i.e. on the procedural justice inherent in routine day -to -day 
administration.91 
We argued that the three normative models of administrative justice set out in Figures 
1 and 2 above were all present in the administration of social security, but that the 
Operational Strategy would further strengthen the dominance of the bureaucratic 
conception of administrative justice at the expense of the two competing conceptions. 
Thus, it was likely to lead to an even more bureaucratised system rather than one that 
was more sensitive to the -needs and circumstances of claimants or one that made it 
easier for them to assert their rights. The main reasons for this were that the DSS 
adopted a `top -down' approach to computerisation that gave priority to the interests 
of the organisation, rather than a `bottom up' approach that would have given priority 
to the interests of claimants or staff; and that the aim of the programme was to make 
administrative savings rather than to improve quality of service (whatever that might 
mean). We concluded that the overall effect of the programme was certainly to alter 
but not necessarily to enhance the procedural fairness of administrative decision - 
making in social security. 
Discretionary Decision -Making in the Scottish Prison System 
During the late 1980s, Brian Longhurst and I undertook a programme of research on 
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day -to -day administrative decision -making in the Scottish prison system, focusing on 
adult, male, long -term prisoners who constituted the largest and, arguably, most 
problematic of the various groups that made up the prison population.92 We used 
documentary analysis, observation and interviews with a wide range of individuals 
inside and outside the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) to study in detail a number of 
important areas of decision making associated with classification, transfers, regimes 
and accountability.93 In each case, we sought to establish what decisions were 
accomplished; why the existing system operated in the way it did; what problems were 
created by existing practices; for whom they were problematic; to what extent they 
gave rise to pressures for change; what alternatives to the present system were being 
canvassed; and what their implications for day -to -day decision -making would be. We 
used the same methods to study the policy- making process by carrying out a detailed 
examination of a series of policy documents that were published by the SPS during 
the period of our research. 
The late 1980s was a period of great turbulence for Scottish prisons and a spate of 
violent disturbances had given rise to a vigorous debate about what prisons were for 
and how they should be run. Some people argued that, because so much was 
changing and it was far from clear what the eventual outcome would be, we were 
attempting to study Scottish prisons at a bad time. However, it turned out to be a 
very good time because the arguments advanced by powerful interests and their 
struggles for control actually helped us to construct a theoretical framework for our 
study. This theoretical framework enabled us to see the processes at work 
particularly clearly and to make sense of the prison system although it was in a state 
of flux. Using an iterative procedure based on `wide reflexive equilibrium',94 we were 
able to achieve a mutual adjustment between our theoretical framework and the 
empirical reality that was the focus of our research. 
While our research on the Operational Strategy utilised the three normative models of 
procedural fairness set out in Figures 1 and 2 above, the turbulence of the prison 
system resulted in the calling into question of the various normative models of 
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substantive justice as well, and this suggested that we needed to consider them too. 
We associated each of the justice models with a distinctive discourse and 
distinguished `ends discourses', which are concerned with what prisons are for, from 
`means discourses', which are concerned with how prisons should be run. The 
discourses in play were characterised as follows: 
Figure 4: Characteristics of three competing `Ends Discourses' 
Discourse Rehabilitation Normalisation Control 
source of legitimacy improving the 
individual. 
prevention of 
negative effects of 
prison; treating 
prisoners like 
individuals in the 
community. 
control of disruption; 
smooth running of 
establishments. 
focus `deviant' individual `normal' individual `disruptive' individual 
dominant concerns socialising the 
prisoner back into 
society through the 
provision of training 
and treatment. 
minimum security; 
contact between the 
prisoner and his or 
her family; improved 
living conditions. 
good order and 
discipline; protection 
of prison staff. 
Figure 5: Characteristics of three competing 'Means Discourses' 
Discourse Bureaucracy Professionalism Legality 
source of legitimacy rules and regulations knowledge based on 
experience 
rule of law 
focus on the system on establishments on individual 
prisoners 
dominant concerns uniformity, 
consistency, fidelity 




the institutional ethos 




internal negotiated external 
The ends and the means discourses were combined to produce a discourse matrix that 
summarised the discursive structure of the Scottish prison system at the time. 
Discourses which characterised individuals, groups and institutions within the Scottish 
prison system were associated with each of the cells in the matrix. 
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Figure 6: Discourse Matrix for the Scottish Prison System 
Rehabilitation Normalisation Control 
Bureaucracy Parole Board HQ - Administration 
Division 
HQ - Operations 
Division 
Professionalism Barlinnie Special Unit Most governors SPOA 




Judges and courts 
Our study asserted that interest groups in particular settings produce discourses that 
reflect their interests and that discursive struggles lie at the heart of the power 
struggles that are to be found in every organisation and are particularly evident in 
periods of flux. The importance of external and contextual factors is that they 
structure the power relations between internal interest groups, and shape the outcome 
of the power struggles between them. By applying our theoretical framework to 
various areas of decision -making and to the policy process,95 we were able to 
demonstrate that the struggle for control between the interest groups represented in 
the discourse matrix had profound implications for procedural fairness as well as 
substantive justice. In addition, we identified a new form of managerial discourse 
that, at the end of our research, had assumed a position of dominance in Scottish 
penal policy.96 
The Assessment of Special Educational Needs in England and Scotland 
The assessment of special educational needs is a very complex process that can be 
divided into a number of discrete and overlapping stages and involves inputs from a 
large number of individuals including educational psychologists, education officers, 
head teachers, class teachers, medical practitioners, social workers, `named persons', 
parents and children. In England, this process is structured by a statutory Code of 
Guidance97 and in Scotland by a non - statutory Manual of Good Practice.98 The 
outcomes of the assessment process are extremely significant for those involved, in 
particular for children and their parents, since they have a direct interest in the type of 
education the child receives and the resources that are made available for this 
purpose. However, as with many decentralised decision- making processes, there are 
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wide variations in outcomes between and among (local) educational authorities in 
England and Scotland.99 Although the Code of Guidance and, to a lesser extent, the 
Manual of Good Practice have undoubtedly led to a degree of standardisation, there 
are also wide variations between authorities in the procedures used to assess special 
educational needs in both countries. 
The research conducted with Sheila Riddell, Enid Mordaunt and Alastair Wilson 
involved an empirical study of the fairness of the different procedures for assessing 
special educational needs in England and Scotland.'°° Its aims were to describe the 
range of practices that constitute statutory assessment in England and in Scotland and 
to analyse the nature of the justice inherent in them. Documentary analysis was 
supplemented by interviews with key informants including politicians, civil servants, 
and representatives of professional organisations, voluntary organisations and 
pressure groups. A postal survey was administered to (local) education authorities in 
England and Scotland to elucidate variations in the ways in which children are 
assessed, `statemented' (in England) or `recorded' (in Scotland), and the outcomes of 
these procedures were investigated through a secondary analysis of official statistics. 
However, the main thrust of the research comprised a more detailed exploration of 
assessment at the local level. We examined the roles of key players, the extent to 
which parental preferences were congruent with professional identifications of need 
and official determinations of policy, and the ways in which outcomes were 
negotiated. The postal survey of (local) education authorities in England and 
Scotland enabled us to identify variations in process north and south of the border and 
provided a basis for selecting four contrasting (local) education authorities (two in 
England and two in Scotland) for in -depth fieldwork. In each of these authorities, 16 
case study pupils with a range of special needs have been selected. The sample of 64 
children included cases where parents and professionals agreed about the child's 
placement and where they did not. Case papers for these children were studied, 
meetings observed and interviews conducted with most of the key actors (i.e. 
educational psychologists, education officers, head teachers, SENCOs,' 
°1 class 
teachers, medical practitioners, social workers, `named persons', parents and, where 
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appropriate, children). 
Our analysis of official policy documents indicated that professionalism, supported by 
bureaucracy, was still the dominant model of administrative justice in Scotland. The 
legal and consumerist models were present but were very weak. In England, 
professional and bureaucratic models were both important, but were more effectively 
challenged by the legal and consumerist models than was the case in Scotland. This is 
because the Code of Practice has imposed legally enforceable obligations on local 
authorities and the establishment of the SENT has made it much easier for parents to 
challenge the terms of the Statement of Needs and the nominated school appeal, while 
Parent Partnership Officers encourage parental participation in decision making. 
Managerialism, evident in the use of performance indicators, and markets, evident in 
the fact that parents could choose between different types of school, were both 
stronger in England than in Scotland. 
Findings from the postal survey confirmed that, although professionalism and 
bureaucracy were important in both countries, the bureaucratic model was stronger in 
England than in Scotland and the professional model was more in evidence in 
Scotland than in England. Thus educational psychologists were the key players in 
Scotland while education officers were more influential in England. It also indicated 
that the legal model was more evidence in England than in Scotland with more parents 
making use of the available means of legal redress. This issue was explored in the 
case studies of four authorities and 60 families. 
The key informant data also provided strong support for the bureaucratic and 
professional models. However, many informants also referred to the legal model. 
This was characterised in terms of parents using redress mechanisms to challenge 
local authority decisions and the extent to which the procedures operated by local 
authorities were regulated by central government. Informants indicated that the 
professional model was the dominant model in Scotland and that the bureaucratic and 
legal models were both more influential in England. Although local authorities in 
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England were more tightly controlled by the Code of Practice than their counterparts 
in Scotland, the greater incursion of market forces in England compared to Scotland 
has led to greater diversity of provision at local level south of the border. 
Local authority and family case study data also revealed the greater emphasis in 
England on the development of forms of procedural fairness geared to the 
involvement of parents. Models of procedural fairness based on legality, consumerism 
and markets acted, in various ways, to tilt the balance of power in England more 
towards parents. Moreover, by constraining bureaucracy and professionalism, 
managerialism has clearly had a similar effect. On the other hand, the continued 
dominance of bureaucracy and professionalism in Scotland has kept the balance of 
power in the hands of local authorities. But, although there were greater 
opportunities in England for parents to exert a significant degree of control, those 
experiencing poverty and social disadvantage were unable to do so and their position 
was very similar to that of their Scottish counterparts. 
One of the main differences between Scotland and England that were revealed by the 
research was that more of the nonnative models of administrative justice were evident 
in England than in Scotland. Because of this, the assessment and statementing of 
children with special educational needs in England reflects a richer and more multi- 
dimensional conception of procedural fairness than the assessment and recording of 
children with special educational needs in Scotland. The two dominant models of 
decision making, i.e. the professional model, associated with educational 
psychologists, and the bureaucratic model, associated with education officers, both 
reflect top -down models of decision making and are much less effectively challenged 
in Scotland than they are in England by any of the bottom -up approaches exemplified 
by the legal and consumerist models which reflect the interests and concerns of 
parents and children. 
In considering the possibility of alternative trade -offs, it is evident that Scotland might 
learn from England in shifting the balance of power towards parents and children. For 
65 
example, a more robust appeals system could be adopted, Records of Needs could 
specify resources to be provided, assessment procedures, including time -scales, could 
be tightened, advocacy systems could be strengthened and public access to 
information improved. However, England might also learn from Scotland that there 
are dangers with this strategy, not least that it may result in a less consistent, and thus 
less equitable, set of outcomes than are currently achieved. 
The Computerisation of Social Security in 13 Countries 
In the course of a comparative study of the use of computers in social security in 13 
countries - ten European countries, Australia, Canada and the USA - Paul Henman 
and I have investigated the impact of computerisation on competing models of 
administrative justice.102 Data were collected from two expert informants in each 
country by means of electronic mail. We thought that there would be many 
advantages to this procedure - that it would constitute an efficient method of data 
collection and an effective means of understanding the detailed operation of policies 
and procedures in different countries; that it would reduce the danger of 
misunderstanding the situation in a particular country; overcome language barriers; 
and provide a useful source of informed advice on research design and the 
interpretation and analysis of the information provided. In the event, perhaps because 
of the rather specialised nature of the research, it was remarkably difficult to find 
individuals who were sufficiently well informed and well disposed to act as expert 
informants, and the amount of feedback we received was quite limited. 
Informants completed a structured questionnaire. Where the responses were unclear 
or incomplete or where further questions arose, informants were sometimes asked to 
provide supplementary information. Preliminary findings and working papers were 
distributed electronically and informants were invited to correct and comment on 
them. In this way, we hope to obtain valuable feedback and to check the accuracy of 
our findings and the validity of our conclusions. Thus, the conclusions we reach will 
emerge through consultation and dialogue. In addition, the project will enable us to 
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explore the potential of e -mail as a research tool. 
The study set out to assess the impact of computerisation on administrative justice in 
a systematic manner. Two indicators have were selected for each of the six models 
included in Figure 3 and respondents were asked to rate them on a 1 -5 scale (where 1 
= generally very important; 2 = generally important; 3 = important in some areas; 4 = 
not very important; 5 = unimportant). They were then asked whether computerisation 
had made each of them more or less important. A 1 -5 scale was used here too (where 
1 = greatly increased importance; 2 = increased importance; 3 = much the same; 4 = 
decreased importance; 5 = greatly decreased importance). The scores for the two 
expert informants from each country were averaged but, where the two informants 
gave very different responses to the same question, attempts were made to resolve 
their disagreements and reach a consensus. 
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Figure 7: A Framework for Assessing the Impact of Computerisation on 
Procedural Fairness in Social Security 
Indicator Model Importance 
Rating 
(on 1 -5 scale) 
Impact 
Rating 
(on 1 -5 scale) 
In making decisions about 
entitlement to benefit, social security 
institutions apply well -established 
rules 
bureaucracy 
Dissatisfied customers can complain 
to a professional body 
professionalism 
The government purchases social 
security services from non- 
governmental service providers 
markets 
Social security institutions are 
expected to meet performance 
targets 
managerialism 
Social security institutions are 
expected to abide by customer 
charters 
consumerism 
Claimants can check and correct 
personal records 
legality 
Dissatisfied customers have their 
cases reviewed internally 
bureaucracy 
Indicators are used to assess staff 
performance 
managerialism 
In making decisions to benefit 
entitlement, staff exercise 
administrative discretion 
professionalism 
Claimants can choose between more 
than one social security institutions 
markets 
Claimants participate actively in 
decision making 
consumerism 
Dissatisfied customers appeal to an 
independent court or tribunal 
legality 
The use of two expert informants for each country was intended to provide a check 
on the accuracy of the data generated by the study. Nevertheless, doubts concerning 
its validity and reliability can still be raised. However, preliminary results, from 10 of 
the 12 countries in the study,lo3 indicate that, with one exception, bureaucracy is still 
the dominant model of administrative justice in social security in the countries 
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included in the study, and computerisation appears to have reinforced its dominance. 
Computerisation also appears to have had a very significant effect in promoting the 
managerial model of administrative justice, which in many countries is now the second 
most important model. In contrast to this, there is little evidence of the professional 
model and computerisation appears to have reduced its importance. There is also 
little evidence that the market model has had much of an impact although it does 
appear to have been strengthened somewhat by computerisation - the two exceptions 
here are Belgium and Finland where employers and employees can choose which 
social security fund should provide statutorily- defined sociál security benefits. As far 
as the legal model of administrative justice is concerned, appeal procedures are 
generally available but few claimants are able to access and correct their records. 
Neither of these indicators of the legal model appears to have been much affected by 
computerisation. Finally, the importance of consumerism differs from country to 
country and computerisation has had a mixed response on it. 
Among these broad shifts, computerisation does appear to have had some effect on 
the procedures for determining entitlement to benefit. In particular, the assessment of 
entitlement has become increasingly automated, involving an increased reliance on 
rules and correspondingly decreased use of discretion. This has been supported by an 
increased reliance on a managerial model, in particular on performance measures, to 
bring about improvements in the delivery of social security benefits. However, there 
is little evidence that this `top -down' type of accountability is being matched by an 
increased emphasis on the legal and consumerist models of administrative justice 
which embody `bottom up' approaches. 
The study indicates that computerisation alters the ways in which decisions are made, 
the ways in which they can be challenged, and the ways in which individuals are 
treated by social security institutions. It follows that it has had an impact on the 
trade -offs that are made between the six different models of administrative justice 
outlined above. However, it did not have the same effect on procedural fairness in 
each of the ten countries in our study. We investigated whether the aims of 
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computerisation were shaped by the socio- political values associated with different 
`welfare state regimes' ,1°4 different types of capitalisml05 and different structures of 
public admin.istration,106 and found some evidence to suggest that they are shaped by 
the socio- political values associated with different types of welfare state.107 However, 
the data do not indicate that the impact of computerisation on procedural fairness is 
patterned in the same way. 
Conclusions 
Each of the studies described above has sought to study and give meaning to 
administrative justice using the relativistic approach outlined in Part 3 above. In two 
of the studies (the study of decision -making in the Scottish prison system and the 
ongoing study of the assessment of special educational needs in England and 
Scotland), this was the over -riding aim, while in the other two (the two studies of 
computerisation in social security), it was ancillary to their main aims. The studies 
adopt a wide range of methodologies ranging from the use of expert informants in the 
two studies of computerisation to documentary analysis, interviewing and observation 
in the other two studies. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. In terms of the 
framework for analysing administrative justice, the attempt to assess the impact of the 
Operational Strategy in terms of the three normative models identified by Mashaw 
was undoubtedly the simplest. By contrast, the study of decision -making in the 
Scottish prison system was probably the most ambitious. With its focus on the 
discourses of procedural fairness and substantive justice and on the discursive 
struggles between the individuals and groups that embodied these discourses, it was 
able to give a dynamic account of the dramatic changes that were taking place in the 
Scottish prison system at the time. Although this study anticipated the rise of 
managerialism as another normative model of administrative justice, it was only in the 
later studies that this was fully elaborated. Our study of the assessment of special 
educational needs in England and Scotland utilised an extended framework based on 
six normative models of administrative justice which yielded a rich account of the 
different forms that administrative justice can take, and the different responses to 
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them of each of the parties concerned. It also indicated how administrative justice can 
be enhanced in each case by means of a different trade -off between the competing 
models. This extended framework was more systematically investigated in our study 
of computerisation in the social security systems in different countries which sought to 
establish its impact on the trade -offs between the different normative models of 
administrative justice. However, in this case, the advantages of a systematic approach 
were inevitably offset by concerns about the reliability and validity of the data. 
Although all of the studies have their limitations, it is contended that, considered 
together, they demonstrate the power of this method of studying procedural fairness 
and the validity of the assumptions that underlie it. 
5: THE SOCIO -LEGAL PARADIGM 
Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence 
Neil MacCormick108 claims that there are four key modes of legal scholarship which 
comprise what he calls `raw law', `doctrinal law', law in social science' and 
`fundamental values and principles'. In Figure 8, these four modes of thought are 
mapped onto a space divided into four quadrants. 
Figure 8: The Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence 
QUADRANT 1 
Raw Law 
(Law in Action) 
QUADRANT 2 
Doctrinal Law 
(`Black -letter' Law) 
QUADRANT 3 
Law in Social Science 
(Socio -legal Studies) 
QUADRANT 4 
Fundamental Values and Principles 
(Legal, Political and Social Philosophy) 
Raw Law (quadrant 1) refers to the practice of law and is defined in terms of 
activities. It comprises, on the one hand what solicitors do for their clients, advocates 
(and barristers) argue before the courts and judges do when they determine the 
outcome of cases and, on the other hand, what legislative draftsmen draft, parliaments 
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legislate and officials implement. However, it also includes what ordinary citizens do 
when they perform their legal duties, e.g. by filling in their tax forms or paying their 
mortgage or their rent, or when they exercise their legal rights, e.g. by suing for 
breach of contract or appealing against an administrative decision. Thus, it covers 
what lawyers, legislators, officials and citizens actually do when they invoke the law. 
Doctrinal Law (quadrant 2) attempts to make sense of decisions that are imputable to 
raw law by analysing them from the inside. It is sub -divided into a number of 
categories, e.g. civil law and criminal law, public law and private law, constitutional 
law, administrative law, tax law, social security law etc. It is carried out by judges (in 
the course of justifying their decisions) and legislators (in the course of formulating 
legislation), and by the majority of law teachers and law students who engage 
critically, albeit within the legal paradigm, with judicial opinions and with legislation. 
It refers to the elucidation of the logic underlying legal decisions, to the search for 
legal rules and principles, and their application to particular cases, to the formulation 
of case law and the promulgation and interpretation of statute law. The legal rules 
and principles in question should, as far as possible, be both mutually consistent and 
normatively coherent. 
Law in Social Science (quadrant 3) involves analysing `the law', which comprises 
doctrinal law (quadrant 2) as well as raw law (quadrant 1) and also includes legal 
institutions, from the perspective of the social sciences. In contrast to doctrinal law, 
examining the law from this perspective involves analysing it from the outside, i.e. 
from some external point of reference. Different external points of reference are 
provided by the various social sciences. Whether they attempt to account for the law 
in terms of economic rationality, class conflict, political power, social control or some 
other principle, they all invoke a broader and more general explanatory framework 
and focus on the relationship between law and society. Law in Social Science 
embraces the contributions of social theorists and of empirical social researchers. 
Fundamental Values and Principles (quadrant 4) refers to legal, political and social 
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philosophy which are concerned with, inter alia, the critical elaboration of theories of 
rights, principles of justice and conceptions of social welfare. Although none of the 
other quadrants can be said to be value free, this quadrant is quintessentially the 
domain of values. It embraces jurisprudence and legal theory. There is much 
controversy about the relationship between this perspective and the others. 
Natural lawyers regard law as being intrinsically linked to morality, arguing that 
human laws derive their authority from natural (or divine) law. In the classical 
accounts of natural law, associated with Catholic thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas, a 
law of nature has characteristics quite different from the ordinary laws with which we 
are familiar - it is a higher law (most frequently divine law), it is universal and 
immutable and it is discoverable by reason. This conception of law has been the 
subject of much criticism but modern natural law theorists, such as John Finnism9 have 
responded to these critics by starting out from a reflective, i.e. subjective, grasp of 
what is self - evidently good for people rather from supposedly objective or given 
statements about human nature. 
Legal positivists, on the other hand, assert that there is no relationship between lam' 
and morality. They assert that all law is `positive law' and deny that there is my such 
thing as `natural law'. What constitutes law is one thing, its goodness or badness 
another, and it is what constitutes law that counts. According to John Aus ,:LI,,Il , 
properly so called', or positive law, comprises the generalisable con- .1. of 
sovereign or his subordinates that can be enforced in the courts; according to ".. L. A. 
Hart,111 it is a system of rules comprising primary (obligation) rules and secondary 
(power conferring) rules. However, Ronald Dworkin112 has argued that km Ott 
be defined solely in terms of primary and secondary rules and th =t it Disco tt 
principles. Judges elucidate these principles by deciding, in 'hard cap, 
outcome would be most consistent, not only with the statutes and prercederotts t l 
have a bearing on the case but also with the institutions supported by cowman* 
and its political morality. Thus, in this respect, institutional theorists, bike tom, 
are on the same side as the natural lawyers in arguing that there is a rebuyvtrliiiif 
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between law and morality. 
Law in Social Science 
During the 1970s, there was a vigorous debate between advocates of the sociology of 
law and advocates of socio -legal studies about how the law (and legal institutions) 
should be analysed from the perspective of the social sciences.113 Those who 
championed the sociology of law114 argued that it was concerned with knowledge for 
its own sake. They adopted a critical stance to law, legal institutions and the legal 
system, most of their work was `theoretical' and their main concern was to promote a 
wider understanding of the nature of legal order and the relationship between law and 
society. By contrast, those who championed socio -legal studies115 adopted a more 
instrumental approach to knowledge - they tended to accept law, legal institutions 
and the legal system as given, most of their work was `empirical' and their main 
concern was to contribute to legal refoun. Today such disputes are much more 
muted and the demarcation lines much harder to identify. This is partly because 
sociologists of law have embraced empirical research while socio -legal researchers 
have developed a greater interest in theory.116 Socio -legal research is now very 
multidisciplinary and sociology represents only one disciplinary orientation within the 
wider enterprise. Writing in 1983, Harris referred to the contributions from 
economics, psychology, social history, anthropology, and political science117 and 
could also have acknowledged those from social policy"" and from feminism.119 
Differences between `Black Letter Law' and Socio -Legal Studies 
As noted above, one difference between doctrinal law (often referred to as `black 
letter law') and law in social science (or socio -legal studies) is that the former adopts 
an internal perspective while the latter adopts an external perspective. While the 
`black letter' approach analyses the law in terms of legal concepts and categories, the 
socio -legal approach analyses the law as a social institution in terms of concepts and 
categories that are derived from the social sciences.120 A second difference is that the 
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black -letter approach tends to focus on `leading' cases, i.e. on those exceptional cases 
which find their way to the superior courts, since it is these cases which (in our 
common law system) create precedents; while the socio -legal approach tends to focus 
on routine cases, since these have the greatest significance for those who are subject 
to them.121 Thus, while `black letter' lawyers use legal argumentation to identify the 
operative rules and principles, socio -legal researchers invoke the social sciences to 
analyse how the law has evolved, how ordinary citizens, lawyers and officials use the 
law and legal institutions, and the impact of law on society. 
The Normative Character of Socio -Legal Studies 
Since what counts as a `fact' only does so in the context of some explanatory scheme 
or theoretical framework, it would be a mistake to think of raw law (quadrant 1) as 
something separate from doctrinal law (quadrant 2). Thus, the categories that are 
used to comprehend `raw law' are actually generated by doctrinal law. Likewise, 
since law is inherently normative, the understanding of law derived from the social 
sciences (quadrant 3) is incomplete unless carried out in conjunction with an analysis 
of values and principles (quadrant 4). Social policy is likewise normative and the 
same argument applies there. What, in my view, makes socio -legal studies (in respect 
of the law) - and social policy (in respect of the making and implementation of policy) 
- distinctive is the fact that, in both cases, social research is (or ought to be) linked to 
philosophical analysis, in particular to the concerns of social, political and legal 
philo sophy. 122 
Conclusions 
The approach to administrative justice that is embodied in the research I have 
undertaken would appear to satisfy each of the three defining characteristics of the 
socio -legal paradigm. It has adopted an external perspective to legal process, which 
seeks to analyse administrative justice in terms of concepts and categories that are 
derived from the social sciences; it has focused on routine, rather than leading, cases; 
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and it has been informed by philosophical analysis. Thus, it can be described, with 
some confidence, as a socio -legal approach. Whether or not it has been successful in 
throwing light on some rather neglected features of public administration is for others 
to judge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO PARENTAL CHOICE* 
SUMMARY 
1. The evidence from a decade of open enrolment in Scotland suggests that 
parental choice has led to an inefficient use of resources, widening disparities 
between schools, increased social segregation and threats to equality of 
educational opportunity. 
2. Although there have been gainers as well as losers, the balance sheet suggests 
that parental choice has been a `negative sum game' in which the gains 
achieved by some pupils have been more than offset by the losses incurred by 
others and by the community as a whole. 
3. It is likely that the outcomes of open enrolment in England will be even more 
problematic. 
4. Recent legislation has not achieved an optimal balance between the rights of 
parents to choose schools for their children and the responsibilities of 
government to promote the education of all children. 
5. An alternative approach to education policy which takes choice seriously but 
attempts to avoid the most unacceptable consequences of recent legislation is 
outlined, the main components of which are as follows: 
(a) Within limits, schools would be encouraged to develop their own 
distinctive characteristics. 
(b) Decisions about school allocation should seek to promote children's 
interests (rather than parental preferences) and would involve teachers 
and older pupils as well as parents. 
* I am very grateful to my colleagues Andrew McPherson, David Raffe and Doug 
Willms, and to Josh Hillman for their very helpful comments to an earlier draft of this 
Briefing. 
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(c) Decisions about school allocation would be made for all children (and 
not just for a minority). Where the number of applicants for a school 
is greater than the number of available places, priority would be given 
to those whose cases are most strongly supported. 
(d) Local authorities would be expected to formulate admissions policies 
for schools. This would provide a measure of protection for schools 
that lose pupils. 
INTRODUCTION 
The aims of this Briefing are (i) to outline and compare English and Scottish 
legislation relating to parental choice, (ii) to review the findings of research on the 
effects of parental choice in Scotland where legislation was introduced more than ten 
years ago, (iii) to assess the likely effects of parental choice in England in the light of 
the 1988 Education Reform Act and subsequent policy developments, and (iv) to put 
forward an alternative approach to parental choice which takes choice seriously but 
seeks to avoid some of the most unacceptable consequences of recent legislation. 
PARENTAL CHOICE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE BORDER 
The 1944 Education Act and the 1945 Education (Scotland) Act gave local 
authorities a broad discretion to determine school admissions. This created few 
problems until the mid -1970s when widespread dissatisfaction with state education 
and political opposition to the extension of comprehensive schooling prompted the 
Conservative Party, which was then in Opposition, to champion parental choice. The 
Conservatives were returned to office in 1979 and soon introduced legislation to this 
effect, first for England and Wales and, soon afterwards, for Scotland. 
The changes brought about by the parental choice provisions in the 1980 Education 
Act and the 1981 Education (Scotland) Act can be interpreted in a number of ways, 
for example: 
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1. As a shift away from an authority -wide approach to school admissions (which 
enables education authorities to prevent overcrowding and under- enrolment, 
deploy resources in an efficient manner and pursue their own conception of 
social justice) towards a parent- centred approach (in which parents decide 
what is best for their children and parents' concerns have priority over those of 
the education authorities). 
2. More generally, as a shift away from a collective -welfare orientation (which 
focuses on the achievement of collective ends, is primarily concerned with the 
overall pattern of decision -making and recognises the necessity for trade -offs 
between the various ends the policy is trying to achieve) towards an 
individual -client orientation (which focuses on each individual case, assumes 
that individuals are capable of deciding and acting for themselves and 
precludes the possibility of trade -offs). 
3. As the first stage of a two -stage deregulation of the educational system which 
seeks to undermine the role of the local authority and replace bureaucratic and 
political forms of accountability with market -like relationships between 
schools and parents. In this two -stage process, the second stage comprises 
the delegation of powers and responsibilities from education authorities to 
individual schools and a greater involvement of parents in their management. 
Until 1988, deregulation had proceeded further in Scotland than in England and 
Wales. This is because the parental choice provisions in the 1981 Education 
(Scotland) Act were considerably stronger than those in the 1980 Education Act and 
Scottish education authorities had much weaker powers to control school admissions 
than local education authorities in England and Wales. 
The position in England and Wales was completely changed by the provisions of the 
1988 Education Reform Act. This strengthened the rights of parents and reduced the 
powers of local education authorities, introducing a form of 'open enrolment' similar 
to that which has existed in Scotland since the early 1980s. Local education 
authorities are now prohibited from imposing their own intake limits and from turning 
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away pupils unless a statutorily- defined number is exceeded. It also introduced a 
substantial degree of delegated financial management. Thus, in England and Wales, 
all secondary schools and most primary schools now receive budgets from the local 
authority which, subject to meeting their statutory obligations, they are free to spend 
as they wish. By contrast, local authorities still determine school budgets in Scotland 
and School Boards only have minor and largely consultative powers.' 
Considering these two sets of developments together, it is clear that demand -side 
deregulation in England and Wales has caught up with its earlier development in 
Scotland while supply -side deregulation has been taken a good deal further. The 
`uncoupling' of schools from local authorities and the replacement of bureaucratic and 
political forms of accountability by market -like relationships between parents and 
schools has been taken a stage further in England and Wales than it has in Scotland. 
How long this disparity will be allowed to continue is a matter for conjecture but the 
recent publication of new guidelines for the devolved management of schools in 
Scotland suggests that the gap is set to close. 
THE IMPACT OF PARENTAL CHOICE IN SCOTLAND 
Since a form of 'open -enrolment' has existed in Scotland for more than a decade and 
there have been a number of pieces of research on the implementation and impact of 
parental choice in Scotland, it is clear that much can be learned from the Scottish 
experience. The latest available figures indicate that 14.9 per cent of pupils in the first 
year of primary school and 11.5 per cent of pupils in the first year of secondary school 
were the subject of a `placing request' (for an alternative to the designated school).2 
There were considerable variations between regions with substantially higher rates in 
the more urban authorities, where a number of schools may be within fairly easy 
reach, and correspondingly lower rates in the more rural authorities, where 
geographical considerations effectively preclude a choice of school for most parents. 
Since 1982/83, the first year in which the legislative provisions were implemented in 
full, the number of placing requests has increased by about 50 per cent. Although 
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most of these placing requests were granted, there has been a significant fall in the 
success rate from 97.8 per cent in 1982/83 to 89.3 per cent in 1990/91 due, mainly, to 
the closure of school annexes, the removal of temporary accommodation and the 
imposition of de facto intake limits to prevent overcrowding. 
About 10 per cent of parents whose requests were turned down appealed to a 
statutory Education Appeal Committee. These committees, which contain a majority 
of councillors, can hardly be described as independent and it is not therefore 
surprising that few appeals are successful at this stage. A very small number of 
parents made a further appeal to the courts. However, most of these cases have been 
deserted by education authorities which have preferred conceding to the individual 
parent to losing the case and having to reconsider those of all the other parents whose 
requests for the school in question had been turned down. Most of the cases that 
have actually been heard by the courts have been decided in favour of the parents. 
Research carried out between 1983 and 1986 by Adler et al assessed the significance 
of the parental choice provisions introduced into Scotland by the 1981 Education 
(Scotland) Acta. The main findings are set out in the panel below. 
1. In the cities, the proportion of placing requests was much higher than in the 
country as a whole. In several cities, it was 20 -25 per cent and in some city 
areas, it was more than 50 per cent. These requests came from right across 
the social class spectrum. However, although there was no overall 
relationship between social class and the exercise of parental choice, there 
were often strong relationships at the local (school) level. 
2. Avoidance of the local (catchment area) school was important for a majority 
of parents who made a placing request in each of our case -study areas. 
3. For a majority of these parents, choice involved finding a satisfactory 
alternative to the local school rather than making an optimal choice from a 
wide range of possible schools. 
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4. In requesting schools for their children, parents claimed that they were 
influenced much more by geographical and social factors, for example 
proximity and discipline, and by the general reputation of the school, than by 
educational considerations, for example the curriculum, teaching methods or 
examination results. Moreover, they relied on rather limited and second -hand 
information about the schools concerned. 
5. Appeal committees tended to uphold the authorities while the courts, on the 
whole, upheld the parents. 
6. Because of declining school rolls and because most intake limits have not been 
challenged in the courts, few schools have been really overcrowded. 
However, some were certainly full to capacity, while.a rather larger number of 
schools were chronically under- subscribed. Nevertheless, there have been 
very few school closures. 
7. On the whole, the schools which gained most pupils were formerly selective 
schools in middle -class areas, while the schools which lost most pupils have 
been those that served local authority housing schemes in deprived peripheral 
areas. 
8. There was considerable evidence of `band wagon' effects, and little evidence 
of the market functioning as a self -correcting mechanism. Success in 
attracting pupils often led to further success while schools that lost pupils 
found it very difficult to prevent the outflow continuing. 
Many of the findings have been confirmed by more recent research. Echols et al have 
shown that the schools which were selected tended to be formerly selective schools 
with above - average attainment levels and pupils from higher socio- economic 
backgrounds, and that the incidence of choice was a function of the opportunities 
available in the local ' community.4 Willms et al have demonstrated that parents 
tended to choose schools with better (unadjusted) examination results and higher 
socio- economic status pupils.5 However, parents found it difficult to gauge the 
'added value' that a school would contribute to their child's examination 
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performance.6 Consequently, parents' choices only marginally benefited their children 
in terms of better examination results. Thus, although parents' choices appear rational 
in the sense that they increase their children's performance in examinations, the effects 
are not as great as they would appear at first sight to be. Moreover, the moderate 
gains for some pupils are associated with high costs for others (in particular pupils at 
schools in deprived areas which lose a substantial number of pupils) and for the 
system as a whole. Although there is no a priori reason why parental choice should 
increase social segregation, the available evidence suggests that it does and that this is 
likely to result in greater inequalities in attainment. 
THE BALANCE SHEET 
Evidence from a decade of open enrolment in Scotland suggests that parental choice 
has resulted in a rather inefficient use of resources since expenditure per pupil is much 
higher in a school with a small roll than a school with a large one.7 It has also led to 
marked differences between schools since, even without formula funding, schools 
which lost pupils also lost staff and resources and could no longer offer comparable 
educational opportunities. Combined with increasing social segregation, parental 
choice poses a serious threat- to equality of educational opportunity with potentially 
very serious implications in a democratic society. In Scotland it has already led to the 
re- emergence of something resembling a two -tier system of secondary schooling in 
the big cities. This is different from the old, two -tier system that existed prior to the 
introduction of comprehensive schooling in that the lower tier now caters for a 
minority of children whereas before it catered for the majority. The existence of a 
small number of rump schools located in the most deprived areas of the big cities is 
clearly a serious cause of concern. 
Although there have clearly been gainers as well as losers from the Scottish 
legislation, the balance sheet suggests that the gains have been relatively small 
compared with the losses. Those who have gained have done so at the expense of 
others and, by and large, those who have lost have been those who could least afford 
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to do so. Thus, parental choice in Scotland appears to have been a 'negative sum' 
game in which the gains achieved by some pupils have been more than offset by the 
losses incurred by others and by the community as a whole. The result of aggregating 
individual choices, which may themselves be rational, is a situation which can fairly be 
described as irrational. Moreover, the problems outlined above can only become 
greater as the incidence of placing requests continues to increase as it will almost 
certainly do. This is partly because education has many of the characteristics of a 
`positional good', i.e. something which is desired because of the status associated 
with having it.8 Since the scarcity value of a positional good diminishes as the number 
of people choosing it increases, 'first order choices' provoke 'second order choices' as 
people attempt to retain their higher status. 
Widening disparities in educational provision can also be attributed to other legislative 
developments. Of particular importance here are the provisions in the 1988 
Education Reform Act (replicated for Scotland, in the 1989 Self -Governing Schools 
etc. (Scotland) Act) which allow parents to decide, in a secret ballot, whether they 
wish their child's school to opt out of local authority control and become a grant - 
maintained (England and Wales) or a self -governing (Scotland) school funded directly 
from central government. Although the final decision rests with the Secretary of 
State, proposals to change the status of the school require the support of a majority of 
parents. Opted -out schools may not change their character or their admissions 
arrangements immediately or without the approval of the Secretary of State, but the 
future direction of policy is quite clear. This has recently been made quite explicit in 
the White Paper which seeks to promote much greater diversity and specialisation in 
schools, to further diminish the role of the local authority and actively to encourage 
opting out.9 The aggregate effect of these changes is almost certain to increase the 
extent of parental choice of school. 
A vital question is whether the impact of parental choice of school in England and 
Wales in the 1990s will resemble the impact of parental choice of school in Scotland 
in the 1980s. Unfortunately, there are several grounds for thinking that it will be 
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considerably more problematic. First, there is less of a tradition of collectivism in 
England than in Scotland and, for this reason alone, the incidence of parental choice in 
English urban areas will probably turn out to be higher than in Scotland. Second, the 
existence of much larger ethnic minority populations in many English cities raises the 
prospect of ethnic segregation on a scale that simply could not exist in Scotland where 
the ethnic minority population is very much smaller. Where, for example, white and 
Asian parents want their children to go to schools with children from similar 
backgrounds, it would appear that there is little a local authority can do to prevent 
this.10 Third, the policy context is very different. The publication of examination 
results will affect schools' reputations (whether deservedly so or not) and will almost 
certainly boost choice while the introduction of formula funding will make it much 
more difficult for local authorities to support schools that may be in need of a measure 
of protection. Although resources may be used more efficiently, they may also be 
used less effectively. Fourth, since more than 300 schools in England have already 
opted out of local authority control while none in Scotland has so far done so and 
since the White Paper (referred to above) only applies to England and Wales, diversity 
and, hence, the rationale for choice are both likely to be more pronounced in England 
and Wales than in Scotland. 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
It does not follow from the arguments set out above that parents should be deprived 
of their rights to express a preference for the schools they wish their children to 
attend. In any case, it would be extremely difficult in practice to bring this about. 
However, a better balance between the rights of parents to choose schools for their 
children and the duties of education authorities to promote the education of all 
children is clearly needed. In the remainder of this Briefing, five proposals which, 
taken together, could help to secure a better balance between these concerns are 
briefly outlined.11 
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1. As a prerequisite, the fiction that all primary and comprehensive secondary 
schools provide an identical set of educational opportunities and the aspiration 
that they should strive to do so should both be abandoned. Over and above 
the common core curriculum, schools should be encouraged to develop 
particular curricular strengths. Schools should also be encouraged to develop 
and promote their own particular teaching styles, institutional ethos and extra- 
curricular activities. These different school characteristics would, in part, 
reflect the views of Governing Bodies and School Boards, in part those of the 
headteacher and the teaching staff, but education authorities would have an 
important role to play in preventing all schools from adopting the same set of 
characteristics and ensuring an appropriate degree of diversity. 
2. In order to ensure the widest possible access to a range of schools with 
different characteristics, school catchment areas should be abandoned. 
Although open enrolment implies that parents may send their children to any 
school, most children still attend the school serving the catchment area in 
which they live. This is because most education authorities still use catchment 
areas and because parents are required to take the initiative if they do not want 
their child to attend -the catchment area school. In towns and cities, school 
catchment areas often do not represent local communities or neighbourhoods. 
Where they do represent local communities or neighbourhoods, they 
constitute the major source of inequality in educational attainment at school 
level and thus the major obstacle to equality of status and parity of esteem 
between schools. 
3. Much more thought needs to be given to the interests that the right of school 
choice is trying to protect. At present, the legislation seeks only to protect 
parents' interests in choice. However, since parents act as agents of their 
children but are not all equally effective in this regard, children's interests need 
to be considered directly. This would entail efforts to ensure that children 
attend those schools which are best suited to their particular personalities and 
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talents. Teachers and parents will often have different views as to what these 
are: it is therefore important to find some means of involving them both in 
decision -making. A recent IPPR report refers to the need to emphasise co- 
operation rather than competition.12 This would call for improved parental 
participation in decision - making rather than increased avoidance of 
unsatisfactory schools, or using Hirschman's terminology, mechanisms that 
enhance `voice' rather than `exit'.13 Discussions between teachers, parents 
and, in the case of older pupils, the pupils themselves would enable all of these 
parties to examine each other's reasoning, and decide what the child's interests 
are and how they can best be furthered. They would lead to recommendations 
for a particular school (or schools) in much the same way that careers guid- 
ance (at a later stage) leads to recommendations for further education, training 
or employment. 
4. Instead of providing an escape -route for a minority of parents who do not 
wish their children to attend the local (catchment area) school, legislation 
would seek to enhance the interests of all children by setting up procedures for 
assessing their needs and identifying the schools at which they are most likely 
to thrive. Where the number of pupils who are matched with a school in this 
way exceeds the number of places available, priority would - subject to local 
authority policy on the composition of the school (see below) - be given to 
those pupils whose cases are most strongly supported through the procedures 
outlined above. This should ensure that schools are chosen for children rather 
than vice versa. 
5. A greater measure of protection would be given to schools that have lost 
pupils and to the pupils who attend these schools. One way of achieving this 
would be to enable education authorities to set limits on the admission of 
pupils to schools that have gained pupils where there are good reasons for so 
doing. Scottish research indicates that the imposition of admission limits on 
the most popular schools can provide a measure of protection for less popular 
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schools although these limits lack statutory force.14 Local authorities would 
still be responsible for formulating a set of general policies, for example in 
relation to minimum, optimum and maximum school sizes and appropriate 
ability, social or racial mixes for schools; 
The proposals outlined above challenge a number of beliefs which are strongly 
supported on the left and the right of the political spectrum. Thus, on the one hand, 
they reject the view that all schools (and all teachers) should be able to cater equally 
well for all children and attach less importance to the links between schools and the 
communities in which they are located; on the other hand, they reject the view that 
parents always know what is best for their children and question the appropriateness 
of internal markets in education. 
Proposals 1 and 2 bear some resemblance to policies that are currently being pursued 
by the government although they differ quite markedly from them in that they 
envisage a much more important and continuing role for local authorities. Proposals 
3, 4 and 5, on the other hand, are rather different in their emphasis in that they seek to 
promote co- operation in place of competition and to offer a greater measure of 
protection to the most vulnerable schools and pupils. Taken together, the five 
proposals constitute an alternative approach to education policy which takes choice 
seriously but attempts to avoid the most unacceptable consequences of recent 
legislation, and to produce better balance between the rights of parents to choose 
schools for their children and the duties of local authorities to promote the education 
of all children for whom they are responsible. 
Although they differ in some respects from proposals outlined in NCE Briefing No. 
7,15 e.g. in the attempt, within limits, to foster diversity, in the involvement of primary 
school teachers in the allocation of children to secondary schools and in the 
procedures for selecting children for schools which are oversubscribed, it is significant 
that they have several common features, e.g. requiring all parents to make a choice, 
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providing help and advice to parents and paying for children's transport to and from 
school. 
CONCLUSION 
Liberal economic theory assumes that individuals are the best judges of what is in 
their own interests. Whether or not this is true, it is fairly clear that parents are not 
necessarily the best judges of what is in their children's interests. However, this 
situation is not one which parents themselves can remedy. The problem is structural 
rather than motivational. Institutional changes, which would enable all parents, with 
the assistance of teachers, to make more informed choices about the types of school 
which would best promote their children's learning and thus further their children's 
interests, and which would re- emphasise some of the legitimate collective policy 
concerns which have been eclipsed by the construction of a `quasi market' in 
education need to be introduced.16 It would be fanciful to suggest that the task is 
going to be easy, but it would similarly be defeatist to conclude that, because it is 
clearly going to be difficult, it should not be attempted. 
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PARENTAL CHOICE AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF CHILDREN'S 
INTERESTS 
I have suggested elsewhere' that the changes brought about by the parental choice 
provisions in the 1980 Education Act and the 1981 Education (Scotland) Act (which 
were inserted into the 1980 Education (Scotland) Act) can be interpreted in a number 
of ways: 
As a shift away from an authority -wide approach to school admissions (which 
enables education authorities to prevent overcrowding and under- enrolment, 
deploy resources in an efficient manner and pursue their own conception of 
social justice) towards a parent- centred approach (in which parents decide 
what is best for their children and parents' concerns have priority over those of 
the education authorities). 
More generally, as a shift away from a collective -welfare orientation (which 
focuses on the achievement of collective ends, is primarily concerned with the 
overall pattern of decision -making, develops rules and procedures to achieve 
the programme's ends, and recognises the necessity for trade -offs between the 
various ends the policy is trying to achieve) towards an individual -client 
orientation (which focuses on each individual case, respects individual 
autonomy and assumes that individuals are capable of deciding and acting for 
themselves, allows individuals to challenge unfavourable decisions and 
precludes the possibility of trade -offs). 
As the first step of a two -part deregulation of the educational system in which 
market -like relationships between schools and parents replace bureaucratic 
and political forms of accountability. In this two -stage process, the first stage 
comprised the introduction of the delegation of powers and responsibilities 
from education authorities to individual schools and a greater involvement of 
parents in their management. 
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Prior to 1988, deregulation had proceeded further in Scotland than in England and 
Wales. This is because the parental choice provisions in the 1981 Education 
(Scotland) Act were considerably stronger than the analogous provisions in the 1980 
Education Act, and Scottish education authorities had much weaker powers to 
control school admissions than local education authorities in England and Wales. 
Under both pieces of legislation, parents were given a statutory right to request the 
school they wished their children to attend, the circumstances in which authorities 
could reject parents' requests were restricted, and parents were given the right of 
appeal to a specially constituted appeal committee. However, the two pieces of 
legislation differed in three important respects: 
While the statutory exceptions to the authority's duty to comply were broad 
and general in the English legislation, they were much more specific in the 
Scottish legislation. The primary exception in England, which applied (under 
Section 6(3) of the 1980 Education Act) when compliance `would prejudice 
the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources', enabled 
an authority to justify a refusal by referring to conditions in schools other than 
the one requested by the parents. By contrast, the primary exceptions in 
Scotland, which applied (under Section 28A(3) (a) of the 1980 Education 
(Scotland) Act) when compliance would either entail the appointment of an 
extra teacher or significant extensions or alterations to the school or `be likely 
to he seriously detrimental to the order or discipline of the school or to the 
educational well -being of the pupils there', meant that the authority could only 
refer to conditions at the school requested by the parents. 
Whereas in England the decision of the appeal committee was final, in 
Scotland parents could appeal against an adverse appeal committee decision to 
the courts. This not only gave parents a second chance to appeal but also 
allowed appeals to be heard by a sheriff, whose civil jurisdiction is roughly 
equivalent to that of an English county court judge, who is clearly independent 
of the local authority and less likely than an appeal committee to be 
predisposed in favour of its concerns. 
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 When an appeal is upheld in Scotland, either by an appeal committee or a 
sheriff, the authority is required to review the cases of all parents in similar 
circumstances who have not appealed and, if its decisions are unchanged, it 
must grant the parents a further right of appeal. There were no analogous 
provisions in the English legislation.2 
It is true that stronger demand -side deregulation in Scotland was partially offset by a 
greater degree of supply -side deregulation in England and Wales. Thus, school 
governing bodies in England and Wales had somewhat greater powers than Schools 
Councils in Scotland but this was of little significance since neither was in any position 
to mount a serious challenge to the centralised decision -making powers of the local 
authority. 
The position in England and Wales was completely changed by the provisions of the 
1988 Education Reform Act. In relation to parental choice, the Act strengthened the 
rights of parents and reduced the powers of local education authorities, introducing a 
foiin of 'open enrolment' similar to what Scotland has had since the early 1980s. 
Local education authorities were prohibited from setting maximum admission limits 
below the physical capacity of the school and from refusing to admit children when 
there was room for them at the schools. Section 26(1) of the Act equates `physical 
capacity' with the `standard number' and stipulates that `the authority ... shall not fix 
as the number of pupils in any relevant age group it intends to admit to the school in 
any school year less than the relevant standard number' which is defined (under 
Section 27(1)) as either the number of pupils admitted to the school in 1979, when 
school rolls were substantially higher than they were a decade later, or the number 
admitted in the previous year whichever is the greater. 
In relation to the local management of schools, the 1988 Education Reform Act 
introduced a degree of delegated financial management which is substantially greater 
than that envisaged even under the `ceiling' provisions of the 1988 School Boards 
(Scotland) Act. Thus, in England and Wales, the governing bodies of all secondary 
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schools and primary schools with more than two hundred pupils now receive budgets 
from the local authority that they are free to spend as they wish. The budget covers 
the vast majority of schools' running costs, including staff salaries. School governors 
can decide what to spend the budget on, that is how much should go on teachers' 
salaries and how much, say, on support staff or school equipment. Schools are 
expected to operate rather as though they are small businesses: their income depends, 
to a very large extent, on their success in attracting pupils since about 70 per cent of 
the local authority's education budget is distributed to schools by means of a formula 
(which must be approved by the Secretary of State) in which a minimum of 
seventy -five per cent is in direct proportion to pupil numbers, weighted by age.3 By 
contrast, schools do not control their own budgets in Scotland and school boards only 
have limited powers.4 These include taking part in the appointment of senior staff, 
approving the headteacher's plans for buying books and materials and receiving and 
making representation on reports from the headteacher and the education authority. 
Under the 1988 School Boards (Scotland) Act, school boards can ask to be given 
further powers, for example to decide which children can enter the school, to 
determine what is taught in the school and to `hire and fire' staff, but none has 
actually done so. 
Considering these two sets of developments together, it is clear that demand -side 
deregulation in England and Wales has caught up with its earlier development in 
Scotland while supply -side deregulation has been taken a good deal further. The 
`uncoupling' of schools from local authorities and the replacement of bureaucratic and 
political forms of accountability by market -like relationships between parents and 
schools has been taken a stage further in England and Wales than it has in Scotland. 
How long this disparity will be allowed to continue, particularly following the 1992 
election victory for the Conservatives, is a matter for conjecture. 
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THE IMPACT OF PARENTAL CHOICE IN SCOTLAND 
In an attempt to assess the significance of the parental choice provisions introduced 
into Scotland by the 1981 Education (Scotland) Act, Alison Petch, Jack Tweedie and 
I carried out a programme of research into the origins, implementation and impact of 
the legislation. Our research was carried out between 1983 and 1986 and reported on 
in a recently published book.5 Our main findings were as follows: 
Across Scotland, about ten per cent of parents have made a placing request' 
for their child, at entry to primary school and at transfer to secondary school. 
(The latest available figures (Scottish Office Education Department, 1991) 
indicate that 14.2 per cent of the parents of children in Primary 1 (P1) and 
11.1 per cent of the parents of children in Secondary 1 (S1) made a placing 
request in 1989/90.) However, in the cities, the proportion has been much 
higher (20 -25 per cent) and, in some city areas, it has been more than 50 per 
cent. 
These requests have come from right across the social class spectrum. 
However, although there was no overall relationship between social class and 
parental choice, there were often strong relationships at the local (school) 
level. Whether or not this has led to increased social segregation is an 
important question, although it is not one which we were in a position to 
answer. 
Avoidance of the district school was important for a majority of parents who 
made a placing request in each of our case -study areas. For the 150 parents of 
P1 children in our sample who made a placing request, avoidance of the 
district school was important for 60 per cent (range 54 to 78 per cent in three 
case -study areas); for the 290 parents of S1 children in our sample who made 
a placing request, it was important for 69 per cent (range 61 to 81 per cent in 
four case study areas). For a majority of these parents, choice involved 
finding a satisfactory alternative to the district school father than making an 
optimal choice from a wide range of possible schools. At S 1, 62 per cent of 
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those who made (or considered making) a placing request considered only one 
alternative to the district school while 27 per cent considered two alternatives. 
At P1, the tendency was even more marked; 79 per cent considered only one 
alternative and a further 17 per cent chose two. 
In requesting schools for their children, parents were influenced much more by 
geographical and social factors, for example proximity and discipline, and by 
the general reputation of the school, than by educational considerations, for 
example the curriculum, teaching methods or examination results. They relied 
on rather limited and second -hand information about the schools concerned. 
Most requests (about 93 per cent) have been granted either initially or on 
appeal. However, there has been a significant drop (from 96 per cent in 
1982/3 to 89 percent in 1989/90) in the number of successful requests for 
secondary schools as authorities have closed annexes, removed temporary 
accommodation and imposed intake limits to prevent overcrowding.6 
Appeal committees have tended to uphold the authorities while the courts 
have, on the whole, upheld the parents. This is not altogether surprising. 
Appeal committees contain a majority of councillors and members receive 
little or no training The courts always prefer to individualise disputes - thus 
most sheriffs have focused on the single child who is the subject of the appeal 
rather than the intake limits set by the authority. Since it is very difficult to 
argue that the admission of one more child would have any significant effect 
on a school, most sheriffs have decided in favour of parents. It is fortunate for 
the authorities that few parents have appealed to the sheriff; in one authority, 
where there have been a substantial number of appeals, the authority routinely 
concedes the case at this point. 
Because of declining school rolls and because most intake limits have not been 
challenged in the courts, few schools have really been overcrowded. 
However, some of them are certainly full to capacity, while a rather larger 
number of schools are chronically under- subscribed. Some secondary schools 
in urban areas now have first -year intakes of substantially less than one 
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hundred pupils. In 1985, two out of twenty non -denominational secondaries 
in one city we studied and two out of ten in another had first -year intakes of 
less than 100; by 1988, the number of such schools had risen to eight. 
On the whole, the schools that have gained most pupils have been the formerly 
selective schools in middle -class areas. In contrast the schools that have lost 
most pupils have been those that serve local authority housing schemes in 
deprived peripheral areas. The effects of these movements on aggregate 
attainment levels and on the distribution of attainment between schools and 
pupils remain to be seen, but could well be quite substantial. 
There was considerable evidence of `band- wagon' effects, and little evidence 
of the market functioning as a self -correcting mechanism. This is presumably 
because schools with diminishing rolls lose resources and parental support and 
frequently experience a fall in morale, all of which make it more difficult for 
them to attract additional pupils. The continuing decline in school age 
population has meant that few schools have actually been overcrowded. 
These outcomes have given rise to a very inefficient use of resources since, other 
things being equal, expenditure per pupil is much higher in a school with a small roll 
than a school with a large one.' There have also been widening inequalities between 
schools since, even without formula funding, schools that lose pupils also lose staff 
and resources and can no longer offer comparable educational opportunities. The 
result of aggregating individual choices that may themselves be rational is a situation 
that many people would describe as irrational.8 Perhaps more importantly, the threat 
to equality of educational opportunity has potentially very serious implications for a 
democratic society. In Scotland it has already led to the re- emergence of a two -tier 
system of secondary schooling in the big cities. This is different from the old, two -tier 
system that existed prior to the introduction of comprehensive schooling in that the 
lower tier now caters for a minority of working -class children whereas before it 
catered for the majority. However, the existence of a small rump of what are, in 
effect, junior secondary (secondary modern) schools located in the most deprived 
areas of the big cities is surely a cause of concern. What will happen when school 
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rolls start to increase (as they will in a few years' time) and the second stage of 
deregulation starts to take effect (in England and Wales if not for the moment in 
Scotland) remains to be seen. 
Although there have clearly been gainers as well as losers from the Scottish 
legislation, the balance sheet suggests that it has not achieved an optimum balance 
between the rights of parents (to choose schools for their children) and the duties of 
education authorities (to promote the education of all the children for whom they 
have responsibility). Although some children may have gained from the legislation, it 
would seem that they have gained at the expense of others and that those who have 
lost are those who could least afford to do so. 
PARENTAL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
There would seem to be a prima facie case for arguing that the parental choice 
provisions in the 1981 Education (Scotland) Act offend not once but twice against 
John Rawls' second principle of justice for institutions. According to Rawls,9 justice 
requires that social and economic inequalities should he arranged so that they are 
both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with 
the just savings principle; and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity. 
The just savings principle refers to the sacrifices which people in one generation may 
make in order to secure advantages for those, including the least advantaged, in 
subsequent generations. One would need to have a great deal of faith in the `trickle - 
down' effects of market forces in order to justify the educational disadvantages which 
the legislation has imposed on the most deprived children in the most deprived areas 
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of society in order to satisfy the first condition. In any case, as Jonathan10 has pointed 
out, 
`Unless it is argued that ability and talent standardly correlate with 
parental agent -effectiveness (i.e. parental choice) then the predictable 
allocation of prizes in the market- competitive education game must 
represent a regrettable waste of human capital.' 
Since children's access to schools is mediated through their parents, and some parents 
will actively seek to promote their children's interests while others are indifferent 
towards them, it cannot be argued, from the standpoint of children, that schools are 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Thus, the parental choice 
provisions in the legislation do not appear to satisfy the second condition either. 
It does not follow, or at least it should not follow from anything I have written so far, 
that a `rights strategy' should be abandoned and that parents should he deprived of 
their rights to choose, or at least, express a preference for the schools they wish their 
children to attend. I should add, in parentheses, that even if this were thought to he 
desirable in principle it would be extremely difficult to bring this about in practice. If 
I have understood her correctly, I part company at this point with Jonathan's 
otherwise admirable critique of recent changes in educational policyll in that she 
would appear to be prepared to do just that. 
My own position is that parents do have a legitimate concern with their own children's 
education and that this does extend to choice of school, and indeed to choice of 
subject (and possibly even to choice of teacher) within the school. This is because 
schools are not and ought not to be identical in all respects, and because some 
children will be happier and perform better in some schools; other schools will be 
more congenial and more appropriate for other children. At the same time, education 
authorities do have a legitimate concern with the education of all children in the 
community. 
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GOOD SCHOOLING AS A SOCIAL RIGHT 
As Brighouse and Tomlinson emphasise in a recent Institute of Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) paper,12 `it ought to be the entitlement of every child to attend a successful 
school'. They go on to argue that this necessarily demands some fettering of the 
application of market principles to the provision of education since these principles 
produce `losers' as well as `winners'. However, this situation undermines the basis of 
citizenship. They argue: 
`To accept such a state of affairs in the design of provision and 
management of schools is to accept that some of our future citizens, 
through no fault of their own, are doomed to receive education in 
schools known to be "failing ".' 
Like Brighouse and Tomlinson, I would also argue that every child ought to attend a 
`successful' school and that market principles cannot be applied to education because 
they would result in some children going to schools that are clearly `unsuccessful'. 
However, it is important to emphasise that there is no agreement, and probably never 
will be any agreement, as to what constitutes a `good' or `successful' school. This is 
because `good schooling' and `successful schooling' are `essentially contested 
concepts' 13 - there exist a number of coherent, plausible, and attractive conceptions 
of the `good' or `successful' school, each of which rests on different sets of value 
assumptions. The publication of `league tables' comparing the examination results of 
pupils in secondary schools, such as those released just before the election by the then 
Scottish Education Minister14 and even the development of more sophisticated 
measures of the `added value' which can be attributed to the schoo115 convey the 
impression that schools can be ranked in terms of a single criterion. Schools can, of 
course, be ranked on other criteria and, in terms of this particular criterion, schools 
with the same score (on either scale) may have little in common with each other. In 
any case, different pupils respond to different schools in different ways - thus, those 
school characteristics which are conducive to a particular conception of `success' for 
108 
one child may be quite different from those which are conducive to the same 
conception of `success' for another child. 
A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE 
CONCERNS: FOUR PROPOSALS 
It is my contention that, in the recent past, many authorities were not sufficiently 
sensitive to parental concerns, but that, in attempting to redress this imbalance, 
legislation has placed too much emphasis on parental choice, and that this has, in turn, 
led to the re- emergence of unacceptable educational inequalities. Thus, the correct 
balance between individual rights and social justice, and between parental choice and 
equality of educational opportunity has still to be found. In the remainder of this 
chapter I propose to indicate how I think a better balance could be struck. 
Encouraging diversity 
As a prerequisite, I think it will be important to abandon the fiction that all primary 
and (comprehensive) secondary schools provide an identical set of educational 
opportunities and the aspiration that they should strive to do so. The common core 
curriculum (whether introduced on a consensual basis as in Scotland or imposed, by 
statute, as in England and Wales) provides the key to this. Over and above the 
common core curriculum, schools should be encouraged to develop particular 
curricular strengths, for example in music, the arts, sports, modern languages or 
technology. Education authorities could play a very important role here, similar to 
that played by the Universities Funding Council (UFC) in relation to universities, in 
the allocation of minority subjects to particular schools. In addition to developing 
particular curricular strengths, schools should also be encouraged to advance their 
own particular teaching styles, institutional ethos and extra - curricular activities. Of 
course, schools already differ in all these respects: what I am advocating is that they 
should be far more explicit about these differences than they currently are. Some 
schools might emphasise progressive child- centred learning while others stressed 
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traditional didactic teaching; some might draw attention to their orderly, structured 
and disciplined atmosphere while others referred to their encouraging, non- 
authoritarian and tolerant characteristics; and different schools would highlight 
particular after- school activities, school exchanges and trips and competitive sports 
fixtures which they were particularly keen to promote. These different school 
characteristics would reflect, in part, the views of school boards and school governing 
bodies and, in part, those of the headteacher and the teaching staff, but education 
authorities would have an important role to play in preventing all schools from 
adopting a common set of characteristics, and in ensuring an appropriate degree of 
diversity. 
Abolishing catchment areas 
In order to ensure the widest possible access to a range of schools with different 
characteristics, all artificial barriers to school admissions should be abandoned. I am 
referring here, in particular, to school catchment areas. Although open enrolment 
implies that parents may send their child to any school, almost ninety per cent of 
children in Scotland (and, one may assume, a similar proportion in England and 
Wales) still attend the school serving the catchment area in which they live. This is 
because most education authorities still use catchment areas and because parents are 
required to take the initiative if they do not want their child to attend the catchment 
area school. In towns and cities, it is rarely the case that school catchment areas 
represent local communities or neighbourhoods and more common for them to reflect 
administrative boundaries which have little salience for the population. Where they do 
represent local communities or neighbourhoods, they constitute the major source of 
inequality in educational attainment at school level and thus the major obstacle to 
equality of status and parity of esteem between schools. Of course, if children are to 
he really free to attend schools outside their neighbourhoods, free travel will probably 
have to be provided. 
110 
Promoting children's interests 
Much more thought needs to be given to the interests that the right of school choice is 
trying to protect. At present, the legislation seeks only to protect parents' interests in 
choice. Since, as Jonathan16 points out very clearly, parents act as agents of their 
children but are not all equally effective in this regard, we need to consider children's 
interests directly. As schools already differ in many ways and would differ even more 
if my proposals were enacted, this would entail efforts to ensure that children attend 
those schools that are best suited to their particular personalities and talents. 
Teachers and parents will often have different views as to what these are: it is 
therefore important to find some means of involving them both in decision -making. In 
another recent IPPR paper, Miliband17 refers to the need to emphasise co- operation 
rather than competition. 
`It is the rules governing choice /preference that tilt the balance towards 
competition or co- operation but no system can eradicate either of 
them. The trick is to promote collaboration at all levels: between 
pupils, between parents and teachers and between teachers and LEAs.' 
If all schools were required to produce genuinely informative prospectuses; if parents 
and pupils were encouraged to visit all the schools concerned (rather than discouraged 
as is often the case at present); and if discussions were to take place between teachers, 
parents and, in the case of older pupils, the pupils themselves, this would enable 
teachers, parents and pupils to examine each other's reasoning, to decide what the 
child's interests were and how they could best be furthered. Miliband continues. 
`Education and public services require a far more interactive 
relationship between client and provider. Parental input to school 
choice, often assumed to be inimical to a co- operative school system, 
can help match children to schools. ... Involving parents in choosing 
schools can be the first step towards a more productive relationship 
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between school and parent for the rest of the child's school career: 
education is, after all, a partnership.' 
It is worth mentioning in this context that, if `norm -referencing', which is currently 
the dominant approach to testing in primary and secondary schools, were to be 
replaced by `criterion -referencing', teachers could use children's test results to discuss 
their progress to date with their parents and to advise on what would best promote 
their progress in future. 
Protecting vulnerable schools 
A greater measure of protection needs to be given to schools that have lost pupils and 
to the pupils who attend these schools. Parental choice has produced a number of 
chronically under- subscribed schools (mainly in deprived urban areas) which cannot 
provide educational opportunities comparable to those provided by other schools. 
However, in a democratic society, it is widely regarded as unacceptable that some 
children, through no fault of their own, should have many fewer educational 
opportunities than others. One way of preventing this would be to enable education 
authorities to set limits on admissions of pupils to schools which have gained pupils 
where there are good reasons for so doing, even if school rolls are less than the 
physical capacity of the schools (as in Scotland) or the numbers admitted in 1979 
when school rolls were at their peak (as in England and Wales). Our own research 
indicated that the imposition of admissions limits on the most popular schools in one 
of the cities we studied provided a measure of protection for less popular schools 
although these limits lacked statutory force.18 
Over and above that I would wish to reactivate a set of proposals which Bondi and I 
put forward in an article on the problems created by falling primary school rolls.19 
These involve the (local) education authority in determining a set of general policies, 
for example in relation to minimum, optimum and maximum school sizes and 
facilities, appropriate ability, social or racial mixes for schools, and in deciding on the 
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level of financial support available for groups of schools serving particular 
communities. The education authority would, in addition, be responsible for costing 
and identifying the advantages and disadvantages of different configurations of 
schooling for the area, as Strathclyde Region has recently done20 and as Lothian 
Region is currently doing. However, the decision as to which configuration would be 
adopted would not be taken by the education authority (as was the case in Strathclyde 
and Lothian) but, rather, by the affected parties in the local community. In this way, 
within the budgetary limits and the policy constraints laid down by the education 
authority, local communities could decide which configuration of schooling they 
preferred. It would, however, be incumbent on the education authority to lay down 
the procedures which local communities would be required to follow in reaching a 
decision. 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO PARENTAL CHOICE 
Taken together, the four proposals outlined above constitute an alternative approach 
to education policy which takes choice seriously but, by structuring choice differently 
and altering some aspects of the context in which choice takes place, attempts to 
avoid some of the most unacceptable consequences of parental choice as constituted 
by the 1981 Education (Scotland) Act and, in all probability, by the 1988 Education 
Reform Act. In particular, it seeks a means of promoting children's interests and 
rehabilitating some legitimate collective policy concerns which have been entirely 
subordinated to parental choice by the 1981 Act in Scotland and the 1988 Act in 
England and Wales. 
Because the most unacceptable consequences of parental choice are to be found in 
large towns and cities, the proposals outlined above are likely to have their greatest 
impact there. However, that is a strength rather than a weakness. In any case, they 
are likely to have some impact on all schools, including rural schools and schools 
serving sparsely populated areas where parental choice is of little significance. Such 
schools would be enjoined to eschew monolithic characteristics and to avoid 
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competing with each other on a single set of criteria. They could, in fact, be 
encouraged to assume some of the characteristics of the `omnibus school', first 
advocated as a model for secondary education by the Advisory Council on Education 
in 194721 just as the omnibus school would have catered for all (academic and non- 
academic) pupils from a given area, albeit in rather different ways, so schools serving 
large areas could be encouraged to develop a number of different teaching styles and 
curricular programmes for children who would derive particular benefits from them. 
Such schools would attempt to provide a diversity of provision under one roof which 
compares with that offered by a number of different schools in an urban area. The 
modem department store which sub -lets floor space to a variety of retailers provides a 
model for such a school. 
RESPONSES TO CRITICISM 
The proposals outlined above have been criticised from many quarters. One set of 
critics is concerned that the core curricula for pupils aged between five and fourteen 
in Scotland and in England and Wales are so congested that schools are in no position 
to develop particular curricular strengths. However, the existence of specialist music 
schools, denominational schools and City Technology Colleges, as well as the very 
considerable de facto variations in the curricular offerings of primary as well as 
secondary schools suggest that this criticism is not a particularly strong one. To the 
extent that the existing national curriculum is felt to impose too much of a straitjacket 
on individual schools, it would be appropriate to relax it somewhat. 
A second set of critics has pointed out that, although different teachers adopt different 
teaching styles, teachers in a given school are likely to adopt a range of approaches to 
classroom teaching. This is particularly so in secondary schools where different 
departments may teach their subjects in different ways. Thus, even if it were possible 
to produce a robust characterisation of teaching styles it is inappropriate according to 
these critics to refer to a school's teaching style. Although I do concede that there is 
some force to this criticism, I think it is overstated. While it is clear that matching can 
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never be an exact science, choices that are informed by some familiarity with the 
modes of teaching which the child is likely to encounter (along with other aspects of 
the school) should help parents and teachers make more informed choices which 
better promote the interests of the child. 
A third set of critics has pointed out that the suggestion that schools might adopt 
different teaching styles has implications for assessment and would only be feasible if 
there were corresponding changes in the examination system. This is clearly correct 
and the two sets of changes would have to proceed hand in hand. However, it is 
worth noting that the development of criterion referencing and the increasing use of 
school -based assessment (until government called a halt to these developments) 
suggest that the examination system is capable of taking on board a wider range of 
teaching styles than are presently to be found in order to do justice to pupils who 
learn best and have been taught in different ways. 
A fourth set of critics has argued that attendance at a primary school with a particular 
curricular emphasis might disadvantage a child when it comes to choosing a 
secondary school. However, the fact that parents and teachers would jointly aim to 
match a child having a given set of aptitudes and abilities with a school that was 
conducive to that particular child suggests that this criticism is not a particularly 
strong one. 
A fifth set of critics has suggested that we lack the knowledge to match children with 
schools and has expressed concern that the process would inevitably come to depend 
on intelligence and personality tests of dubious validity. While I am certainly not of 
the view that matching could ever be an exact science and would be vigorously 
opposed to the use of any tests other than the criterion -based tests that would be 
supported by the large majority of teachers, I cannot accept that education is, or 
ought to be, any different from several other areas of professional activity, for 
example medicine, social work and criminal justice, in which what is known as 
`differential diagnosis and treatment' is applied. In any case, if matching were to be 
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seen as an ongoing process rather than a once -and -for -all event (or, at best, two such 
events, one for primary school and the other for secondary school) and became part of 
an annual pupil appraisal, the risk of `failure' would be greatly reduced as there would 
be repeated opportunities to correct `mistakes' when these became apparent. 
A sixth set of critics point out that parents and teachers would not necessarily agree 
on what was best for the child. This is obviously true - parents and teachers do not 
always agree now in their assessment of the children's ability or potential or over 
issues like subject choice or examination presentations. However, this objection 
should not be overstated since many parents and teachers reach agreement now and 
more could be expected to reach agreement after a full discussion. And, where they 
fail to agree, then subject to the availability of a place, the parent's view would still 
prevail much as it does today. 
CONCLUSION 
Liberal economic theory assumes that individuals are the best judges of what is in 
their own best interests. Whether or not this is true, it is fairly clear that parents are 
not necessarily the best judges of what is in their children's best interests. However, 
this situation is not one which parents can themselves remedy. The problem is 
structural rather than motivational. Institutional changes which would enable parents, 
with the assistance of teachers, to make more informed choices about the types of 
school which would best promote their children's learning and thus further their 
children's interests and which would re- emphasise some of the legitimate collective 
policy concerns which have been eclipsed by the construction of a `quasi market' in 
education22 need to be introduced. It would be fanciful to suggest that the task is 
going to be easy, but it would similarly be defeatist to conclude that, because it is 
clearly going to be difficult, it should not be attempted. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LOOKING BACKWARDS TO THE FUTURE: PARENTAL CHOICE AND 
EDUCATION POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
Policy research, as distinct from research for policy makers, should be emancipatory. 
It should be mindful of the policy agenda and seek to illuminate problems and 
potentialities with a view to avoiding the former and exploiting the latter. As such, it 
is a clearly a value -laden enterprise but this need not be problematic if these values are 
made explicit. In this paper, I look back on a programme of research on parental 
choice which I carried out more than 10 years ago and explain how this was related to 
the policy agenda at the time. After summarising the main findings, the research is 
subjected to some criticism - in particular for its parochialism and its failure to adopt 
a comparative perspective. The paper then reviews policy developments in Scotland 
and England since that time, describes the current policy agenda and indicates how 
further research might respond to this. It concludes that the key policy issue to which 
research should now be addressed is the relationship between choice and diversity and 
argues that this problem should be studied comparatively across a number of different 
educational systems through research which seeks to investigate the implications of 
each for the other and for other societal values. 
RESEARCH IN THE 1980s 
In the mid- 1980s, together with my colleagues Alison Petch and Jack Tweedie, I 
carried out a programme of research on the socio -legal and policy implications of the 
parental choice provisions in the 1981 Education (Scotland) Act. The programme of 
research, which was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, comprised 
five inter- related projects as follows: 
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 a study of the origins and parliamentary consideration of parental choice 
legislation for England and Wales as well as Scotland. Our aims here were to 
examine the emergence of parental choice as an issue; to study the policy - 
making processes which culminated in legislation; and to explain why the two 
pieces of legislation differed in significant ways. 
a study of the implementation of the Scottish legislation by three education 
authorities. Here the aim was to examine how these authorities responded to 
the legislation; to describe the process of dealing with placing requests (the 
term used in the legislation to describe requests for a school other than the one 
to which the child had been assigned by the education authority) and the 
outcome of this process; and to identify the problems it gave rise to. 
a survey of 1,000 parents with children about to enter primary school or to 
transfer from primary to secondary school designed, inter alia, to elicit the 
characteristics of parents who made a placing requests and their reasons for so 
doing. 
a detailed study of appeals to appeal committees and the courts. Our concerns 
here were to describe how appeals were dealt with and to examine their 
impact on the policy and practice of the authorities concerned. 
an analysis of the flow of children between schools, which attempted to 
explain these movements, to identify the characteristics of schools which 
gained and lost pupils as a result of parental choice, and to describe the impact 
of parental choice on admissions to primary and secondary schools. 
The research was carried out between 1983 and 1986 and led to a series of published 
articles, unpublished reports and a book.1 
120 
We concluded that both pieces of legislation could best be understood as political 
rather than educational initiatives and were enacted in spite of the opposition of the 
main interest groups. Parental choice legislation for England and Wales was 
promoted by the Conservative Opposition and various neo- liberal `think tanks' during 
the period 1974 -1979 as an electorally- popular response to perceived dissatisfaction 
with educational provision. However, when the Conservatives were returned to 
office in 1979, their commitment to parental choice was tempered by their 
determination to reduce public expenditure and the parental choice provisions in the 
1980 Education Act reflect a compromise between these concerns. Somewhat 
paradoxically, since there was less perceived dissatisfaction with education in 
Scotland and less pressure for change, the Scottish legislation contained substantially 
stronger rights for parents and imposed greater restrictions on education authorities 
than the English legislation. This reflected a different political judgement by a 
different Minister of the extent to which education authorities could be trusted not to 
undermine the government's intentions. The fact that the Scottish legislation was 
different from that in England illustrates the thesis developed by McPherson and 
Raab2 that, for issues of high political salience (like parental choice), policy making in 
Scotland involves the separate elaboration of items drawn from the UK policy agenda. 
The Scottish legislation had a similar impact on each of the three authorities that were 
studied in detail. Each was confronted by substantial numbers of placing requests at 
entry to primary school and transfer to secondary school and, in some cases, these 
resulted in substantial imbalances in school intakes. However, the authorities differed 
in the extent to which they responded by imposing 'intake limits' on oversubscribed 
schools. 
At both primary and secondary levels, parents who made placing requests represented 
a wide cross section of the community. Choice appeared to be motivated by 
pragmatic and practical concerns rather than by educational considerations. Parents 
who made a placing request were influenced more by geographical and social 
considerations, for example proximity and safety at primary level; discipline and the 
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child's preferences at secondary level, and by the general reputation of the school, 
rather than by educational considerations, for example the curriculum, teaching 
methods or examination results. Although most parents appeared to rely on rather 
limited and second -hand information about schools, they were reasonably well 
informed about their rights and supported the view that education authorities should 
be able to refuse placing requests where failure to do so would lead to overcrowding. 
`Push' seemed to be more important than `pull'. Thus avoidance of the local 
(catchment area) school where this was deemed to be unsatisfactory was the main 
concern for a majority of parents who made placing requests and `choice' usually 
involved selecting the nearest satisfactory alternative to the local school rather than 
making an optimal choice from a wide range of accessible schools. It involved 
`satisficing' rather than 'optimising' .3 
Appeal Committees appeared to be exclusively concerned with whether or not the 
authority had applied its own policy correctly. Most sheriffs allowed parental 
preferences to prevail unless the individual's circumstances justified an exception. As 
a result, some education authorities felt able to fix and impose intake limits while 
others did not. However, because of falling school rolls and because most intake 
limits were not challenged in the courts, few schools were seriously overcrowded. A 
few schools were full to capacity while a rather larger number were chronically under - 
subscribed. In spite of this, there were very few school closures. 
Detailed statistical analysis indicated that the majority of placing requests were to an 
adjacent primary school or to a secondary school involving a short journey. 
Movement between primary schools was towards larger primary schools and schools 
whose catchment areas contained fewer social problems but the effect on school mix 
was relatively small. Movement between secondary schools was also towards larger 
schools, schools with higher staying -on rates, and schools with better unadjusted 
examination results. On the whole, the schools which gained most pupils were 
formerly selective schools in middle class areas, while the schools which lost most 
pupils were formerly non -selective schools serving local authority housing schemes in 
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deprived peripheral areas. Strong relationships between social class and movements 
between schools at the local level had a considerable effect on the social composition 
of some schools. There was strong evidence of `band -wagon effects',4 i.e. of parents 
opting for particular schools because they perceive other parents to be doing so, and 
little evidence of any self -correcting mechanisms at work. Schools which were 
successful in attracting pupils often had even greater success in subsequent years 
while schools which lost pupils found it very difficult to stop the outflow. 
SCOTLAND AS `TRAIL BLAZER' 
Since the parental choice provisions in the 1981 Education (Scotland) Act established 
considerably stronger rights and imposed substantially greater restrictions on 
education authorities than the equivalent provisions in the 1980 Education Act, it 
made a great deal of sense, in the mid- 1980s, to study parental choice in Scotland 
rather than in England and Wales. Although the two pieces of legislation had a 
number of common features in that both gave parents a statutory right to select the 
schools they wished their children to attend, restricted the circumstances in which 
parents' requests could be rejected by education authorities, and established a right of 
appeal to a specially -constituted administrative tribunal (known as an Education 
Appeal Committee), they differed in a number of important respects. 
While the statutory exceptions to the authority's duty to comply were specific 
and relatively difficult to satisfy in Scotland, they were much broader and 
rather easier to satisfy in England and Wales. The primary exception in 
England, which applied when compliance `would prejudice the provision of 
efficient education or the efficient use of resources' enabled an authority to 
justify a refusal by referring to conditions at schools other than the one 
requested by parents. By contrast, the primary exceptions in Scotland, which 
applied when compliance would entail either the appointment by the education 
authority of an extra teacher or significant extensions or alterations to the 
school or `be likely to be seriously detrimental to order or discipline at the 
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school or to the educational well -being of the pupils there', meant that the 
authority could only refer to conditions at the school requested by the parents. 
Whereas in England, the decision of the appeal committee was final, in 
Scotland parents could appeal against an unsuccessful appeal decision to the 
courts. This not only gave parents a second chance to appeal but also allowed 
appeals to be heard by a sheriff, whose civil jurisdiction is similar to that of an 
English county court judge, who is clearly independent of the authority and 
less likely than an appeal committee comprising councillors and other 
members selected by the authority to be predisposed in favour of the 
authority's decisions. 
Under the Scottish legislation, when an appeal is upheld, either by an appeal 
committee or by sheriff, the authority is required to review the cases of all 
parents in similar circumstances who have not appealed and, if it does not 
change its decisions, it must grant the parents a further right of appeal. No 
comparable provisions are found in the English legislation. 
Our research suggested that parental choice in Scotland had resulted in a rather 
inefficient use of resources since expenditure per pupil is much higher in a school 
which is half empty than in one which is full. It had also led to increasing disparities 
in schools' financial circumstances since, even before formula funding, schools which 
lost pupils also lost staff and resources and, as a result, were no longer able to offer 
comparable educational opportunities. This posed a serious threat to equality of 
educational opportunity with potentially very serious implications in a democratic 
society. Moreover, it appeared to be leading to the re- emergence of something 
resembling a two -tier system of secondary schooling in the big cities. This was 
different from the old, two -tier system which existed prior to the introduction of 
comprehensive schooling in that the lower tier catered for a minority of children 
whereas previously it had catered for the majority. However, the existence of a small 
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number of no- longer viable `rump' schools located in the most deprived areas of the 
big cities was clearly a cause for concern. 
Although there had clearly been gainers as well as losers from the Scottish legislation, 
the balance sheet suggested that the gains were relatively small compared to the 
losses. Those who gained from the exercise of parental choice and ended up in 
secondary schools in middle class catchment areas with good `unadjusted' 
examination results did so at the expense of those who stayed at seriously under - 
subscribed and under -resourced schools with deprived catchment areas and poor 
examination results. Thus, parental choice in Scotland appeared to have been a 
`negative sum game' in which the gains achieved by some pupils and, by extension, by 
some parents were more than offset by the losses incurred by others and by the 
community as a whole. The choice of a school, like the purchase of a car, may have 
been a `rational' decision for each of the individuals concerned, but the aggregation of 
these individual decisions had resulted in situations (rump schools and congested 
streets) which, from the perspective of the whole community, could only be described 
as irrational.5 This situation results from what Hirsch6 has called `the tyranny of small 
decisions' and would not arise if, when making individual choices, people could see 
and act on the results of their combined choices. 
We concluded that this situation could only get worse if the incidence of placing 
requests continued to rise, as it was almost certain to do. This was partly because 
education has many of the characteristics of a `positional good' (ibid.), i.e. something 
which is desired not because of its intrinsic value but because of its scarcity value. 
Since the scarcity value of a positional good diminishes as the number of people 
possessing it increases, `first order choices' provoke `second order choices' as people 
attempt to retain their higher status. 
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ENGLAND CATCHES UP AND TAKES THE LEAD 
The contrast between the relatively weak form of parental choice which was 
established by the 1980 Act in England and Wales and the relatively strong form 
which was established by the 1981 Act in Scotland persisted for several years. 
However, in 1987, the government announced that, if it won the forthcoming general 
election, it would introduce a new Education Act which would strengthen the rights 
of parents in England and Wales and restrict the powers of local education authorities. 
These promises subsequently bore fruit in the form of the 1988 Education (Reform) 
Act. 
As far as school admissions are concerned, the 1988 Act sought to prevent local 
education authorities from setting intake limits which were less than the school's 
physical capacity and from refusing to admit children if there was room for them at 
the school. The 1988 Act equates `physical capacity' with the `standard number' and 
stipulates that `the authority ... shall not fix as the number of pupils in any relevant 
age group it intends to admit to the school in any school year a number less than the 
relevant standard number' which was defined as the either the number admitted to the 
school in 1979 when school rolls were at their peak and were substantially higher than 
they were a decade later, or the number admitted in the previous year whichever is the 
greater. 
Although the detailed statutory provisions in the 1988 Act are very different from 
those in the Scottish legislation, the intentions are much the same. Inasmuch as it 
prevents authorities from referring to conditions in schools other than those chosen by 
the parents and makes it much more difficult for them to reject parents' requests, it 
has likewise sought to introduce a regime of 'open enrolment' and brought the 
position of parents in England and Wales broadly into line with those which were 
introduced some years earlier in Scotland. 
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There have been no further legislative changes in relation to parental choice in either 
Scotland or England since 1988. However, a number of other educational reforms 
have had an impact on parental choice. Of particular importance here was the 
introduction of Local Management of Schools (LMS) in England and Devolved 
School Management (DSM) in Scotland in the late 1980s.7 LMS and DSM have a 
number of common features in that they both attempt to increase competition among 
schools in attracting pupils, with school budgets largely determined by the number of 
pupils at the school; to promote lay, especially parental, participation in school 
decision making; to enhance teachers' accountability to parents; and to delegate more 
decisions to school level with local education authorities adopting a strategic and 
enabling role and providing only a small number of central services themselves. 
However, like parental choice, they differed in a number of significant respects. 
LMS was introduced in England (and Wales) by legislation (the 1988 
Education Reform Act) while DSM was introduced in Scotland by more 
flexible guidelines without prior legislation. LMS was implemented in 1990 
whereas the first phase of DSM began some four years later in 1994 and full 
implementation is not scheduled until 1998. 
Parents constitute a majority of the membership of School Boards in Scotland 
but parents do not constitute a majority on School Governing Bodies in 
England and Wales. But, although English Governing Bodies have been given 
statutory powers on a range of matters including staffing, curriculum and 
discipline, Scottish School Boards have a largely consultative role and powers 
which are broadly analogous to those which have been devolved to the 
Governing Body in England have been devolved to the head teacher in 
Scotland. 
Scottish education authorities are not required to delegate as high a 
proportion of the education budget to schools as English LEAs (in Scotland, 
the minimum is 80 per cent, in England, it is 90 per cent). In addition, they 
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have more flexibility than their English counterparts in applying their own 
funding formulae and in devising schemes of delegation to schools. In 
England, a fixed minimum proportion (80 per cent) of a school's budget is 
allocated on the basis of pupil numbers weighted for several factors whereas in 
Scotland the guidelines only require that the 'bulk of funding' is allocated on 
this basis. School budgets are delegated to the Governing Body in England 
and Wales but to the head teacher in Scotland. 
It would appear to be the case that devolved management has been taken rather 
further in England than in Scotland. Education authorities retain more powers in 
Scotland than they do in England and English schools are better able to respond to 
parental choice than their Scottish counterparts. 
Other contextual developments have also been important. In 1986, the Government 
announced its intention to establish a pilot network of City Technology Colleges (in 
England and Wales) and Technology Academies (in Scotland). These schools were 
intended to provide a highly technological curriculum and to cater for 11 -18 year -olds 
in selected inner -city areas. They were to be funded by private capital, run by private 
educational trusts and, as the title of the promotional booklet City Technology 
Colleges : a New Choice of School8 makes clear, were, at least in part, justified and 
legitimated in terms of parental choice. 9 Of greater significance are the provisions in 
the 1988 Education Reform Act (replicated in the 1989 Self -Governing Schools etc. 
(Scotland) Act) which allow parents to decide, in a secret ballot, whether they wish 
their child's school to `opt out' of local authority control and become a Grant - 
Maintained (GM) school (in England and Wales) or a Self -Governing (SG) school (in 
Scotland). GM and SG schools, which are funded by central government, are also 
intended to enhance choice, are largely autonomous in their ability to make decisions 
and are almost as free to respond to parents wishes as private (independent) schools 
are.10 Both these developments have taken much stronger root in England (and 
Wales) than in Scotland. 
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Since it has already been demonstrated that, since 1988, the statutory enactment of 
parental choice in England has been comparable to that which has existed in Scotland 
since 1981, it is clear from the fact that devolved management, opting out and the 
establishment of new types of school have all been taken further in England, that 
Scotland is no longer in the vanguard as far as school choice is concerned. Rather, 
the boot is now on the other foot. 
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE RESEARCH - 
REFLEXIVE SELF CRITICISM 
The research we carried out in Scotland was necessarily a creature of its time and 
cannot really be faulted for failing to take into account subsequent developments of an 
academic or a policy nature. It was conducted before the emergence of a fully - 
developed 'quasi market' in educationll when only the first stage of what subsequently 
became a two -stage de- regulation of the education system was in place. In this two - 
stage process, the first stage (the statutory enactment of parental choice) represented 
a de- regulation of the demand side in education while the second stage (devolved 
management) represented a de- regulation of the supply side. As a result, the research 
is now necessarily somewhat dated. Nevertheless, many of our findings have been 
confirmed by more recent research. 
Echols, McPherson and Willms12 have shown that the secondary schools which 
parents selected tended to be formerly selective schools with above average 
attainment levels and pupils drawn from higher socio- economic backgrounds, and that 
the incidence of choice was a function of the opportunities available in the local 
community. However, on the basis of a national sample of 3,164 pupils, they also 
demonstrated that, contrary to our findings, choice was more common among better 
educated and higher social -class parents. Willms and Echols13 demonstrated that 
parents tended to choose schools with higher socio- economic status pupils and better 
`unadjusted' examination results. However, the 'chosen' schools did not differ 
substantially from the `rejected' schools once account had been taken of the 
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background characteristics of pupils at the school. Two inferences can be drawn from 
these findings : they suggest that parents were unable to gauge the `added value'14 
that a school would contribute to their child's- educational performance and that 
parental choice was leading to increased between -school segregation. Consequently, 
although parents' choices appeared rational in the sense that their children performed 
better in examinations than they might otherwise have done, the gains were less than 
at first sight they appeared to be. Moreover, the moderate gains for some have to be 
offset by the high costs for others (in particular pupils at schools in deprived areas 
which lost a substantial number of pupils) and for the system as a whole. 
In his most recent paper on the effects of parental choice, Willms15 attempted to 
measure the extent of segregation in 54 communities in Scotland which had at least 
two secondary schools. Although he concludes that, as the reform took hold, choice 
was no longer more common among better educated or higher social -class parents 
(mainly because more of them were opting for private schools), he also shows that 
segregation (measured in terms of any of three different segregation indices) increased 
in large and small communities alike and that the biggest increase was in the isolation 
of middle class pupils in the five largest cities (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Paisley, 
Aberdeen and Dundee). Whether or not parental choice causes increased social 
segregation is hard to say. Nevertheless, it is clear that choice is not helping to reduce 
between- school segregation in Scotland. Although there is no a priori reason why 
parental choice has to increase social segregation, the evidence suggests not only that 
it has done so but also that it is almost certain to result in greater inequalities in 
attainment. 
Although it is fair to assume that most of our conclusions would still hold, policy 
developments since the mid- 1980s, including the publication of 'unadjusted' 
examination results in a manner that makes possible otiose comparisons between 
schools as well as the other contextual developments outlined above, suggest that the 
time has now come to replicate our research. Any attempt to do so is almost certain 
to conclude that the impact of parental choice in Scotland is greater now than it was 
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then and that, as I have already demonstrated, its impact in England is likely to be 
greater still. 
Notwithstanding the fact that our research was a creature of its time and that many of 
our results have been confirmed by subsequent research, it is clear that it had 
weaknesses as well as strengths and that, in any attempt to replicate it, efforts should 
be made to minimise its weaknesses and build on its strengths. Among its strengths 
was the fact that it comprised five inter- related projects and utilised the full range of 
available methods of research (including documentary analysis, in -depth interviews, 
observations, large scale surveys and the statistical analysis of administrative data) so 
that conclusions from one project using one methodology could be used to cross 
check conclusions from another project using another methodology. Among its 
weaknesses was the (not unrelated) fact that it attempted to do too much and that, as 
a result, it was too unfocused. This criticism applies particularly to the survey which 
consumed a disproportionate amount of time, effort and resources. The sampling 
frame was unnecessarily complex - it involved sampling parents who made placing 
requests, parents who had considered doing so but decided against it, and parents 
who had not considered it; parents with children starting primary school drawn from 
one case -study area in each of the three education authorities and parents with 
children transferring to secondary school drawn from four case -study areas in the 
three authorities.16 In addition the questionnaire was far too long - it contained about 
150 questions, the multiple choice questions often contained as many as 10 
alternatives to choose from and there were a considerable number of open -ended 
questions; it took far too long complete and code; and many of the questions were 
never analysed at all or not analysed at the local (school) level. For example, among 
the unanalysed data are school -level data on `administrative competence' 17 which 
could have been used to differentiate between parents who did and those who did not 
make a placing request. Our failure to analyse the survey data at the school level is a 
serious weakness because, as Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz18 argue 
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`while there may be certain principles of choice and market relations, 
the dynamics of choice are local and specific. The principles have to 
be related to local conditions, possibilities and histories.' 
Glatter and Woods' work on 'local competitive areas' provides further confirmation of 
the importance of research at the local level.19 
Analysing our survey data also stretched our statistical and computing skills to the 
limit. For all these reasons, the project which undoubtedly took up the most time and 
effort not only generated the smallest return but also prevented us from carrying out a 
series of in -depth interviews with parents as planned. As luck would have it 
compensation for some of these shortcomings was subsequently obtained when two 
very experienced data analysts (Echols and Willrns) volunteered to reanalyse our data. 
However, if the survey is to be replicated, a much shorter questionnaire and a much 
simpler sampling frame would have to be used. 
We were very much taken to task in a critical review of our book by Miriam David20 
but, although we thought that most of her criticisms were misplaced, we did accept 
that we could have said more about gender differences.21 Likewise, since parental 
choice seems to have had some rather serious effects on social segregation, it is clear 
that we should have collected more data about the social composition of schools. In 
any future research, this deficiency would have to be addressed. 
A third weakness was a function of the case study method we adopted. Several small 
case studies are, in many ways, preferable to one large one because they make 
comparisons possible and foster an awareness of a range of variation that would not 
be apparent from focusing on a single case. Although this is true of within country 
comparisons, it applies with even greater force to comparisons between countries 
because the range of variation is greater. In this respect, comparisons within the UK 
are a much under- utilised resource.22 By studying parental choice within a single 
country (Scotland), a number of important and researchable problems were 
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foreclosed. One of these problems was the relationship between choice and 
diversity23 and, in any further research on parental choice, it would be important to 
devise a research design which will make it possible to study this extremely important 
question. Such a research design would necessarily involve comparative research, 
both within the UK and between the UK and other countries. 
PARENTAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
In recent years, there has been a movement to give parents (and pupils) an element of 
choice in deciding which schools their children should attend. The UK is by no means 
unique in this respect and similar developments have taken place in most advanced 
industrial (or should I say `post -industrial' ?) societies. According to Hirsch,24 two 
main influences have shaped this development, one political and the other social, but, 
of the two, political influences have generally been the more important. 
The political influence has been neo- liberal ideology which has exercised such 
a profound influence on public policy making in many countries over the last 
decade or so. In its crude foun, it advocates a reliance on free markets rather 
than centralised planning to manage publicly financed but not necessarily 
publicly provided services. In education, it has meant making schools 
dependent for their resources on the decisions of parents to enrol their 
children. The idea is that this will create pressure on schools to perform well 
and to reflect the wishes of parents and pupils rather than those of teachers 
and administrators. Taken to extremes, under a system of education vouchers, 
this would blur the distinction between public (maintained) and private 
(independent) schools as every school would be eligible for a payment by the 
state in respect of every pupi1.25 
The social influence reflects changing social realities. Greater social and 
geographical mobility, higher levels of educational attainment among adults 
and the growth of `credentialism' have changed the ways in which people 
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think about schools. An increasing number of them view education as a route 
to economic and social success and finding the 'right' school for their children 
is seen by many parents as a way of giving their children a good start in life. 
THE AIMS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 
On the basis of a comparative study of school choice in six countries (Australia, 
England, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States), Hirsch26 
isolates four main objectives of school choice. Thus, school choice aims 
to stimulate and respond to an increased desire to choose among existing 
schools, extending to everyone opportunities hitherto only available to those 
with the means to buy a place at a private (independent) school or a house 
near a good public (maintained) school; 
to give parents a greater role, and professional educators a reduced role, in 
shaping school policy, again particularly in public (maintained) schools; 
to establish a new discipline which encourages schools, in particular, public 
(maintained) schools, to perform well - schools which acquire a good 
reputation will attract more pupils and thus more resources; 
to extend the range of choices available to parents and to encourage greater 
educational pluralism within the public (maintained) as well as the private 
(independent) sector. 
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DEMAND LED OR COMPETITIVE CHOICE VS. SUPPLY LED OR 
PLURALISTIC CHOICE 
Although these objectives overlap, Hirsch has suggested that a very important 
distinction can be made between demand led or competitive choice policies, whose 
aim is to encourage competition, and supply led or pluralistic choice policies, whose 
aim is to increase the range of schools available to choose from. 
On the basis of comparative evidence, Hirsch suggests that competitive pressures on 
their own rarely generate much variety, especially in the public sector, and that they 
create frustration when they are not accompanied by pluralistic choice. This is 
because competitive choice assumes that there is a measure of agreement about what 
constitutes a `good' school, that some schools are `better' than others, and that all 
parents will want their children to go to the best schools. These schools quickly 
become full leading to disappointment for those who are turned away. As John 
Gray27, referring to school choice in England, put it in an article in The Guardian: 
`It is not choice that is being exercised when parents, no longer 
trusting their neighbourhood schools try and fail to place their children 
elsewhere. [A] Hobson's choice between over - subscribed `good' 
schools and under -resourced `bad' schools is not a freedom that 
parents greatly value.' 
Judith Judd28 made a similar point in a recent article in The Independent: 
`What the Government has created is a vast appetite for choice with no 
means for satisfying it...While there is no genuine diversity, parents 
who cannot get their children into the popular schools will continue to 
feel conned by the rhetoric of parental choice.' 
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Hirsch believes that the alternative of a variety of types of school and a range of 
preferences probably has more going for it although it is more rarely achieved. 
Likewise Hargreaves29 argues that some combination of diversity and choice is not 
only intellectually tenable but provides an attractive basis for policy. The challenge 
for policy makers will be to find some way of promoting diversity without 
encouraging hierarchy.30 Past experience with principles like `parity of esteem' (in the 
UK) and `separate but equal' (in the USA) suggests that it will not be easy. 
OBJECTIONS TO SCHOOL CHOICE 
Partly because of its ideological origins and significance, school choice is intrinsically 
controversial. Just as Hirsch isolated four main objectives, so four sets of objections 
can be identified. Objectors variously argue that 
choice might be a fine idea but it will not work in practice, either because 
parents who are already more advantaged, i.e. those who have an abundance 
of `administrative competence' or `cultural capital',31 are more likely to take 
advantage of it and, by so doing, add to their advantages; or because (as Gray 
and Judd point out) popular schools are bound to fill up and, as a result, 
choice is closed off; 
choice might work but it will have undesirable side effects e.g. it may weaken 
the sense of community, result in increased social segregation and reduce the 
pressure to improve the educational system; 
choice in education is self -defeating because the exercise of choice by some 
may pre -empt choice for others, e.g. where a minority of parents in a given 
area choose not to send their children to a particular local school. As a result, 
the school is no longer viable and has to close although a majority of parents 
in the area wished to send their children there; 
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 putting power into the hands of parents will make schools more conservative 
and throttle innovation as schools seek to perform well in those respects 
which parents regard as important, e.g. good examination results, at the cost 
of providing a `good' education. 
LIMITS ON CHOICE 
The basic element of any open enrolment policy is to give parents the right to send 
their children to any school. However, it may be limited in a number of ways. 
Countries differ in terms of 
whether choice is optional or mandatory - there is clearly a big difference 
between countries (like Sweden) in which pupils are allocated to a school but 
may choose a different one of they wish and countries (like New Zealand) in 
which no -one is allocated to a school and everyone has to choose; 
whether or not limits are set on school rolls - in the Netherlands there are no 
limits and the public authorities have to build or procure extra accommodation 
for schools that are overcrowded, in New Zealand schools must admit pupils 
unless they can demonstrate that they are in danger of overcrowding, in 
France, choice of secondary schools is permitted only as long as the preferred 
school does not become too full or the local school too empty; 
how places are allocated when they cannot all be met - 'objective' criteria are 
usually adopted, most commonly geographical proximity (although this can 
end up by restricting places to those who live in a de facto catchment area) 
and one or more siblings already at the school (although this gives an 
advantage to parents who had previously been able to secure a place for an 
older sibling when the school was possibly not as over -subscribed). 
Somewhat paradoxically, the use of such criteria militates against parents who 
may have good reasons for wanting to send their child to a particular school, 
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e.g. because they like something about it. Note: selection (by the school), 
banding by ability or by ethnic group, where they are used, necessarily 
constrain parental choice 
whether reasons for choice need to be given or are taken into account - if 
reasons are taken into account, parents can 'play the system', if not, parents 
can choose on `questionable' grounds, e.g. on the basis of the ethnic 
composition of the school; 
whether or not choice is restricted to schools within the parent's education 
authority; 
whether or not choice is restricted to public (maintained) schools and 
whether or not it extends to private (independent) schools; 
whether or not assistance with transport costs is available. 
FORMULA FUNDING AND DEVOLVED MANAGEMENT 
For those who see choice as the means of injecting the dynamic of competition into 
schooling, it is important to give schools an incentive to compete. But effective 
competition will not result unless parental choice, which represents deregulation of 
the demand side, is matched by deregulation of the supply side. The two 
(complementary) ways in which this is most often done are by linking the school's 
resources to pupil numbers and by giving schools greater autonomy. The former is 
known as 'formula funding', the latter as devolved management. However, supply 
side policies are not always adopted and, where they are, there are again a number of 
variations: 
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 a proportion (which may vary in size) of the education budget may be 
withheld from schools and retained by the education authority to spend on the 
provision of common services; 
a proportion (which may again vary in size) of school budgets may be 
determined by formula or, alternatively, the education authority may have 
some discretion to take other circumstances into account; 
schools may or may not receive the same resources for all pupils - thus pupils 
with special needs, children from low- income families or with poorly- educated 
parents may receive a premium; 
schools may or may not be responsible for capital expenditure in addition to 
current expenditure; 
schools may or may not be responsible for staff salaries - where schools are 
responsible for paying staff salaries, they will have an incentive to make 
experienced (and expensive) teachers redundant and replace them with 
inexperienced (and cheaper) teachers; 
schools may have more or less autonomy and be subject to more or less 
control from the education authority. 
THE EXTENT OF DIVERSITY 
Parental choice and open enrolment, even where they are accompanied by formula 
funding and devolved management, do not, in and of themselves, give rise to diversity 
which requires some central initiative to ensure that all schools do not attempt to 
compete with each other on the same grounds. The extent to which schools do 
diversify depends on a number of contingent considerations including: 
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 whether or not different types of school exist; 
whether or not schools are required to follow a national curriculum and how 
prescriptive this is; 
(related to the above) whether or not schools can specialise; 
whether or not schools are encouraged to adopt distinctive teaching and 
learning strategies, e.g. streaming vs. mixed ability teaching, an emphasis on 
'traditional' didactic teaching vs. group project work etc. 
whether or not the government or the education authorities actively 
encourage or actually decree diversity. 
SCOTLAND VS. ENGLAND 
The approach taken above enables Scotland to be compared with England and put 
into comparative perspective. Table 1 does this for parental choice while Table 2 
does so for devolved management. 
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Table 1 : Characteristics of Parental Choice (PC) 
LOW PC SCOTLAND ENGLAND HIGH PC 
optional/ 
mandatory 




limits on school 
rolls 
yes de facto - related 
to capacity 
EA has discretion 
- distance and 
siblings carry 
most weight 
by statute - 
related to peak 
figures 
EA has discretion 




how places are 
allocated when 
school is 'full' 
reasons required 
or taken into 
account 
yes not required, not 
really taken into 
account 
not required, not 





yes no no no 
restricted to 
maintained sector 
yes yes yes no 
payment of 
transport costs 
no no no yes 
Two inferences can be drawn from the comparisons in Table 1. First, parental choice 
appears to be 'stronger' in England than in Scotland and, second, that, in both 
countries, it falls somewhere in the middle of the range of institutional possibilities. 
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Table 2 : Characteristics of Devolved Management (DM.) 
LOW DM SCOTLAND ENGLAND HIGH DM 
% EA budget 
delegated to 
schools 
0% 80% minimum 90% minimum 100% 
% school budget 
based on pupil 
numbers 
no restriction 'bulk of funding' 80% minimum 100% 
fixed sum per 
pupil 
no based on age, but 
extra for special 
needs 
based on age, but 













no actual costs met 
(no) 









Similar inferences can be drawn from the comparisons in Table 2. First, devolved 
management is clearly `stronger' in England than in Scotland and, second, both 
countries again fall somewhere near the middle of the range of institutional 
possibilities. 
In light of the above, we should expect the consequences of school choice to be 
greater in England than in Scotland. In addition, there are two other grounds for 
thinking that its consequences may be greater in England than in Scotland. First, 
there is less of a tradition of collectivism and rather greater enthusiasm for the rugged 
individualism associated with neo- liberal ideology in England (especially in the south 
of England) than in Scotland. There is likewise probably more dissatisfaction with 
schooling and less respect for traditional forms of educational governance in England. 
Scottish secondary schools have stronger links with their associated primaries and 
Scottish schools are more embedded in the communities they serve than their 
counterparts in England. Second, social stratification is probably even more 
pronounced in England than in Scotland. Moreover the existence of large ethnic 
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minorities in many English cities raises the prospect of parents choosing schools on 
ethnic grounds on a scale which could not take place in Scotland where the ethnic 
minority population is very much smaller.32 Both these considerations suggest that 
the incidence of parental choice in England and its social and educational 
consequences will be greater than they are in Scotland. Indirect evidence for this 
conclusion is provided by marked differences in the number of dissatisfied parents 
who appeal to an Educational Appeal Committee. In 1995, 41,389 appeals were 
received and 29,520 were decided in England and Wales; 596 were received and 444 
decided in Scotland.33 Taking the difference in population into account, this suggests 
that parents in England were 7 -8 times more likely to appeal than parents in Scotland. 
DIVERSITY AND CHOICE 
There is a further difference between Scotland and England. As can be seen from 
Table 3, there is now considerably greater diversity of schools in the public 
(maintained) sector in England than there is in Scotland. 
Table 3: Extent of diversity in England and Scotland 
SCOTLAND ENGLAND 
selective schools 0 250 (approx.) 
alternatives to all through' 
comprehensives 
none middle schools, 
sixth form colleges 
single sex schools no all boys schools, one or 
two all girls schools 
available in most LEAs 
Grant Maintained /Self 
Governing schools 
2 1,200 (approx.) including 





can schools specialise in 
particular subjects? 
not really to some extent 
can schools adopt distinctive 
teaching styles? 
not overtly perhaps more easily 
central encouragement of 
diversity? 
ineffectual more effective 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Parental choice and devolved management are both more muted in Scotland than they 
are in England and the extent of diversity between schools is considerably less. In 
Scotland, there is a fair amount of competitive choice but very little pluralistic choice 
-a great deal of competition but very little diversity. In England, there is rather more 
competitive choice and a fair amount of pluralistic choice - rather more competition 
but a significant amount of diversity too (albeit muted by clear hierarchies of status 
and esteem between different types of school). These can be explained in terms of the 
relative weakness of the political and social influences mentioned above in Scotland 
and their greater salience in England. The result is that the comprehensive principle 
and the ongoing commitment to equality of educational opportunity are more strongly 
supported in Scotland than in England. However, as a result of the failure to 
encourage diversity between schools, the extent of dissatisfaction with parental choice 
as more and more parents find themselves unable to enrol their child in the school of 
their choice is almost certainly growing. And statistics confirm that this is indeed the 
case. The latest Scottish Office figures indicate that the proportion of placing 
requests granted has fallen from 92.2 per cent in 1984/85 to 86.9 per cent in 1994/95. 
In the case of admission to primary schools, it has fallen from 96.7 per cent to 91.4 
per cent and, in the case of secondary schools, from 91.6 per cent to 83.2 per cent 
over the last 10 years.34 
Whether there is more dissatisfaction with school choice in Scotland or in England is 
hard to say. However, the pessimistic assessments given by John Gray and Judith 
Judd which were cited earlier probably apply just as much (if not more) to the 
situation in Scotland than they do to England. Since choice is probably here to stay, 
the challenge for policy makers is to find some way of providing choice (in one form 
or another) but minimising its adverse consequences for the many parents who are 
currently disappointed, for the many children who are currently short - changed and for 
the principles of equity and justice. The challenge for policy researchers is to devise 
research which will contribute to the solution of this conundrum. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DECISION MAKING AND APPEALS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: 
IN NEED OF REFORM ?* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1971, a celebrated and controversial article by Richard Titmuss, entitled `Welfare 
"Rights ", Law and Discretion',' was published in Political Quarterly on whose 
Editorial Board Titmuss then sat. In it, Titmuss analysed the relationship between 
`legal rule' and `administrative discretion' in the Supplementary Benefit scheme, the 
forerunner of Income Support and the Social Fund today. This article, which is based 
on the Richard Titmuss Memorial Lecture delivered at the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem in November 1996,2 attempts to assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
Titmuss' analysis and to provide an alternative theoretical framework which can be 
used to account for developments during the subsequent quarter of a century. It is in 
four parts. 
Part 1 gives a critical account of Richard Titmuss' attempt to analyse the relationship 
between rights and discretion in social security; Part 2 develops an alternative 
approach, based on the work of two American public lawyers (K C Davis and Jeny 
Mashaw), which distinguishes bureaucratic rules from claimants rights and suggests 
that the problem is one of achieving a balance between rules, discretion and rights; 
Part 3 utilises this approach to examine the shifting balance between these three 
principles in the social security system over the last 25 years; while Part 4 uses it as 
* I should like to record my thanks to the Trustees of the Richard Titmuss Memorial 
School of Social Work at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in particular, Uri 
Aviram, the Director of the School, and Avraham Doron. I should also like to thank 
a number of former students, present colleagues and friends, in particular Tony 
Bradley, Sue Fyvel, Jackie Gulland, Sue Morris, Ann Oakley, Adrian Sinfield and 
Fran Wasoff, for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks 
to them, the argument is now a great deal tighter than it was when the lecture was 
delivered. 
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the basis for criticising the proposals outlined in the to reform the system of 
adjudication and appeals in social security which were outlined in the Consultation 
Paper on Improving Decision Making and Appeals in Social Security (Cm. 3326) in 
July 1996. Although the stated aims of the Consultation Paper were fairly innocuous, 
its detailed proposals (which include making staff directly accountable to the 
Secretary of State for their decisions, shifting the emphasis away from appeals to an 
independent tribunal to internal reviews by members of staff, encouraging `paper 
hearings', enabling most oral hearings to be conducted by a single tribunal member, 
and dropping the requirement that tribunals should be chaired by a lawyer) would 
destroy many of the welfare rights which are currently available to recipients of social 
security. Following the change of government, the fate of these proposals is unclear 
but the inclusion of a Social Security Modernisation Bill in the Queen's Speech 
suggests that it is unlikely that they will be shelved altogether. 
PART 1: TITMUSS' APPROACH 
Titmuss' aim in the Political Quarterly article was to discuss policy choices in social 
security, `in particular the choice between legal rule and administrative discretion' in 
the Supplementary Benefit scheme. A number of factors combined to make the 
article controversial. In addition to being Professor of Social Administration at the 
London School of Economics (LSE), Titmuss was Deputy Chairman of the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission (SBC), whose main role was to determine how 
the discretionary powers contained in legislation governing the Supplementary Benefit 
scheme should be exercised by staff in local offices. At the time, the scheme was 
under sustained attack from claimants' unions and other welfare rights organisations 
who claimed, with some justification, that the discretionary powers were being 
exercised in very inconsistent and restrictive ways.3 The Supplementary Benefits 
Commission felt itself to be under siege and this article, by its most distinguished and 
respected member, should be understood in that context. It is not a detached, 
academic analysis of the arguments deployed by the various parties in dispute (as one 
might have expected from a Professor at the LSE) but, rather, a committed and 
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partisan contribution to the debate from someone who was personally involved in it 
(as Deputy Chairman of the SBC). It is written in a vigorous and rather adversarial 
manner, and Titmuss shows scant respect for the arguments deployed by his critics - 
for example, whenever `welfare rights' are referred to, quotation marks appear 
around the word `rights' thereby casting doubt on their status. It makes few 
concessions and constitutes a robust defence of the status quo as it was at the time. 
Titmuss' statement of the problem 
The article begins by raising the following question: 
`If all decisions involving social security justice to individuals were 
lined up on a scale with those governed by complete eligibility rules at 
the extreme left, those involving complete discretion at the extreme 
right and those based on a mixture of rules, principles, standards and 
discretion somewhere in the middle, where on the scale might the most 
serious and the most frequent injustice lie ?' ( Titmuss, p. 113) 
Although it may seem rather odd that the question is posed in terms of injustice rather 
than in terms of justice, there is a fairly simple explanation for this - it is a virtual 
paraphrase of the opening paragraph of K C Davis' book Discretionary Justice4 
which Titmuss cites. However, he only does so when it suits his own purposes 
because, although he does not point this out, Davis comes to exactly the opposite 
conclusion about the place of discretion in public administration. Another difference 
is that, for Davis, rooting out injustice is merely a starting point. In the opening 
chapter of his book, Davis' concerns are expressed in more positive terms: 
`One major thesis of this essay is that the degree of discretion is often 
much greater than it should be. [However,] the problem is not merely 
to choose between rule and discretion but to find the optimum point 
on the rule -to- discretion scale.' (Davis, p. 15) 
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Titmuss argues that it would be hard to find anyone in Britain or in North America 
who would publicly support the principle of complete individualised discretion across 
the whole field of income maintenance. He might have added that very few people 
would support the principle of total reliance on the application of eligibility rules but 
he does not do so, claiming instead that this position is precisely where the arguments 
of those who champion welfare rights will lead. 
Welfare rights and the welfare rights movement 
Titmuss was not unaware of the major concerns of the welfare rights `movement' but 
describes them in essentially negative terms, suggesting that 
`[i]t is easier to say what the social rights movement is against rather 
than what it is for. It is against power, against the arbitrary, non- 
accountable exercise of power, against stigma, against charity as 
opposed to rights, against the use of discretion, against discrimination 
on grounds of age, sex, class, colour and religion, against moral 
judgements being made about claimants by social workers as well as 
administrators.' (Titmuss, p. 118) 
Titmuss saw the welfare rights movement `as part of the more general protest and 
liberation movement' (ibid., p. 117) but also claimed that it was part of an unholy 
alliance with 
`the modern Diceyists of the New Right who advocate negative 
income taxation and Speenhamland wage supplementation systems as 
the answer to the problem of minority poverty and as a means of 
radically reducing the role of government in the provision of services.' 
(ibid., p. 114) 
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However, this is really little more than a rather shameful case of guilt by association. 
The fact that the welfare rights movement and the `modern Diceyists of the New 
Right' were both critical of what Titmuss refers to as `the so -called bureaucracy of 
the public welfare system' is less significant than the very different reasoning which 
underlay their opposition to it. The welfare rights movement advocated strong social 
rights as a component of citizenship and was opposed to the exercise of 
administrative discretion in welfare because it prevents people from exercising their 
social rights. The New Right, on the other hand, argued that social rights are not a 
legitimate component of citizenship because they can only be granted by interfering 
with other rights (in particular, property rights) which must be given priority. 
Although the New Right critics were opposed to the exercise of discretion in welfare, 
this was because they believed that the state should not be involved in the provision of 
welfare and they were even more opposed to the strengthening of rights to welfare, 
on the grounds that this would only make an already bad situation worse. 
Although Davis does not use these terms, and I am borrowing the terminology from 
Jerry Mashaw's book Bureaucratic Justice,5 his reference to a `rule -to- discretion 
scale' makes it clear that he regards rules and discretion as being competitive rather 
than mutually exclusive. The first of this pair of terms refers to a situation in which 
`the more you have of the one, the less you can have of the other' while the second 
refers to one where `if you have the one, you cannot have the other'. It is the 
competitive nature of the relationship between rules and discretion that makes it 
possible for policy makers to seek an optimum balance between them. However, it 
would appear that Titmuss only partially grasped this point. In asking where on the 
rules -to- discretion scale the most serious and frequent injustice lies and in concluding 
that it lies with `legal rules', he is concerned to exclude that option altogether. 
Titmuss' incomplete grasp of the point arises, in large measure, from his use of the 
term `legal rule', a composite term which conflates legal rights and bureaucratic rules. 
Davis is mainly concerned with bureaucratic (or administrative) rules and hardly (if at 
all) refers to legal rights but Titmuss runs into problems because, although he accepts 
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that rules and discretion are competitive, he appears to regard rights and discretion as 
mutually exclusive. The following quotation makes this clear: 
It is assumed that justice will be advanced if case law is substituted 
for discretion; if all appeal systems are judicialised and claimants 
represented by lawyers; if all discretionary cash additions are 
abolished; if access to the courts is made available to all claimants; if 
the adversary system replaces the inquisitorial lay tribunal.' (Titmuss, 
p. 118) 
In this article, I am concerned both to show that rights and discretion are competitive 
and that the task for policy makers is also to seek an optimum balance between these 
two principles. 
Although Titmuss' claim that there was little empirical research on the administration 
of social security in Britain at that time on which he could draw was undoubtedly 
true, his reliance on research carried out in the USA is very problematic. This is 
because he attributed the worst excesses of the welfare rights movement in the USA, 
in particular what has been described as the `pathology of legalism', to the welfare 
rights movement in the UK. 
`The increasing application of "legalism" (defined as an insistence on 
legal rules based on precedent and responsive only very slowly to 
rapidly changing human needs and circumstances) to the public 
assistance system has led, all over the United States, to a massive 
fragmentation of entitlement. Itemised legal entitlements in the 
assessment of needs and resources now embrace hundreds of visible 
articles and objects - practically everything that bedrooms, living - 
rooms, kitchens and lavatories may contain, most articles of clothing, 
day, night, summer and winter, for individuals of both sexes, all ages, 
and nearly all shapes and sizes.' (ibid., p. 125) 
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The clear implication is that agreeing to any of the demands of the welfare rights 
movement in the UK would be the thin end of the wedge. Thus, any attempt to 
accommodate their demands would lead inexorably to the somewhat bizarre situation 
which, according to Titmuss, already existed in New York City, where 
`a man had a "right" to possess one pair of winter trousers at $7.50 
(regular sizes); the household had a "right" to possess in the kitchen 
one can opener at 35 cents and in the lavatory one toilet holder at 75 
cents "but only if the landlord does not have to give you one ". And so 
on, and so on through hundreds of itemised entitlements from scrub 
brushes to panties.' (ibid., p. 125) 
According to Titmuss, the consequences had been far -reaching: 
`more concealed discretionary power not less (for example, in the 
assessment of itemised needs); more frustration, bewilderment and 
apathy among claimants as fair hearings become more esoteric; more 
inequitable treatment with the growth of itemised entitlements; more 
administrative inefficiencies and fewer "quality controls "; and more 
hostility and fear on both sides of the counter, not less.' (ibid., p. 125) 
Clearly such a situation had to be avoided at all costs. And how could that best be 
achieved? 
Titmuss' Fabian solution 
In line with the thinking of Fabian socialists6 and in accordance with the philosophy 
underlying the post -war welfare state (which assumed that the state was in the 
business of promoting welfare, that officials were all well -intentioned, that it was 
unnecessary to grant enforceable rights to individuals and that it was sufficient to 
impose duties on public authorities), Titmuss' answer was that the best strategy for 
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achieving the right balance was to trust institutions like the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission `to get it right'. This was most likely to promote the well -being of 
claimants and it was therefore important to keep at bay the rights culture, which 
undermined the service ethic, generated conflict and promoted selfish and acquisitive 
behaviour. 
Richard Titmuss was a strong supporter of the public provision of social services on 
the grounds that they were needed to compensate for what he called the `diswelfares' 
associated with the market. He also asserted the moral superiority of the collective 
values associated with public provision and believed that these values would 
eventually displace the individualistic values associated with the private sector and 
lead to the establishment of a socialist society. It was this philosophy and these 
values which led him not only to accept the invitation, from the Labour Government 
in 1966, to serve as Deputy Chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission but 
also, some years later, to mount a robust defence of the Commission against the 
attacks of the welfare rights movement. Although a social assistance scheme might 
seem a rather strange vehicle for propagating values which would eventually 
undermine and engulf the market, Titmuss' faith in the supposedly well - intentioned 
aims of the legislation, in the fact that it embodied the discourse of needs, and in the 
undoubted achievements of the Commission, convinced him that it was a worthy 
cause to defend. According to Titmuss (pp. 125 -131), the Commission had achieved 
a number of important advances, for example it had: 
provided information (in the form of the widely available Supplementary 
Benefits Handbook) about the scheme and the ways in which discretion was 
exercised; 
reduced or eliminated unnecessary discretionary power (although, it must be 
said, no evidence is presented in support of this claim); 
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 developed quality controls e.g. the supervision of subordinates by superiors, 
checks by one officer over another, audit and inspection controls, random 
sample checking, administrative surveys, the analysis of statistical data, and 
commissioned research; 
continually clarified and updated administrative rule making; 
advocated more and better training, retraining, education and staff 
development programmes; 
recognised the need to reduce overcrowding, discomfort, psychological stress 
and overwork among staff, and to improve premises and facilities; and 
ensured that the pressures on the Supplementary Benefit scheme were reduced 
so that the exercise of discretion could lead to individualised justice. 
Although this was clearly a `top -down' view of the Supplementary Benefit scheme,' 
and was at odds with the experiences of many claimants and the claims of many 
critics, Titmuss was concerned to ensure that what he regarded as the achievements 
of the Supplementary Benefits Commission should not be put at risk. Moreover, he 
believed that any concession to the demands of the welfare rights movement would 
have precisely this effect. 
Prior to the publication of the Political Quarterly article, Titmuss' academic and 
political standing were both very high indeed but his dismissal of the arguments of his 
critics and his defence of the status quo lost him a good deal of support, both among 
students and among community and Labour Party activists, most of whom had 
previously regarded him with admiration and respect.8 
Did Titmuss get it right? My provisional answer must be no, but in order to assess 
the strengths and weaknesses of his analysis, I want now to take a somewhat more 
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dispassionate look at the relationship between rules, discretion and rights. The 
challenge will be to do better. 
PART 2: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
The relationship between citizens and the welfare state can be understood as a 
contract, i.e. as a relationship of exchange between individual (legal) rights and 
collective (legal) duties. Rights to social welfare are conferred on individual citizens 
and duties to promote the collective welfare of the population are assumed by the 
state. These rights and duties are mediated through the administrative process. 
Davis on rules and discretion 
Where an administrative agency has discretion (which I shall refer to as agency 
discretion), it can structure its routine decision -making in a variety of ways: it can 
formulate a set of rules which express the intentions of policy makers or leave officials 
free to exercise their discretion. These two alternatives (which I shall refer to as 
administrative rules and officer discretion) can be represented as end points on a 
continuum: in practice most decision- making corresponds to some point between the 
two extremes. 
In a rule -based agency, officials are expected to apply the rules to the facts of the case 
and have relatively little decisional space. The rules themselves (defined as general 
instructions which prescribe how individual cases should be dealt with) may deal with 
procedural as well as substantive matters. However, for a variety of reasons, a set of 
rules may not be formulated: 
the intentions of the policy makers may not be clear enough; 
the knowledge to formulate a set of rules may be lacking; 
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 the complexity and variety of individual circumstances may make it extremely 
difficult to formulate a set of rules; 
it may be regarded as preferable to consider each case on its merits rather than 
subsume it under some general rule. 
In these circumstances, we can say that an officer has discretion. Discretionary 
Justice offers a helpful definition of this term 
`A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his 
power leave [the officer] free to make a choice among possible 
courses of action or inaction.' (Davis, p. 4) 
Davis' emphasis on the `effective' limits of an officer's power alerts us to the fact that 
discretion may be legal or illegal. Policy makers may have decided that officials 
should have a choice; alternatively, officials may be able to exercise a choice, e.g. by 
ignoring or bending the rules in circumstances where they are expected to apply them. 
His definition likewise makes it clear that discretion may apply to the choice between 
action and inaction, as well as between alternative courses of action. It can also apply 
to the finding of facts as well as the processing of these facts; it can cover procedural 
as well as substantive choices and can thus affect outcomes in a number of ways. 
According to Davis, the problem is not to choose between administrative rules and 
officer discretion but, rather, to find the optimum point on the rules -to- discretion 
scale in the particular circumstances of the case. He believed that `[ p]erhaps nine- 
tenths of injustice ...flows from discretion and perhaps only one -tenth from rules' 
(ibid., p. 25) and that achieving an optimal balance involved eliminating `unnecessary' 
discretion and `confining, structuring and checking' what discretion was left (ibid., p. 
4). However, it is important to stress that, in another context, achieving an optimal 
balance might have entailed increasing (rather than decreasing) the amount of 
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discretion exercised by officials to a more appropriate level. Davis' definitions of 
confining, structuring and checking are set out below: 
confining involves deciding how much discretion each official should have 
(higher -tier officials are often given more discretion than lower -tier officials); 
structuring involves developing standards or guidelines in order to influence 
and shape the exercise of discretion. (Note: education and training can also 
contribute to structuring); and 
checking involves ensuring that officials are held to account for their decisions 
and may involve (internal) administrative review; (external) appeals to courts, 
tribunals, or ombudsman; internal and external audit etc. 
In Davis' view, `discretionary justice' exists when an optimum balance is achieved. 
Adding rights to Davis' account 
Having outlined the relationship between rules and discretion, I want now to bring 
rights into the picture. Rights refer to enforceable claims and legal rights to legally 
enforceable claims. It is important to point out that although rights entail duties, the 
converse does not hold. Thus, if an individual has a legal right to something, it 
follows that some other individual (or institution) is under a legal duty to provide it. 
If, however, an individual (or institution) is under a general duty, e.g. to relieve the 
poor or help the needy, it does not follow that any poor or needy individual 
necessarily has a legal right to help. That will depend on the resources that are 
available and the priority given to that individual's claim. 
Arguments for and against rules, discretion and rights 
The main arguments for and against rules, discretion and rights are set out below: 
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For Administrative Rules 
1. Rules lead to greater consistency 
2. Rules ensure that like cases are treated alike 
Against Administrative Rules 
1. Rules can lead to rigidity unless they are continuously updated 
2. Rules give too much power to the organisation 
For Officer Discretion 
1. Discretion allows for greater flexibility which facilitates creativity 
2. Discretion enables cases that are not alike to be treated differently 
Against Officer Discretion 
1. Discretion allows for the exercise of moral judgments 
2. Discretion gives too much power to individual officials. 
For Claimants' Rights 
1. Rights foster a greater sense of security and empowerment among claimants 
2. Rights make decision -makers accountable for their decisions 
Against Claimants' Rights 
1. Rights promote conflict 
2. Rights give too much power to claimants 
Although different people will weigh up the arguments for administrative rules, officer 
discretion and claimants' rights in different ways, I suspect that many people will find 
all the positive arguments attractive and all the negative ones unattractive. I certainly 
do. The problem is that it is impossible simultaneously to maximise all the positive 
arguments and minimise all the negative ones. This is why an optimum balance has to 
be sought. However, it is not sufficient to seek an optimum balance between two of 
these concepts (rules and discretion) as both Titmuss and Davis attempt to do. An 
optimum balance needs to be struck between all three of them, i.e. between 
administrative rules, officer discretion and claimants' rights. To see how this might be 
done, I shall now refer to another seminal contribution to the subject, Jerry Mashaw's 
book Bureaucratic Justice.9 
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Mashaw's account of administrative justice 
Mashaw defines administrative justice (equated with the justice inherent in routine 
day -to -day administration) in terms of 
`those qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for the 
acceptability of its decisions' (p. 24). 
i.e. the principles which can be invoked in seeking legitimation for the justice of the 
decision -making process. 
In his study of the American Disability Insurance (DI) scheme, Mashaw detected 
three broad strands of criticism levelled against it: producing inconsistent decisions; 
failing to provide a good service; and failing to ensure `due process' and respect 
claimants' rights. He argued that each strand of criticism is based on a different 
normative conception of the DI scheme, i.e. a different model of what the scheme 
could and should be like. These three models are bureaucracy (Mashaw refers to this 
as `bureaucratic rationality'), professions (Mashaw calls it `professional treatment') 
and the legal system (Mashaw's term is `moral judgement'). 
Each model is associated with a different set of principles. Based on Mashaw's 
approach, we can associate a different mode of decision -making, a different 
legitimating goal, a different mechanism of accountability and a different type of 
remedy with each of the three models. These are set out below: 
In a bureaucracy, decisions are made by applying rules, the legitimating goal is 
accuracy, accountability is hierarchical and upwards, ultimately to the head of the 
organisation, while remedies are achieved through (internal) administrative review. In 
a profession, decisions are made by applying knowledge, the legitimating goal is 
service, accountability is interpersonal and outwards (to other professionals) while 
remedies are achieved through complaints to the relevant professional body. In a 
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legal system, decisions are made by weighing up arguments, the legitimating goal is 
justice, accountability is to an independent body and remedies are achieved through 
appeals to a court or tribunal. 
According to Mashaw, each of these models is also associated with a different 
conception of administrative justice. This is because, in each case, different principles 
are invoked to assess the acceptability of decisions. Thus one conception of 
administrative justice is based on the model of an organisation as a bureaucracy, 
another is based on the model of the organisation as a profession, and a third is based 
on the model of the organisation as a legal system. Mashaw argues that each of the 
three models is `coherent and attractive' and that, in his terminology, they are highly 
competitive rather than mutually exclusive (ibid., p. 23). Thus, these models can and 
do co -exist with each other. However, other things being equal, the greater the 
influence of one, the less will be the influence of the others. It follows that overall 
administrative justice, i.e. the justice inherent in day -to -day decision -making, can be 
understood as a trade -off between the different conceptions of administrative justice 
associated with each of the three models, i.e. with bureaucracy, professionalism and 
the legal system. Rather than being a question of `all for one', it is more a matter of 
`one for all' and Mashaw implies that this is the case not only for the American DI 
scheme but for social welfare organisations in general. 
Although this approach is certainly attractive, it is very relativistic in that it implies 
that the administrative justice of an organisation depends on what kind of organisation 
it is. It is also rather prescriptive in its claims since it holds that these three, and only 
these three, models always need to be taken into account. The latter claim is 
questionable since, for example, a strong argument can be made that the new 
emphasis on managerialism in public administration represents an additional model 
which is in competition with the other three, and not merely a development of the old 
bureaucratic model. 
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Mashaw's approach enables us to see not only what trade -offs are made between the 
three models of administrative justice in particular cases, but also to consider what 
different sets of trade -offs might be more desirable. The trade -offs which are made 
reflect both the concerns of legislators and the bargaining strengths of the institutional 
actors who have an interest in promoting each of the models, typically civil servants 
and officials in case of the bureaucratic model; doctors, social workers, police 
officers, other professionals and `street level bureaucrats' 1° in the case of the 
professional model; and lawyers, court and tribunal personnel and groups representing 
clients' interests in the case of the legal model. The trade -offs will vary from one 
organisation to another and, within a given organisation, from one area of activity to 
another. 
Bearing in mind the competitive relationship between Mashaw's three models of 
administrative justice, it is important to ask whether the overall justice inherent in 
routine decision -making could be increased through a different set of trade -offs from 
those which currently apply. This requires the exercise of judgement and, although 
there may be a consensus that some alternative state of affairs would be preferable, 
this will not always be so. In any case, whether or not such a state of affairs can 
actually be brought about will need to be taken into account. 
In my view, this approach provides a more satisfactory framework for analysing the 
actual and potentially more desirable trade -offs between rules, discretion and rights, 
which not only draws attention to their organisational implications but also highlights 
their consequences for administrative justice. Using this framework, I want now to 
consider how the balance between rules, discretion and rights in social security has 
altered in the United Kingdom over the last 25 years. 
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PART 3: THE SHIFTING BALANCE BETWEEN RULES, DISCRETION 
AND RIGHTS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 
The Reform of Supplementary Benefit in 1979 
The position advocated by Richard Titmuss in `Welfare "Rights ", Law and 
Discretion' did not hold for long. Titmuss died in 1973 and, following the retirement 
of Lord CoEdson as Chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission in 1975, 
David Donnison, a colleague of Titmuss' who had also been a Professor of Social 
Administration at the LSE, was appointed to succeed him. Donnison came in from 
the outside and, unlike Titmuss, had no vested interest in the policies which had been 
developed by the Commission. He quickly embarked on a review of policy which 
concluded that much larger caseloads, the changing composition of the claimant 
population (in particular the substantial increase in the number of unemployed persons 
and single parents claiming Supplementary Benefit) and the greater assertiveness of 
claimants had combined to make it impossible to exercise discretion in a humane and 
sensitive manner.'1 In 1976, the Labour Government set up a review of the 
Supplementary Benefit scheme which concluded by advocating, inter alia, a new 
legislative framework for the Supplementary Benefit scheme in which statutory 
regulations would replace administrative discretion.12 This was welcomed both by the 
welfare rights movement, one of whose main grievances was that supplementary 
benefit staff (and appeal tribunals) regularly used their discretion to deny payments to 
claimants and thus deprive them of their entitlements, and by the incoming 
Conservative Government, which argued that staff (and tribunals) used their 
discretion to make payments to claimants who did not really need them and who were 
`playing the system'. Legislation, passed in 1980, introduced statutory rights to 
`single payments' (for the purchase of essential items which claimants could otherwise 
not afford) and `additional requirements' (designed to meet the higher recurrent 
expenses of claimants with greater needs). Adopting a `top -down approach', the 
Government hoped that the existence of these rights would curb the generosity of 
staff and tribunals and strengthen their resistance to the special pleading of 
164 
unscrupulous claimants. Adopting a `bottom -up approach', the welfare rights 
movement hoped that the existence of statutory rights would ensure that more 
claimants received their full entitlement to benefit. Thus, for entirely different 
reasons, the Government and the welfare rights movement found themselves 
supporting the same strategy. 
The reform of social security in 1986 
For a short while after the passage of the 1980 Social Security Act, the number of 
single payments declined quite dramatically and it looked as though the Government 
would achieve its objectives but, after a year or so, they began to increase again. The 
rise proved quite relentless and was met by a series of cuts in the items which could 
be provided through single payments. 
Four years later, in 1984, the Government set up yet another set of reviews. On this 
occasion, they were not restricted to Supplementary Benefit but covered the most 
costly social security programmes in public expenditure terms. The stated aims of the 
reviews were to target limited resources on areas of greatest need (targeting), to 
make the social security system easier to understand (simplification) and to encourage 
greater individual self -reliance (through enhanced work incentives). However, it was 
clear to all concerned that the main aim was to devise means of capping or otherwise 
limiting the growth of public expenditure on social security. As far as Supplementary 
Benefit was concerned, the Government recommended its replacement by two 
schemes.13 Thus, the 1986 Social Security Act (which is currently in force) 
introduced a simplified Income Support scheme providing regular weekly payments of 
benefit `as of right', and a cash - limited Social Fund providing loans and grants as 
`one -off extras on a discretionary basis. I should point out that, in the case of these 
grants and loans, the staff do not have complete discretion since their decisions are 
constrained by a comprehensive set of administrative rules, directions and guidance 
and by the cash -limited nature of the scheme.14 But, while claimants of Income 
Support can still appeal to an independent tribunal if they wish to challenge a 
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decision, those who apply to the Social Fund cannot. The only mechanism of redress 
open to them is to ask for the decision to be reviewed administratively. In 
considering the actual and potential trade -offs between rules, discretion and rights, we 
therefore need to consider these two parts of the social assistance scheme, i.e. Income 
Support and the Social Fund, separately from the rest of the social security system. 
The dual system of adjudication 
When `Welfare "Rights ", Law and Discretion' was published in 1971, there were two 
parallel systems of adjudication in social security.15 Under arrangements which can be 
traced back to the introduction of unemployment insurance in 1911, there was a 
three -tier system (or, more accurately, a `three -tier plus' system) of adjudication for 
national insurance and related benefits. At the first tier, all non -medical, i.e. lay, 
questions were dealt with by National Insurance Officers (the forerunners of the 
present Adjudication Officers) while medical questions (most of which arose in 
relation to sickness /invalidity and disability benefits) were dealt with by general 
medical practitioners. Appeals against first -tier decisions were heard by National 
Insurance Local Tribunals ( NILTs) and Medical Appeal Tribunals (MATs) - the 
former dealt with lay questions and the latter with medical questions. There was then 
a further appeal from NILTs and MATs on a point of law to the National Insurance 
Commissioners. 
Although National Insurance Officers (NIOs) were civil servants, as far as 
adjudication was concerned they were expected to act independently in applying the 
law (statute law and case law) to the facts of the case. Thus, they were not 
answerable to management or to the Minister in Parliament for their decisions. 
NILTs comprised a legally qualified chairman and two lay members (one representing 
employers and the other trade unions) while the Commissioners were all experienced 
lawyers of at least 10 years standing. Their decisions constituted a set of precedents 
which had to be followed by NILTs and NIOs. Thus, they were, in effect, specialised 
administrative law judges. Finally, since all tribunals are supervised by the courts, 
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there was the possibility of a further appeal, on a point of law, from the 
Commissioners to the Court of Appeal (in England and Wales) or to the Court of 
Session (in Scotland) and ultimately to the House of Lords. 
A wholly different model of adjudication applied to supplementary benefit. Under 
arrangements which can be traced back to the introduction of unemployment 
assistance in 1934, there was a simpler (and more attenuated) two -tier system of 
adjudication. At the first tier, decisions were taken by Supplementary Benefit Officers 
(SBOs). There was then a right of appeal to a Supplementary Benefit Appeal 
Tribunal (SBAT) whose decisions were final. SBOs were also civil servants and were 
expected to apply statute law and Commission policy (there was very little case law) 
to the facts of the case. SBATs also comprised three members but they had a lay 
chairman and could override Commission policy by substituting their own discretion 
for that of the SBO. 
The contrast between the two systems was striking. In the case of Supplementary 
Benefit, the law gave considerable discretion to the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission. Although Commission policy was expressed in endless rules and 
regulations, officials nevertheless had a fair amount discretion in implementing policy. 
There were no precedents to be followed and SBATs functioned rather like case 
conferences. In National Insurance, officials had much less discretion in applying the 
law, tribunals were more like courts and Commissioners' decisions constituted a body 
of case law. 
In terms of the framework set out in Part 2, rights (associated with a legal model of 
decision making) were much stronger in national insurance while discretion 
(associated with a professional model of decision making) was much greater in 
Supplementary Benefit. However, the bureaucratic model (associated with 
administrative rule -making in large government departments) was even more 
important in both cases. This was, in part, because of the limited availability of 
specialist advice and representation which are needed to enable claimants to enforce 
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their rights. In national insurance, the bureaucratic model exercised most influence 
over decision making, the legal model somewhat less and the professional model very 
little indeed. In Supplementary Benefit, the bureaucratic and, to a lesser extent, the 
professional model were dominant while the legal model was very weak. 
As far as Supplementary Benefit was concerned, the 1980 legislation changed the 
position completely. As I explained in Part 1, the model of adjudication in 
Supplementary Benefit was subjected to sustained attack by the welfare rights 
movement for failing to protect claimants' entitlement to benefit, while the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission, and subsequently the government, concluded 
that the model was no longer viable. This was partly due to changes in the size and 
composition of the claimant population and to pressure from welfare rights activists 
but also reflected a lack of trust by claimants in officials who were being asked to 
exercise discretionary powers more suited to professionals. This model of 
adjudication was eventually abandoned in favour of the national insurance model 
which, for some years, applied to all social security benefits administered by central 
government. The status of the first -tier decision makers in Supplementary Benefit 
cases became as that of first -tier decision makers in national insurance cases, the 
composition and powers of SBATs became the same as those of NILTs and, in 1983, 
the two tribunals were merged into Social Security Appeal Tribunals. Moreover, 
during this period, some of the characteristics associated with the legal model were 
further enhanced. In 1984, all Adjudication Officers were made accountable to the 
Chief Adjudication Officer whose roles include advising AOs on the performance of 
their functions, discharging certain responsibilities relating to appeals to the 
Commissioners, and monitoring standards of adjudication.16 In the same year, 
responsibility for appeal tribunals was transferred from the Department of Social 
Security to an independent statutory body (now known as the Independent Tribunal 
Service) under a President (appointed by the Lord Chancellor after consultation with 
the Lord Advocate), who is responsible for the appointment and training of all 
tribunal personnel, and all tribunal chairmen were required to be lawyers of five years 
standing. Commissioners' decisions in supplementary benefit cases constituted a 
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body of case law with the force of precedent in exactly the same way as in other 
social security benefits. 
In terms of the framework set out in Part 2, the extent of discretion (associated with 
the professional model of decision making) available to Adjudication Officers and 
Social Security Appeal Tribunals (whose responsibilities now embraced 
Supplementary Benefit as well as national insurance and related benefits) in 
Supplementary Benefit cases had clearly declined while that of rights (associated with 
the legal model) had been brought into line with that in national insurance and related 
benefits. 
In 1986, the pattern of adjudication changed again. Supplementary benefit was 
replaced by a simplified Income Support scheme and a cash -limited, discretionary 
Social Fund. (The Social Fund is also responsible for a number of non -discretionary 
social security benefits, e.g. maternity and funeral payments, but since decisions about 
entitlement to these benefits are made by AOs and there is a right of appeal to a 
SSAT, there is no need to say more about this here.) In the case of Income Support, 
the pattern of adjudication which had formerly applied to all social security benefits 
administered by central government continued to apply. However, the cut -backs in 
home visits and the increased emphasis on postal applications for benefit weakened 
whatever influence the professional model may formerly have had. In addition, a new 
requirement that appeals to a tribunal had to be preceded, as a first stage, by internal 
administrative review, was introduced for a number of new benefits.17 This reduced 
the number of decisions which were reversed on appeal and weakened the legal model 
somewhat. At the same time, computerisation had the effect of further increasing the 
influence of the bureaucratic model which made further gains at the expense of both 
the professional and the legal models.18 
The case of the Social Fund is altogether different.19 First -tier decisions are made by 
Social Fund Officers acting under the direction and guidance of the Minister. There is 
no right of appeal as such (if there had been, tribunals could have made decisions 
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which would have breached the cash -limits), although dissatisfied claimants can obtain 
a review of the decision in question. This is carried out first by the official who made 
the original decision and subsequently, after an interview with the claimant, by a 
senior member of the local office. Claimants who are still dissatisfied may request a 
further review by a Social Fund Inspector whose decisions are monitored by the 
Social Fund Commissioner.20 Although the arrangements are rather complex, the 
important point is that there is no appeal from an initial decision to an independent 
appeal tribunal, or from there to a body like the Social Security Commissioners, no 
body of case law and no mechanism that is in any way analogous to the Chief 
Adjudication Officer. Thus the resulting balance between rules, discretion and rights 
(associated with bureaucratic, professional and legal models of decision making) is 
similar to that which applied in supplementary benefit before the 1980 reforms. In 
both cases, the bureaucratic model of decision making is dominant, the influence of 
the professional model is quite strong while that of the legal model is weak. 
Implications for justice 
The trade offs between the models in each of the periods referred can be summarised 
as follows. Between 1971, when Titmuss' article was published, and 1980, the 
bureaucratic model exerted the strongest influence on National Insurance, the 
influence of the legal model was also quite strong but the professional model was very 
weak. In Supplementary Benefit, the bureaucratic model likewise exerted the 
strongest influence but the influence of the legal model was rather weak while that of 
the professional model was much stronger. This is not to imply that National 
Insurance Officers (the forerunners of today's Adjudication Officers) were less 
`professional' in the performance of their duties than Supplementary Benefit Officers 
(all the evidence would seem to suggest the opposite) but rather, to emphasise that 
the professional model of decision making (as outlined above} exerted much less 
influence over their work. 
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Between 1980 and 1986, the relative influences of the three models in National 
Insurance was unchanged. However, following the reform of Supplementary Benefit 
in 1980, in particular by the replacement of discretionary Exceptional Needs 
Payments by rights to Single Payments, and the assimilation of Supplementary Benefit 
to the system of adjudication and appeals in National Insurance, the establishment of 
the Independent Tribunal Service and the Chief Adjudication Officer, the influence of 
the legal model was considerably strengthened while that of the professional model 
was correspondingly weakened. 
The reform of social security provisions in 1986 again had little effect on decision 
making and appeals in National Insurance. However, its effects on Income Support 
and the Social Fund, which replaced Supplementary Benefit, were considerable. 
Income Support was assimilated to National Insurance (in which the bureaucratic 
model exerted the strongest influence, the influence of the legal model was also quite 
strong but that of the professional model was very weak). However, the relative 
influences of the three models in the Social Fund was very different - that of the 
bureaucratic model was by far the strongest, that of the professional model quite 
strong while that of the legal model was rather weak. Thus the relative influence of 
the three models on the Social Fund resembled their influence on the Supplementary 
Benefit scheme in the early 1970's when Titmuss wrote his article. 
PART 4 : THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS 
In the final section of this paper, I want briefly to summarise the Consultation Paper 
Improving Decision Making and Appeals in Social Security21 which was published by 
the Department of Social Security in July 1996, and then to subject the suggested 
reforms (some of which have already been implemented) to critical scrutiny. 
The case for reform 
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The case for reform set out in the body of the Consultation Paper is not particularly 
compelling in that the arrangements which it seeks to change have existed for many 
years and have neither been regarded as problematic nor in need for reform. The real 
case is to be found in Appendix G which reproduces the speech in which Peter Lilley 
announced the Department's `Change Programme'. Although administrative costs 
only account for some 4 -5% of the total social security budget, the sums involved 
(£3 -4bn per year) are very substantial and, in an attempt to rein them in, Peter Lilley 
announced measures designed to achieve administrative savings of 25% over three 
years. It is said that these savings were demanded by the Treasury and that even 
Peter Lilley, who was known to be especially enthusiastic about public expenditure 
cuts, regarded them as excessive. Standards of adjudication, which currently leave a 
great deal to be desired (the Consultation Paper acknowledges that 22% of income 
support decisions were inaccurate in 1994/95), are bound to deteriorate further as the 
result of these `efficiency savings'. However, instead of recognising that this 
constitutes a strong argument for strengthening appeal procedures, the Secretary of 
State has decided that the Independent Tribunal Service, which in spite of its 
independence from the Department of Social Security is financed by it, should bear its 
share of the cuts. 
The aims of the `new' approach which are set out in the Consultation Paper are 
`[t]o improve the processes for decisions and appeals; to produce a 
less complex, more accurate and cost -effective system for making and 
changing decisions; and to preserve customers' rights to an 
independent review of decisions in appropriate cases' (para 1.2). 
Although these aims may, at first sight, seem quite uncontentious, many of the 
proposals are very controversial. 
In relation to first -tier decision making, the Consultation Paper recommends the use 
of simpler and better -designed claim forms; clearer rules and guidance about the 
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evidence needed to support claims to benefit; an increased emphasis on direct contact 
with claimants, better explanations for decisions and improved computer support 
(para. 1.3).. These are all worthwhile reforms, but in light of the planned cuts in 
expenditure on the administration on benefits, it is hard to see how some of these 
worthwhile reforms, in particular more direct contacts with claimants (now known as 
`customers'), will be paid for. 
The Consultation Paper also recommends that claimants who do not provide the 
evidence which can reasonably be sought from them should be penalised, e.g. by 
postponing the date on which they become entitled to benefit until they produce it 
(para. 4.8). However, such a measure is bound to hit the most vulnerable claimants, 
e.g. those with learning difficulties or mental health problems, those who are socially 
disadvantaged or have a poor command of English. 
In relation to accountability, the Consultation Paper proposes that first -tier decision 
makers, who are managerially accountable to the Minister and accountable to the 
Chief Adjudication Officer in respect of adjudication, should be accountable to the 
Minister alone (para.4.9). Their status would not be prescribed in law and the system 
of dual accountability, which- appears to have worked well since it was established in 
1911, would be ended. Moreover, in transferring the functions of the Chief 
Adjudication Officer to the Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency, which is currently 
responsible for the delivery of social security benefits (para. 4.14), all the advantages 
of an independent check on standards of adjudication would be lost. 
The Consultation Paper also outlines a series of reforms to the appeals process. Only 
cases which need to proceed to appeal would do so; the appeal would cover only the 
issue in dispute rather than the whole decision; and would refer to the date on which 
the decision appealed against was made, rather than the date of the appeal hearing as 
at present (para. 5.4). Cases would be sifted to decide how they should be handled; 
the range of expertise available to and the composition of tribunals would not be 
prescribed; legal expertise would be reserved for `appropriate' appeals with others 
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being heard by non -legal decision makers; single decision makers would hear most 
cases with two or more decision makers `only as necessary' (para. 5.5). In addition, 
and this is one of the provisions which has already been put into effect, there would 
be a specific statutory provision for `paper hearings', i.e. hearings dealt with on the 
papers alone, where appellants do not opt for an oral hearing (para. 5.6). There is, of 
course, nothing new about hearings which are dealt with on the papers alone - cases 
where appellants do not appear and are not represented are all too frequent. 
However, most tribunals find such cases very satisfactory and it is most unlikely that 
there would be much support for proposals which are intended to produce more of 
them. 
The Consultation Paper ends by inviting comments on an appropriate model for 
decision making and appeals in social security for the future. The proposals, if put 
into effect, would radically alter the existing settlement, i.e. the delicate balance 
between bureaucratic, professional and legal considerations and between the interests 
of management, staff and claimants. Waiting in the wings is the alternative model of 
internal (administrative) review found in the Social Fund where there is no appeal to 
an independent appeal tribunal. This is commended for achieving `independence' and 
`public accountability' (para. 6.14), and it is no secret that this was the former 
Secretary of State's (Peter Lilley) preferred option for the entire social security 
system. 
Implications for justice 
How appropriate are the stated aims and how likely is it that these proposals will 
achieve them? Although the Consultation Paper is undoubtedly correct in 
emphasising the importance of getting decisions right in the first place, the need to 
produce `efficiency savings', the abolition of the independent check on standards of 
adjudication and the weakening of the appeals procedure all suggest that the quality 
of decision -making is likely to deteriorate further rather than improve. 
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It is significant the stated aims refer to the preservation of `rights to an independent 
review' rather than to `rights of appeal' because, for many claimants, the latter would 
clearly not be preserved. Moreover, it is far from clear that review procedures, such 
as those which currently exist in relation to the Social Fund, can ever be truly 
independent. It is also significant that the rider `in appropriate cases' has been added. 
This presupposes that such cases can be identified in advance, but experience suggests 
that this is extremely problematic and likely to be very difficult to achieve in practice. 
One of the major virtues of the existing arrangements for decision making and appeals 
is that the system of independent adjudication, which includes the right of appeal to an 
independent tribunal, provides a measure of protection for those who are dependent 
on social security which compares favourably with that provided by lawyers and the 
courts for private forms of property22. This is not to suggest that everything in the 
garden is rosy - far from it - or that there is no scope for improvements which would 
enhance the justice inherent in the administration of social security. However, far 
from enhancing administrative justice, the Government's proposals are virtually 
certain to diminish it, and to do so quite substantially. Although the influence of the 
professional model, in particular the role of administrative discretion, has been 
`squeezed out' of most social security benefits, it still exists in the Social Fund. But 
the influence of the legal model, and thus of claimants' rights, would, if the proposals 
are implemented, be weak across the board. The already dominant position of the 
bureaucratic model would be strengthened even further and the undoubted 
advantages associated with the legal model of decision making would be lost. 
Every reform produces winners and losers. With a much greater emphasis on 
characteristics associated with the bureaucratic model of decision making and a 
greatly reduced emphasis on those associated with the legal model, the winners will 
be the Government and the Benefits Agency who will be able to dispose of cases 
more quickly and thus more `cost effectively', while the losers will be claimants who 
will lose the protection that an independent system of adjudication provided for them. 
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This conclusion is supported in the Consultation Paper by the claim that `the customer 
views speed as being at least as important as accuracy' (para. 6.3). 
CONCLUSION 
The framework developed in Part 2 of this article enables us to understand the shifting 
balance between bureaucratic rules, administrative discretion and claimants' rights in 
social security and to criticise the proposals in the Consultation Paper in a way that 
Titmuss' analysis in `Welfare "Rights ", Law and Discretion' does not. In my view, 
this is partly because Titmuss confused and conflated bureaucratic rules and 
claimants' rights, partly because he failed to distinguish officer discretion from agency 
discretion, and partly because he was too personally involved in the debate. Thus, in 
this instance, Titmuss did not get it right. Whether he would have approved of the 
proposals in the Consultation Paper is, of course, hard to say. More importantly, 
perhaps, the fate of those proposals is hard to predict. 
Following the publication of the Consultation Paper in July 1996, Dr Roy Sainsbury, 
an experienced and very well -respected socio -legal researcher in the Social Policy 
Research Unit at the University of York, was commissioned by the government to 
analyse the submissions of organisations and individuals who responded to the 
proposals it contained but his report has not yet been published. However, it is well 
known that the proposals outlined in the Consultation Paper were not given a very 
favourable reception, either from the Independent Tribunal Service or from 
organisations representing claimants, and it may be assumed that the results of 
consultation will not provide much support for them. 
Since the publication of the Consultation Paper, there has, of course, been a change of 
government. Although the new government has not yet revealed its position, the 
inclusion of a Social Security Modernisation Bill in the Queen's Speech suggests that 
it is unlikely that all the proposals favoured by the Conservatives will be dropped by 
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Labour and probable that they will be taken forward in some foam. However, we 
shall have to wait and see. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PROPOSALS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DSS CHANGE 
PROGRAMME 
In order fully to understand the provisions of Part I of the 1997 Social Security Bill, 
it is helpful to view them in historical perspective, in the light of current operational 
developments in social security, and in the context of contemporary initiatives in 
other, cognate policy areas. In the first instance, as Tony Bradley shows in his 
contribution to the book,' they involve a fairly radical break with the past, in the 
second instance, as I hope to demonstrate, their origins can be traced back to the DSS 
pressure for substantial administrative savings, and, in the third instance, as Hazel 
Germ argues in her contribution,2 they involve some rather dubious analogies with 
the reform of civil justice. 
The case for reform set out in Chapter 3 of the Green Paper3 is not particularly 
compelling in that the arrangements which it seeks to change have existed for many 
years and have neither been regarded as problematic nor in need for reform. The real 
case is to be found in Appendix G which reproduces the speech made by the then 
Secretary of State, Peter Lilley, in February 1996 in which he described the 
Department's `Change Programme'. Although administration costs as a proportion 
of benefit expenditure have been reduced year on year since 1990/91 - falling from 
5.7 per cent in 1990/91 to 4.3 per cent in 1996/97 - and compare well with private 
sector financial institutions,4 the sums involved (£3.4 billion in 1996/97) are very 
substantial. It is therefore understandable that they should be seen as a target for 
savings. 
Arguing that substantial cost savings cannot be produced just by cutting back on 
routine activities or working harder, Peter Lilley concluded that a large `step change' 
was required.5 Drawing inspiration from (certain unnamed) businesses which, he 
claimed, had improved their productivity by `20, 30 even up to 50 per cent' in very 
short periods of time, he concluded that the Department should `aim to absorb both 
inflationary increases in pay and costs and increasing workloads' through increasing 
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productivity by 25 per cent over the next three years. It is said that these savings 
were demanded by the Treasury and that even Peter Lilley, who was known to be 
especially enthusiastic about public expenditure cuts, regarded them as excessive. 
Whether or not that is so, they became Government policy. 
To indicate how these savings could be achieved, Peter Lilley set out seven 
'propositions': 
Proposition 1: Too many current procedures are rooted in the past clerical world. 
Proposition 2: Benefit entitlement rules are often outdated, inconsistent between 
benefits and more complex than necessary. 
Proposition 3: Laying down procedures in law is a barrier to efficient customer 
service. 
Proposition 4: It costs less to get things right first time than to check, revise and 
repeat work done wrong initially. 
Proposition 5: We need the information just once. 
Proposition 6: We should pay people not to perform processes but to achieve results. 
Proposition 7: The ethos of public service is essential but state monopoly of 
provision is not. 
As far as social security is concerned, some of these propositions are new while 
others are rather long in the tooth. Examples of the former are Propositions 3, 4, 6 
and 7; examples of the latter are Propositions 1, 2 and 5 which provided the rationale 
for the `Operational Strategy', the name given to the ambitious programme to 
computerise the UK social security system over the last ten to fifteen years. In return 
for substantial Exchequer funding, the DHSS, as it then was, undertook to improve 
operational efficiency and reduce administrative costs; to improve `quality of 
service' to the public by treating `customers' in a less compartmentalised way and 
more as `whole persons' with a range of social security business to transact; and to 
modernise and improve the work of social security staff.6 Although these aims were 
to be achieved by using information technology to promote a `user -friendly' 
assessment of claimants' needs; by simplifying the eligibility rules, standardising the 
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conditions of entitlement, and developing a single claimant data base, we are now 
being told, in so many words, that the critics were right and these aims were not 
achieved at the time. If they had been, we might not be in the position in which we 
find ourselves today. 
Just as some of the propositions are new while others are less so, so some of them are 
uncontentious while others are more controversial. In my view, examples of the 
former are Propositions 1, 2 and 5 (which were referred to above) and Proposition 4 
(which is particularly important); examples of the latter are Propositions 3, 6 and 7. It 
is surely preferable for all concerned to get decisions right first time than to `check, 
revise and repeat' decisions which were wrong initially. However, the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating and the Change Programme is best judged not in terms of 
the propositions themselves but, rather, in terms of the measures which were 
proposed to give effect to them. As far as Propositions 3, 6 and 7 are concerned, 
brief reflection indicates that each of them is extremely problematic. If importance is 
attached to procedural justice, then procedures must be prescribed in legislation; it is 
far from clear that competitive tendering is applicable to the administration of social 
security; and it is likewise not at all obvious that the ethos of public service can be 
maintained if the administration of social security is privatised. 
Under the Change Programme, the stated aims of the Department were to: 
concentrate on its core tasks, cutting out non -essential work and costs; 
redesign its business processes to cut out wasteful work; 
introduce new computer systems which will enable the Department to capture 
new information once; 
use the private sector where this will generate investment and increase 
efficiency; 
change its incentives and funding of Agencies and local managers; 
reduce staff numbers; 
improve the jobs of the remaining staff; 
reform the structure of decision - making and appeals. 
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In pursuit of these aims, the Department has cut out a number of its former activities. 
Thus, for example, Freeline, the benefits advice line, was closed in July 1996; the 
ethnic minority language helplines have likewise been wound up; mobile advice 
centres have been withdrawn in many areas; and `outreach services' have been 
closed and replaced by a telephone service. Within one month of closing Freeline, 
the DSS set up a National Benefits Fraud Hotline and, soon afterwards, launched a 
series of local anti -fraud initiatives known as Spotlight on Benefit Cheats. One must 
assume that anti -fraud measures are regarded as core tasks whereas the provision of 
information and advice are `non -essential' activities. 
Overall the Department reports a substantial improvement in productivity. Although 
some of this improvement can, no doubt, be attributed to improved work practices 
and the greater use of information technology, much of it is attributable to staff 
losses and it is hard to see, at least in the short run, how these staff losses, especially 
if they are considered alongside reductions in the provision of information and 
advice, will ensure that officials get decisions right first time (Proposition 4 above). 
It is more than likely that they will have the opposite effect. 
Standards of adjudication still leave a great deal to be desired. Thus, the Green Paper 
acknowledges that 22 per cent of Income Support decisions were inaccurate in 
1994/95 and this gloomy picture is confirmed by the latest Annual Report of the 
Chief Adjudication Officer.8 Although there were `swings and roundabouts' and the 
Chief Adjudication Officer acknowledges the difficulty of weighing improvements in 
some areas with lowered standards in others, he concludes that `the case for concern 
remains.' That this is so may be illustrated by citing a few examples. Thus, the 
report highlights a significant increase in the error rates for Disability Working 
Allowance where adjudication errors were detected in 68 per cent of cases compared 
to 16 per cent in the previous year and for Family Credit where the error rate went up 
from 23 to 35 per cent. Perhaps more significantly, although error rates in Income 
Support changed little over the period, errors were detected in 45 per cent of new and 
repeat claims, 34 per cent of reviewed decisions and 58 per cent of appeal 
submissions. In the case of new and repeat claims, the error rate varied from 27 per 
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cent and 70 per cent in different Area Directorates; in appeal submissions, 43 per 
cent of the cases examined were `fundamentally flawed', mainly because the 
submission supported an incorrect initial decision or failed to fully and effectively 
argue the case. 
Most of the measures announced by the previous government, for example, 
reviewing work processes, simplifying benefit rules, developing new information 
systems and exploiting information technology, and devising a new framework for 
allocating funds and measuring performance, cannot possibly produce short -term 
savings. The same is true of the intention to involve the private sector in the 
ownership and management of the DSS estate and in the delivery of services, not 
least because the present Government is proceeding more cautiously. In any case, 
the savings which are likely to be made here are likely to be somewhat less than 
previously envisaged because the present government intends to set minimum quality 
of service thresholds for private contractors. Thus, the 25 per cent savings in 
administration costs, and the inevitable cuts in service which must follow, are almost 
certain to lead to a further deterioration in adjudication standards. However, instead 
of recognising that this constitutes a strong argument for strengthening the 
independent monitoring of standards by the Central Adjudication Service and the 
existing system of adjudication and appeals, the previous Government decided to 
abolish the former and weaken the latter and the present Government has decided to 
follow suit. In so doing, `New' Labour has not only decided to adopt an extremely 
contentious and partisan Conservative measure but has also chosen to ignore the 
results of the consultation exercise which revealed a widespread lack of support for 
it. 
Just why the present Government has chosen to press ahead with the Bill is very 
unclear, especially since its own estimate of the savings resulting from the reform of 
decision making and appeals is a mere £50 million per annum `over the longer 
period', a paltry sum when compared to the £3.4 billion it currently spends on the 
administration of social security and one which is, in any case, within the margins of 
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error and may well not be achieved in practice. In any case, it would have been a 
small price to pay for maintaining a set of accumulated procedural rights 
which have been one of the very few compensations for the parallel decline in 
benefit levels in recent years. Although the provisions in Part I of the Social Security 
Bill can be traced back to the DSS pursuit of substantial administrative savings, the 
measures proposed can neither be explained nor justified in terms of the contribution 
to this end. 
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CHAPTER 8 
LAY TRIBUNAL MEMBERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
There is far less uniformity among the sixty or so different types of tribunal which 
fall under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Council on Tribunals than there is 
among the civil or criminal courts. Indeed, as Genn has argued,1 it is almost 
impossible to provide a simple definition of a tribunal. The label is given to so many 
different kinds of bodies with such widely different functions, covering a vast range 
of subject areas including private as well as public law issues. In addition, as she 
points out, `there is no common procedure ... and no common appeal process or 
appellate body. Some tribunal decisions are appealable to ministers, and others to 
courts and other tribunals. Many tribunals are composed of legal and lay members 
although some tribunals are comprised of a single individual without legal 
qualifications, some have members with specialist qualifications relevant to the 
particular jurisdiction. Some tribunals act in a strictly judicial fashion while others 
look more broadly at policy considerations'. 
TRIBUNALS AND COURTS 
Nevertheless, tribunals are frequently contrasted with courts. Of course, some 
tribunals, like employment tribunals, have many court -like characteristics while 
some courts, like small claims courts, resemble tribunals. Nevertheless, tribunals are 
not only regarded as different from courts but also as better than courts, at least for 
handling certain types of disputes. In some cases, they involve disputes between one 
individual and another where the involvement of the courts is strongly resented by 
one side. The clearest example here is that of disputes between employers and 
employees where allegations of class bias by the judiciary would have deprived the 
courts of their legitimacy. But, in most cases, they involve disputes between the 
citizen and the state which have become increasingly common as the state has 
assumed more welfare and regulatory functions. Tribunals are cheaper than courts, 
in part because legal aid is, with one or two exceptions, not available and in part 
because payments to tribunal chairmen and members are considerably less than the 
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salaries paid to judges in the civil courts. Considering the volume of cases which are 
heard by tribunals, this is not a trivial consideration. But, in addition, tribunals have 
other characteristics which, it is widely believed, give them advantages over the 
courts. According to the Franks Report, these are, in addition to cheapness 
`accessibility, freedom from technicality, expedition and expert knowledge of their 
particular subject'.2 Whether these alleged advantages are delivered in practice has, 
of course, been called into question. Prosser has argued that `tribunals were not 
established to make up for defects in the judicial system. The choice was never 
between appeal to tribunals and appeal to the courts, but between appeal to tribunals 
and no appeal. Their introduction did not represent an incorporation of the idea of 
legality into new areas of society for its own sake. The provision of a formal right of 
appeal ... was introduced as a counter measure to political protest and as a means of 
making oppressive changes in the relief of poverty more palatable by giving a 
symbolic appearance of legality while ensuring that this had no real effect'.3 While 
the reference at the end of this quotation undoubtedly fits the establishment of 
tribunals under the Unemployment Assistance Act of 1934 better than the tribunals 
established under the National Insurance Act of 1911, the general point that tribunals 
have been preferred to the courts on political and cost grounds rather than because it 
is believed that they provide better access to justice is one that must be taken 
seriously. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIBUNALS 
The effectiveness of tribunals in providing a check on first- instance administrative 
decision making has, in recent years, been the subject of a number of empirical 
studies. Two of these, Genn and Genre's The Effectiveness of Representation at 
Tribunal? and Baldwin, Wikeley and Young's study Judging Social Security5 both 
involved social security appeal tribunals, although in the former case they were 
compared with three other types of tribunals (immigration adjudicators, industrial 
tribunals and mental health review tribunals) while in the latter case, they were 
studied against a background of research on adjudication in local offices and internal 
reviews of first instance decisions. Since social security appeal tribunals hear more 
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appeals than any other administrative tribunal, the research clearly has wide -ranging 
implications for tribunals in general. 
According to Genn, tribunals are relatively ineffective because, even when a 
relatively straightforward mechanism of appeal exists (as it does in the case of social 
security), most people do not use it because they assume that the original decision 
was `correct' or that it is unlikely to be changed. Although this research confirmed 
that tribunal procedures are generally more flexible and straightforward than court 
hearings, the nature of tribunal adjudication means that those who appear before 
tribunals without representation are often at a serious disadvantage. Thus, in the 
1,115 social security cases sampled, the presence of a skilled representative increased 
the likelihood of a successful appeal from an average of 30% to about 48% after 
controlling for other factors. Genre goes on to argue that the shortcomings of 
tribunals as effective checks on administrative decisions are the result of 
`misdescription of procedures as informal and misconceptions about simple decision 
making and [about] the scope for unrepresented appellants to prepare, present and 
advocate convincing cases' because the issues dealt with are often highly complex in 
terms of both regulations which are to be applied and the factual circumstances of the 
appellants. She concludes that, if tribunals are to provide an effective check on 
administrative decision making, and a means of achieving administrative justice, 
their deficiencies need to be addressed and explicit attention needs to be given to 
achieving a better balance between procedural simplicity and legal precision.6 
THE ROLE OF LAY MEMBERS 
According to Baldwin, Wikeley and Young, the phasing out of lay chairmen in 1984 
has resulted in a more professional approach to the conduct of appeals and chairmen 
now have much clearer sense of their purpose and direction. However, their research 
revealed how chairmen marginalised lay members by assuming a dominant role in 
tribunal proceedings. This is really unsurprising since legally -qualified chairmen 
enjoy many advantages over lay members - in addition to their legal backgrounds, 
they receive more and better training and acquire greater experience by sitting more 
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frequently. Few of the tribunal members observed said very much - less than a fifth 
of the members observed in their study of 337 appeals made more than a limited 
contribution to the proceedings and almost half were completely silent throughout. 
Moreover, they frequently failed to participate actively in the deliberations following 
a hearing. In 331 of the 337 cases, the decision was unanimous and in the six where 
there was disagreement, the chairman was in the majority. In other words, there was 
not a single case in which the chairman was outvoted by the lay members. Members 
most commonly saw their job in terms of looking after the interests of the appellant 
and few saw their role in judicial terms - being impartial and applying the law. 
However, following the curtailment of discretion following the 1988 Social Security 
Act, the application of common sense' and the lay person's `benevolent' approach 
are no longer what is required at social security appeal tribunals. It is rather the 
rigorous and impartial application of the law combined with an objective assessment 
of the evidence. Baldwin, Wikeley and Young conclude that `the issues in most 
social security appeals are too legal, too technical and too complex to allow the 
average lay member much scope to make a significant contribution' and that `the 
relatively low level of training that members receive has proved insufficient to equip 
them for the task of adjudicating on a complex body of law'. However, they are of 
the view that lay members can act as useful back -stops, asking supplementary 
questions and picking up points the chairman has missed. Moreover, in certain types 
of case, for example where the issue is whether someone has `just cause' for 
voluntarily leaving a job, `the lay person's experience and considered judgement of 
evidence may be more relevant than the chairman's expert knowledge of the law'. 
Lay members can often use their local knowledge and experience to suggest sources 
of help which are of assistance to appellants and can provide chairmen with the 
opportunity to discuss their view of the case before coming to a decision. Thus, they 
concluded that `the potential remains for them to play an important role at tribunal 
hearings' but that this would only be achieved if attention was paid to recruitment 
and training 7 The present arrangements for selection and monitoring do not result in 
the appointment of the most able or most suitable people in the community and 
training has not enabled those who have been selected to maximise their input to 
tribunal pro ceedings.$ 
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THE REMOVAL OF LAY MEMBERS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
CHILD SUPPORT APPEAL TRIBUNALS 
Against this background, how should we assess the fact that, almost unnoticed, the 
long tradition of lay involvement in appellate decision making in social security has 
recently been brought to an abrupt end by the Social Security and Child Support 
(Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999. Whether it is best understood as a 
logical outcome of the introduction of legally qualified chairmen and the increasingly 
tight regulation of social security provisions or to the relatively low level of training 
which members have received or to the government's overriding concern with 
promoting efficient administration, the central question ought to be whether the 
change will promote administrative justice for those who, for one reason or another, 
are dependent on social security? Will it give rise to a better balance between 
procedural simplicity and legal precision and enable tribunals to provide a more 
effective check on what the government itself refers to as `the significant number of 
decisions taken by the Department [of Social Security] which are incorrect' ?9 
Under section 40 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, the President of the 
Independent Tribunal Service was required to appoint panels of lay persons to act as 
members of social security appeal tribunals, the panel for an area comprising 
`persons appearing to the President to have knowledge or experience of conditions in 
the area and to be representative of persons living or working in the area' and, under 
section 41, a duly constituted tribunal consisted of a legally qualified chairman (who 
could either be the President, a full -time chairman appointed under section 51 or a 
person drawn from the panel of part -time chairmen appointed by the Lord Chancellor 
or, in Scotland, the Lord President), sitting with two lay members. These provisions 
were both amended by the Social Security Act 1998. Under section 6 of the 1998 
Act, the Lord Chancellor is required to appoint a (single) panel of persons and, under 
section 7, an appeal tribunal is to consist of a chairman sitting with one or two 
members drawn from the panel. At least one of the tribunal members must be legally 
qualified and, in cases of special difficulty, one or more of the members may have 
special expertise. In spite of the fact that the qualifications of tribunal members were 
191 
to be prescribed in regulations, no -one anticipated that these legislative provisions 
would result in the demise of lay members. 
However, following parliamentary assent to the Social Security and Child Support 
(Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999, which set out the composition of 
tribunals according to the benefit and the issues raised in the appeal, this is precisely 
what has happened. In broad terms, the composition of tribunals considering 
disability issues (the former disability appeal tribunals) will be unchanged; those 
considering industrial injuries and severe disablement allowance (the former medical 
appeal tribunals) will consist of a legally qualified panel member and one medically 
qualified panel member (rather than two as hitherto); while SSATs hearing 
incapacity benefit cases will comprise a legally qualified panel member and a 
medically qualified panel member (the former medical assessor becoming a member 
of the tribunal). All other appeals, which according to recent DSS estimates may 
account for 50% of the total,10 will be considered by a legally qualified panel 
member sitting alone although, in exceptional cases, a tribunal may now include a 
financially qualified panel member, i.e. an accountant. For child support appeal 
tribunals (CSATs) and SSATs hearing cases other than those involving incapacity 
benefit, the new arrangements were to be phased in over a six -month period. Since 
1st June, all child support appeals have been heard by a legally qualified member 
sitting alone and after 30th September, the same will apply to `mainstream' social 
security appeals. The appointments of existing lay members, most of which expire 
on 30th September 1999, will not be renewed and the lay panels will then cease to 
exist. Thus, a tradition of lay involvement in appeals, which can be traced back to 
the courts of referees which heard appeals under the National Insurance Act 1911, 
will come to an end and three person tribunals will cease to exist in social security. 
A POLICY U -TURN 
A very different outcome was envisaged when the previous government embarked on 
its review of decision making and appeals three years ago. The Government's first 
thoughts were published in October 1996 in a Green Paper, entitled Improving 
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Decision Making and Appeals in Social Security,' which included a series of 
possible reforms to the appeals process. Cases would be sifted to decide how they 
should be handled; the range of expertise available to and the composition of 
tribunals would not be prescribed by statute; legal expertise would be reserved for 
'appropriate' appeals with others being heard by non -legal decision makers; and 
single decision makers would hear most appeals with two or more decision makers 
sitting `only as necessary.' In addition, and this provision was quickly enacted, there 
was to be a specific statutory provision for 'paper hearings', i.e. hearings dealt with 
on the papers alone, where appellants do not opt for an oral hearing. The Green 
Paper invited comments not only on the merits of the proposals outlined but also on 
the most appropriate model for dealing with appeals against first -tier decision 
making.12 Respondents were asked to assess the strengths and weakness of six 
organisational models which, in addition to the existing model, included models 
derived from the Social Fund, the Irish Social Security System and the Land 
Registry, none of which contain any judicial appointments. One of the main points 
at issue was not whether lay involvement in appellate decision making should 
continue but rather whether lawyers should continue to have an input into the appeals 
process. 
A total of 437 organisations and individuals responded to the Green Paper and, at the 
end of the three -month consultation period, an academic consultant was 
commissioned to analyse these responses. The consultant's report was submitted to 
the Department of Social Security in February 1997 but distribution was held up by 
the impending election. The proposals for reforming the way in which cases are 
dealt with by tribunals attracted more criticism than support by a factor of about two 
to one - 51% of the 117 respondents who commented on this proposal were against 
more flexible appeal arrangements, 29% were for and 20% were broadly neutral. 
There was considerable support for retaining the current composition of tribunals and 
little enthusiasm for the proposal to reserve legal expertise for 'appropriate' cases - 
among the 80 respondents who commented on this proposal, 88% were in favour of 
the status quo, 9% were in favour of change and 4% broadly neutral - a return to non- 
legal decision -makers being seen as an undesirable and retrograde step.13 
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In spite of the fact that the Green Paper had been prepared by the previous 
Government, the new Government adopted almost all the measures proposed in it 
and seemingly ignored the results of the extensive consultation exercise. Soon after 
the General Election in May 1997, the new Secretary of State announced the 
imminent publication of a Social Security Bill, which appeared two months later in 
July 1997. 
THE 1997 SOCIAL SECURITY BILL AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Under the provisions of Part 1 of the 1997 Social Security Bill, the Government 
sought to abolish both the requirement that appeals relating to social security and 
child support had to be heard by a three -person tribunal and the requirement that 
tribunal chairmen had to be lawyers of standing. In spite of opposition from (among 
others) the welfare rights lobby, the Independent Tribunal Service and Liberal 
Democrats on the Standing Committee, there was little opposition to these provisions 
in the House of Commons. Opposition to the Bill from Labour members focused on 
other contentious provisions, most notably those affecting single parents in Part 2 of 
the Bill, and the radical shake -up of decision making and appeals envisaged by the 
Bill attracted little criticism. 
By contrast, the two proposals referred to above encountered considerable opposition 
in the House of Lords and, in an effort to secure the passage of the Bill, the 
Government agreed to an amendment proposed by Lord Archer of Sandwell, 
Chairman of the Council on Tribunals, which ensured that at least one member of an 
appeal tribunal (but not necessarily the chairman) would be legally qualified. 
However, the Government refused to accept a second amendment designed to ensure 
that all appeals would continue to be heard by three -person tribunals. Thus, although 
some appeals would be heard by a one person `tribunal', that person would have to 
be legally qualified. 
In President's Circular No. 14, issued in May 1998, Judge Michael Harris made it 
clear that, from the date on which the Act was passed (21 May 1998), SSATs would, 
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with three exceptions, continue to comprise a legally qualified chairman and two lay 
members. The three exceptions covered applications to set aside under Regulation 
10 of the Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1995; paper determinations 
where appeals are determined on the written representations of the parties; and where 
one or both the lay members cancel in advance or fail to arrive on the day and 
appeals. In these cases, appeals could be, and, in practice, have been heard by a 
legally qualified `chairman' sitting alone. 
Four months later, in September 1998, the President issued another circular dealing 
with tribunal composition. In President's Circular No. 16, Judge Harris added two 
further exceptions to the three referred to above. As from 28th September 1998, 
corrections of accidental errors under Regulation 9 of the Social Security 
[Adjudication] Regulations 1995 and appeals over whether a person satisfies the all 
work test could also be heard, and, in practice, have been heard by a legally qualified 
`chairman' sitting alone. 
Finally, in May 1999, the declining role of lay members was brought to an abrupt 
end. In President's Circular No. 17, Judge Harris announced that all appeals heard 
by a CSAT or a SSAT, including those covered by President's Circulars No. 14 and 
No. 16, may be, and, it may be safely assumed, will be determined by a legally 
qualified `chairman' sitting alone. In the course of two years, the pendulum had 
swung away from the provisions in the 1997 Social Security Bill, which would have 
removed the legal input into appeal tribunals, to those in the Social Security and 
Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999, which have ended lay 
participation in tribunal decision making and, in most cases, left this in the hands of 
legally qualified `chairmen' sitting alone. This outcome is not at all what those who 
opposed the provisions in the Bill had in mind. 
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS 
The government may well have elected to proceed via statutory instrument because 
the parliamentary timetable precluded the possibility of realising its policy objectives 
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by means of primary legislation. If this is the case, it would be understandable 
although that would not make it acceptable. Statutory instruments are appropriate in 
some circumstances, for example where the aim is to fill out the detail by putting 
some flesh onto the bare bones of primary legislation. However, they are 
inappropriate in other circumstances, for example in cases like this which involve a 
substantial departure from the principles underlying the primary statute. This is 
because the government is not required to put forward any explanations for the 
measures it wishes to enact and because the measure itself is not subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny. Although the Secretary of State is under a duty to submit all 
proposals for making regulations to the Social Security Advisory Committee for 
comment, this general duty does not apply to regulations which are made within six 
months of primary legislation. As Ogus14 explains, the assumption is that such 
proposals will already have received adequate scrutiny by Parliament. However, in 
this case, the assumption clearly did not apply. The draft regulations were 
considered by the Council on Tribunals and, although the Council has not issued an 
official statement, it is clear that they were unhappy with the proposal. Thus, in 
evidence to the Social Security Select Committee on 23 June 1999, Ms Anne 
Galbraith, a Member of the Council on Tribunals, stated that `[T]he Council on 
Tribunal ... have, throughout, expressed our anxieties about single- member 
tribunals. Our preference would be for three- member tribunals. We felt that the lay 
members brought a very important contribution. We have heard some of the points 
about chairmen sitting alone, and these have been a constant theme. We have been 
very anxious about the balance and what proportion of cases would be heard by 
single- member tribunals'. This being so, it would appear that the government was 
undeterred by the Council's reservations. John Barnes, Chair of the Social Security 
Committee of the Council, who also gave evidence, referred to the possibility that 
single- member tribunals would not be capable of such adjudicative quality or 
consistency as two or three member tribunals; the quality of deliberation which is 
significantly higher where there is some form of dialogue (as there is in a two or 
three member tribunal); and the balancing act which single member tribunals will 
have to perform as appellants and others speak, whilst somehow effectively keeping 
a watch on body language. He noted, further, that although judges in other courts sit 
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alone, for the most part, they are not required to keep a full written record of 
proceedings. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 
Procedural considerations of legality and procedure do not really touch on the merits 
of the proposal. The fact that, within a very short period of time, the government 
moved from a position in which, in the Social Security Bill 1997, it attempted to 
remove the lawyer's input into tribunal decision making to one in which, in the 
Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999, it has 
actually removed the lay members' input, ought to set alarm bells ringing. It 
certainly suggests that the DSS has had no clear idea of what it wants from appeal 
tribunals. However, outside the DSS, it is widely believed that, notwithstanding the 
increasingly tightly regulated legislative framework, the curtailment of discretion and 
the resulting marginalisation of lay members, lay members could still have made a 
significant contribution to tribunal proceedings because they are often more 
approachable than lawyers; bring wider experience to bear on the issues in dispute; 
adopt a more `common sense' approach to decision making and are better at 
establishing the `facts' where these are in dispute. They are often better at assessing 
the appellant's credibility, they provide a check on any prejudices or biases the legal 
chairman may have and an opportunity for the chairman to discuss the evidence 
pertaining to the case, the arguments put forward, the tribunal's decision and the 
reasons for it. And if the performance of lay members is, in practice, less impressive 
than this, a more serious commitment to selection, monitoring and training which 
aimed to identify and nurture the distinctive contribution to tribunal proceedings 
which lay members could have been encouraged to take, would, almost certainly, 
have enhanced the quality of tribunal decision making, conferred additional 
legitimacy on tribunals and thus made tribunal decisions more acceptable. Lay 
members were not paid but received travel expenses and, in a diminishing number of 
cases where they lost wages as a result of sitting on a tribunal, an allowance in lieu. 
With such a large pool of people willing to volunteer their services in this way, any 
assurance that lay participation could give to appellants was arguably well worth 
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preserving. Some cost would have been involved if training had been taken but this 
would have been relatively small and would almost certainly have represented good 
value for money. 
WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
One of the most notable distinctions between the British and other systems of 
administrative law has been the amount of lay participation in the tribunal process. 
In some countries, e.g. the United States, judges sitting alone hear most 
administrative disputes. Sometimes, they are actually employees of the agency under 
review, in which case, the procedure for remedying grievances will not involve 
independent adjudication but, rather, an extension of the administrative process. 
Moreover, there is no sense in which this form of grievance handling enables an 
appellant to feel that he is being judged by his peers. 
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, lay participation in the form of lay 
membership of administrative tribunals does give some assurance to an appellant or a 
defendant that he is being judged by his peers. Such a view has, of course, long been 
a part of our constitutional practice in the criminal courts, and the extension of this 
principle to administrative procedures is viewed favourably by commentators in 
other countries who regard their own systems as over-judicialised. The analysis of 
responses to the Green Paper referred to above revealed that the combination of a 
legally qualified chairman sitting with lay members was seen, not as a weakness, but 
as a positive feature of the tribunal system15. Several respondents observed that the 
then current membership of SSATs was the culmination of years of development and 
that it reflected the benefits of involving lay people from a wide range of personal 
and working backgrounds. Against this background, one might have expected that 
the onus of proof would have been on those who wished to alter the status quo. 
Sadly, this was not the case and it is a matter of considerable regret both that the 
contribution of lay members to tribunal decision making in social security should 
have been ended and that no arguments for doing so were ever publicly put forward. 
Notwithstanding the diversity among the many different types of administrative 
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tribunal, there is a real danger that the other government departments will seek to 
follow the lead taken by the DSS. The danger, if they do so, is that tribunals will 
become a less effective means of dispute resolution than the civil courts, a less 
effective check on poor quality administrative decision making, and a less effective 
means of delivering administrative justice. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between substantive justice and procedural 
fairness in social security. After considering whether this is a theoretical or an 
empirical issue and concluding that it is an empirical matter, it reviews developments 
in the UK social security system since 1979. It provides a critical assessment of the 
adequacy of benefit levels and of the proposals contained in the government's Green 
Paper Improving Decision Making and Appeals (DSS 1996) published last year. It 
then explores the implications of substantive justice and procedural fairness for 
different theories of citizenship and contrasts the different positions of social 
democratic and 'new right' thinkers on the status of social rights and their relationship 
to civil and political rights. It concludes with an examination of the relationship 
between poverty, justice and citizenship in the UK today. 
The paper is in four parts. Part 1 analyses the concept of justice; Part 2 reviews the 
recent evidence relating to substantive justice in the UK social security system; Part 
3 does likewise with procedural fairness; while Part 4 discusses the implications of 
recent developments for citizenship. Part 2 draws extensively on the CPAG 
publication Poverty: the Facts (Oppenheim and Harker 1996) and the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation's Inquiry into Income and Wealth (Barclay 1995, Hills 1995), 
while Part 3 draws on material which appears in the Richard Titmuss Memorial 
* This paper is dedicated to the memory of Matthew Walsh, whose PhD thesis 
on `The Concept of "Quality" as a Possible Means of Evaluating the Social 
Security System' would have addressed many of the issues raised here, in 
particular the relationship between process and outcome, albeit in a rather 
different way. Tragically, Matthew died in a climbing accident on Mont Blanc in 
1992, at the end of his first year in Edinburgh, by which time he had developed 
a novel theoretical framework and produced a detailed research proposal (Walsh 
1992) but had not yet embarked on any empirical research. In writing this 
paper, I have been reminded of how much I learned from Matthew's imaginative 
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Lecture (Adler 1997a) which the author delivered in Jerusalem in November 1996 
and in a subsequently published article (Adler 1997b). 
PART 1: THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE 
According to the American social philosopher John Rawls (1972, p. 7), `the subject 
matter of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which 
the major social institutions' (which comprise `the political constitution and the 
principal economic and social arrangements') `distribute fundamental rights and 
duties and determine the distribution of advantages from social co- operation'. 
Justice is, for Rawls (ibid., p. 3), the primary criterion by which the basic structure of 
society should be judged, `the first virtue of social institutions, just as truth is of 
systems of thought'. 
Rawls distinguishes (ibid., p. 10) between the concept of justice, which refers to `a 
proper balance between competing claims' and competing conceptions of justice, 
each of which expresses a different set of `principles for identifying those 
considerations which determine the balance'. The coexistence of a single concept 
and several competing conceptions suggests that justice, like many other important 
social and political ideals, is essentially contested (Gallie 1964). As such, it can be 
defined in a relatively uncontroversial or uncontentious way (in this case as `a proper 
balance between competing claims') but the terms in which it is defined (i.e. what 
constitutes `a proper balance' and even what are to count as `claims') are the subject 
of considerable disagreement. 
Put another way, justice entails `ensuring that everyone receives their due' (Miller 
1976, p. 20) and a just state of affairs is one in which individuals receive exactly 
what is due to them in terms of their personal characteristics and circumstances. 
Although it is clear that there is considerable disagreement about what is due to an 
individual and how this should be determined, there is general agreement that justice 
and iconoclastic approach and of how much he might have contributed to the 
problems I have sought to address. 
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is concerned with the ways in which items are distributed among persons or groups 
whose characteristics and circumstances are open to inspection. Thus it refers to the 
share of an item which individual members of a group receive rather than to the total 
amount of an item that is enjoyed by the group as a whole and, as such, it is a 
distributive rather than an aggregative principle. 
Legal justice and social justice 
It has become commonplace to distinguish between different subdivisions of justice 
in terms of their fields of application. Thus, Honoré (1970) points out that while 
restorative justice is concerned with compensation for harm or injury (in civil 
matters), punitive justice is concerned with the punishment of wrong -doing (in 
criminal matters). Together they comprise legal justice and are largely, but not 
exclusively, the concern of the legal system, i.e. of lawyers and the courts. Social 
justice, on the other hand, is concerned with the distribution of benefits and burdens 
among individuals and groups in society. As such, social justice refers to matters 
such as the distribution of income, wealth and other `primary goods' such as health, 
education, social security etc. However, two caveats need to be made here: 
because punishments have been included in the domain of legal justice, the 
burdens included here refer to disadvantages other than punishments, e.g. to 
taxes or unpleasant work; 
although social justice usually refers to the allocation of material benefits and 
burdens, it can also refer to intangible (non -material) resources, e.g. praise 
and blame. 
Although social justice has been distinguished from legal justice, some of the same 
moral considerations apply to them both. Likewise, although legal justice is 
obviously bound up with the law as an institution, so too is social justice - they are 
merely concerned with different aspects or areas of law. 
203 
Substantive justice and procedural fairness 
While substantive justice is concerned with outcomes, procedural justice (which we 
shall refer to as procedural fairness) is concerned with process. Substantive justice 
is perhaps more straightforward and will be considered first. 
There are at least two dimensions to substantive justice. Thus, in his seminal 
analysis of the choices confronting policy makers in social security, Richard Titmuss 
(1970) distinguishes adequacy (defined in terms of sufficiency and referring to the 
absolute amount received) from equity (defined in terms of fairness and referring to 
the relative treatment of one person or group in relation to others). His insight that 
concepts of adequacy are increasingly entangled with concepts of equity is not only 
important but is clearly also of wide and general application to fields far removed 
from social security. 
One view of procedural fairness, which Rawls amongst other subscribes to, ties it to 
substantive justice by equating it with those procedures which lead to just outcomes. 
Galligan (1986, p. 138) likewise argues that `the object of procedures is to realise a 
given object, and so in this sense procedures are instrumental to outcomes'. 
However, another view suggests that substantive outcomes are not necessarily 
enhanced by increasing procedural safeguards. Indeed, Prosser (1981) has even 
suggested that enhanced procedural fairness may provide a degree of legitimacy to 
unjust substantive outcomes, thereby deflecting criticism and making them 
impervious to change. 
There have been various attempts to specify the requirements of procedural justice. 
Thus, in legal justice. we refer to a fair trial (in the case of criminal prosecutions) and 
to fair proceedings (in civil matters). In a criminal prosecution, the procedural 
requirements reflect the rights and duties of the accused and the state. However, 
there is wide agreement that accused persons should be entitled to know the case 
against them and to be legally represented, to plead not guilty and, if they do so, to 
be deemed innocent until proven guilty. The evidence against them must stand up 
204 
and the case for the prosecution must be established `beyond reasonable doubt'. 
Similarly, in a civil action, there are procedural requirements which reflect the rights 
and duties of the parties in dispute. 
Procedural considerations are also an important component of social justice. Thus, 
for example, it is widely held that like cases should be dealt with alike, policies 
should not be applied retrospectively, people should be shown respect, their 
circumstances should be investigated thoroughly, their claims should be decided 
impartially and expeditiously irrespective of the outcome, and there have been a 
number of attempts to specify what procedural fairness involves. Thus, Mashaw 
(1983, p. 24) defines administrative justice (the procedural justice inherent in 
administrative decision -making) in terms of 
`those qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for the 
acceptability of its decisions'. 
i.e. the principles which can be invoked in seeking legitimation for the justice of the 
decision - making process. 
In his study of the American Disability Insurance (DI) scheme, Mashaw detected 
three broad strands of criticism leveled against it: producing inconsistent decisions, 
failing to provide a good service, and failing to ensure `due process' and respect 
claimants' rights. He argued that each strand of criticism is based on a different 
normative conception of the DI scheme, i.e. a different model of what the scheme 
could and should be like. These three models are bureaucracy (Mashaw refers to 
this as `bureaucratic rationality'), the professions (Mashaw calls it `professional 
treatment') and the legal system (Mashaw's term is `moral judgment'). 
Each model is associated with a different set of principles. Based on Mashaw's 
approach, we can associate a different mode of decision -making, a different 
legitimating goal, a different mechanism of accountability and a different type of 
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remedy with each of the three models. The characteristics of each of these models are 
set out in Table 1 below: 
Table 1: The characteristics of different models of administrative justice 













service interpersonal complaint to a 
professional 
body 
legal system weighing up 
arguments 
fairness independent appeal to a 
court or tribunal 
According to Mashaw, each of the models is also associated with a different 
conception of administrative justice. This is because, in each case, different 
principles are invoked to assess the acceptability of decisions. Thus one conception 
of administrative justice is based on the model of an organisation as a bureaucracy, 
another is based on the model of the organisation as a profession, and a third is based 
on the model of the organisation as a legal system. Mashaw argues that each of the 
three models is `coherent and attractive' and that, in his terminology, they are highly 
competitive rather than mutually exclusive (ibid., p. 23). Thus, these models can and 
do co -exist with each other. However, other things being equal, the greater the 
influence of one, the less will be the influence of the others. It follows that overall 
administrative justice, i.e. the justice inherent in day -to -day decision -making, can be 
understood as a 'trade -off between the different conceptions of administrative justice 
associated with each of the three models, i.e. with bureaucracy, professionalism and 
the legal system. 
The trade -offs which are made, and likewise those that could be made, reflect the 
concerns and the bargaining strengths of the institutional actors who have an interest 
in promoting each of the models, typically civil servants and officials in case of the 
bureaucratic model; doctors, social workers, police officers, other professionals and 
'street level bureaucrats' (Lipsky 1980, p. 1991) in the case of the professional model; 
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and lawyers, court and tribunal personnel and groups representing clients' interests in 
the case of the legal model. Thus, these trade -offs vary from one organisation to 
another and, within a given organisation, from one area of activity to another. 
Developing a constructive critique of Mashaw's approach, Sainsbury (1992) puts 
forward a much less relativistic conception of administrative justice, suggesting, first, 
that it comprises accuracy and fairness, and, second, that fairness consists of 
promptness, impartiality, participation and accountability. Galligan (1996, p. 95) is, 
like Mashaw, rather more relativistic and equates procedural fairness with those 
'procedures which lead to fair treatment according to authoritative standards'. 
Although Mashaw's approach is very attractive, it can be criticised on a number of 
grounds. It is extremely prescriptive since it holds that the three models of 
administrative justice referred to above, and only these three models, always need to 
be taken into account. This is not necessarily correct and, for example, a strong 
argument can be made that the new emphasis on managerialism in public 
administration represents an additional model which is in competition with the other 
three (Adler 1997a and b). It is also very relativistic in that it implies that the 
administrative justice of an organisation necessarily depends on what kind of 
organisation it is. 
A more fundamental criticism of Mashaw's approach is that it assumes a high degree 
of consensus on the values underlying programmes like the DI scheme and a 
correspondingly high level of agreement on the goals which such programmes should 
aim to achieve (Maranville 1984). Consensus on values and agreement on goals may 
exist but, on the other hand, it may not. However, as Adler and Longhurst (1994) 
have demonstrated in their analysis of decisions relating to the management of long- 
term prisoners, Mashaw's approach can also be applied to competing models of what 
programmes are for as well as to competing models of how programmes should be 
run, i.e. to competing models of substantive justice as well as to competing models of 
procedural fairness. Each of the models of substantive justice may, in theory, be 
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combined with each of the models of procedural fairness and each of the paired 
combinations can be associated with a different group of institutional actors. 
The resulting two -dimensional model of justice is necessarily more complex but its 
characteristics are still the same in that it not only enables us to see what trade -offs 
are made between different combinations of substantive and procedural justice in 
particular cases, but also to consider what different sets of trade -offs might be more 
desirable. What would be desirable is, of course, not necessarily feasible. 
The relationship between substantive justice and procedural fairness 
At this point, it is appropriate to ask whether there is a relationship between 
substantive justice and procedural fairness. But, before doing so, it is important to 
determine what kind of question this is and to decide whether it is a theoretical or an 
empirical question. If there were a causal relationship between substantive justice 
and procedural fairness, i.e. between procedures and outcomes, it would follow that 
the question is a theoretical one but if, on the other hand, the relationship between 
them were purely contingent, it would follow that it is an empirical one. 
By considering social security, it should be clear that there is no causal relationship 
between substantive justice and procedural fairness. This is because fair procedures 
do not necessarily lead to just outcomes - scrupulously fair procedures can result in 
manifestly unjust outcomes while outcomes which are, at least in the aggregate, 
accepted as just may be arrived at rather arbitrarily. Similarly, low levels of 
entitlement can be given a high degree of procedural protection whereas high levels 
of entitlement can receive very little protection at all. It follows, therefore, that the 
relationship between procedural justice and substantive justice in social security is an 
empirical one which can only be investigated by reviewing the empirical evidence. 
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PART 2: SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN THE UK SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM 
The goals of social security 
Three of the main goals of social security are the provision of income support, the 
reduction of inequality and the promotion of social integration. The provision of 
income support refers to poverty relief, the protection of customary living standards 
and the smoothing out of income over the life- cycle; the reduction of inequality 
implies redistribution from individuals and families on higher incomes to those on 
lower incomes through vertical transfers and from individuals and families with 
lesser needs to those with greater needs through horizontal transfers; while social 
integration implies that benefits should not be stigmatising or socially divisive but, 
on the contrary, should foster social solidarity (Barr and Coulter 1990). 
Substantive justice refers to the extent to which these aims have been realised in 
practice and policy can be evaluated in terms of its success in achieving these goals. 
Providing a comprehensive assessment of social security policy in terms of all of 
these goals and each of the measures they refer to is clearly beyond the scope of this 
paper and I shall therefore focus on two of the most important measures: poverty 
relief and the extent of redistribution from rich to poor. This will be done by looking 
first at social security policy in the period up to 1979 under a succession of 
Conservative and Labour governments and then at social security policy in the period 
since 1979 when the Conservatives were returned to office under Margaret Thatcher. 
The aims of social security policy 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the main aim of social security policy was to move 
away from means testing by raising the level of national insurance and other 
categorical benefits above that of supplementary benefit, the national scheme of 
social assistance. Thus, during the 1970s, real spending on national insurance and 
other non means- tested benefits rose by about 25 per cent. Other important aims 
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were to protect benefits against inflation, to make more benefits earnings -related and 
to increase public expenditure on social security. 
The main aims of social security during the 1980s and 1990s could hardly have been 
more different. The primary aims of social security policy were to increase 
incentives in order to encourage people to remain in or to rejoin the labour market; to 
introduce greater targeting by increasing the reliance on means testing; and to reduce 
public expenditure on social security. However, because of the large rise in 
unemployment, expenditure on social security rose rather than fell. Within the larger 
total, the proportion of expenditure which went on means- tested benefits increased 
quite substantially. 
Poverty relief 
The definition and measurement of poverty are both very controversial. A key issue 
is whether poverty should be regarded as `absolute' or `relative', i.e. whether it 
should be defined in relation to a fixed subsistence level uprated only in line with 
price inflation or in terms of the living standards of society as a whole, being uprated 
broadly in line with earnings or income. Poverty can be defined in terms of an 
insufficiency of income (and /or other disposable resources) but the existence of these 
two apparently irreconcilable conceptions of insufficiency suggests that, like justice, 
poverty is also an essentially contested concept (Gallie op. cit.). However, this 
conclusion has been contested by Sen (1983) who argues that poverty has absolute as 
well as relative features. His approach involves distinguishing those capabilities or 
basic needs, whose satisfaction is a condition of effective social functioning, from 
the bundle of commodities, and the income required to obtain them, which make 
effective social functioning possible in practice. Sen argues that, whereas basic 
capabilities (which include the need to meet nutritional requirements, to escape 
avoidable diseases, to be sheltered, to be clothed, to be able to travel, to be educated, 
to live without shame, to participate in the activities of the community and to have 
self respect) can be defined absolutely, their commodity requirements are clearly 
variable and can only be defined relative to the society in question. 
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Accepting Sen's conclusion that the commodities that are required for effective social 
functioning will vary across time and space still leaves us with the problem of 
deciding what, in a given society at a given time, these commodities are and what 
level of income is required to purchase them. This would ideally require ongoing 
empirical research focused on this issue but, needless to say, it does not exist in the 
United Kingdom and it is therefore necessary to make the best out of the survey data 
that are available. 
Measures of poverty 
Unlike some other countries, there is no official poverty line in the United Kingdom, 
i.e. no government- sanctioned marker that admits the existence of poverty. 
However, two sets of official statistics are routinely used to provide proxy measures. 
The first of these is based on the Low Income Families (LIF) Statistics which were 
published by the Department of Social Security (DSS) from 1972 until a decision 
was taken to cease publication in 1985. Subsequently, they were produced by the 
independent Institute of Fiscal Studies and are now published under the auspices of 
the House of Commons Social Security Committee. This statistical series gives the 
number of people living on, below or just above supplementary benefit /income 
support, i.e. social assistance, levels. The second poverty line is based on the 
Household below Average Income (HBAI) Statistics with which the government 
replaced LIF. The measure of poverty which is most commonly used gives the 
number of people living at or below 50 per cent of average income net of housing 
costs and adjusted for family size. 
Both sets of statistics are derived from the same source, i.e. from the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES), an annual government survey of a representative sample 
of around 7,000 households in the UK. Neither set of statistics is perfect and each 
has its strengths and weaknesses (Oppenheim and Harker 1996, Appendix 1). The 
first approach allows us to assess how many people are living on or below what the 
state deems to constitute a minimum level of income for people who are not in `full- 
time' work and is an important way of assessing the extent to which, on the 
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government's own terms, social security provides an effective means of poverty 
relief The second approach is an explicitly relative measure and looks at how 
people at the bottom end of the income distribution have fared in relation to the 
average. In spite of the differences between them, the two measures give quite 
similar results. 
Figure 1 : Numbers and proportion of children living in 
poverty, on or below supplementary benefit/income support 
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The extent of poverty 
The LIF Statistics show that 13.7m people (24 per cent of the UK population) were 
living at or below Income Support levels in 1992. Of these, 4.7m people (8 per cent 
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of the population) were actually living below the 'official' poverty line. In addition, 
18.5m people (33 per cent of the population) were living in or on the margins of 
policy with incomes of up to 140 per cent of Income Support levels. 
Figure 2 : The risk of poverty by economic status in 1992193 
(defined as living below 50% of average income after housing costs) 
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Figure 3 : The risk of poverty by family status in 1992193 
(defined as living below 50% of average income after housing costs) 
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Figure 1 shows the increase in the number of people living at below or just above 
Income Support levels between 1979 and 1992. Due to recent changes in the way in 
which figures are calculated, two sets of figures are given for 1989 (reflecting the old 
and the new methods). In 1979, 7.7m people (14 per cent of the UK population) 
were living in poverty but, by 1992, this had risen to 13.7m people (24 per cent of 
the population). The bulk of this increase occurred in the early 1980s and was due to 
the sharp rise in unemployment. Since 1989, there has been an increase in the 
number of people and the proportion of people in receipt of Income Support. 
However, while the number of people living below Income Support levels has 
increased, the proportion of the population living below this level has remained fairly 
constant. One of the most important things that the LIF Statistics reveal is the large 
number of people who, for whatever reason, fall through the `safety net' of Income 
Support. 
The HBAI Statistics show that, in 1992/93, 14.1m people (25 per cent of the UK 
population) were living in households with incomes, net of housing costs, below 50 
per cent of the average. Figure 2 shows that this is almost three times the number in 
1979 when 5.0m (9.0 per cent of the population) were living below this poverty line. 
Figure 4 : Proportion of children and population living in poverty 
between 1979 - 1992/93 (living below 50% average income after 
housing costs) 
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Figures 3 and 4 show how poverty is related to economic and family status. The 
groups with the highest risk of experiencing poverty are the unemployed (75 per cent 
of whom were in poverty) and lone parent households (58 per cent of whom were in 
poverty in 1992/93). Figure 2 also shows that children were more vulnerable to 
poverty than society as a whole throughout the period from 1979 to 1992/93. Thus 
in 1979, 10 per cent of all children and 9 per cent of the population were in poverty 
while, in 1992/93, the corresponding figures were 33 per cent of all children 
compared to 25 per cent of the population. 
Redistribution from rich to poor 
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The HBAI statistics only provide comparative data as far back as 1979, and cannot 
be used to make comparisons over a longer period. However, the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation's recent Inquiry into Income and Wealth (Barclay 1995, Hills 1995) 
analysed changes in the distribution of income over a longer period. 
Figure 5 summarises the changes in inequality that have taken place in the UK 
during the last four decades. The top panel shows the growth in real net income 
between 1961 and 1979 for the population as a whole and for successive deciles of 
the population. It does this for income before deducting housing costs (BHC) and 
after deducting them (AHC). For the whole population, incomes grew by 35 per cent 
(BHC) and 33 per cent (AHC). But, at 55 per cent (BHC) and 51 per cent (AHC), 
the growth was about 50 per cent greater than this 'average' for the lowest decile 
group. The bottom panel shows what happened between 1979 and 1991/92. For the 
whole population, incomes grew by 36 per cent (BHC and AHC), slightly faster over 
this 12 -13 year period than over the previous 18 years. But the growth was smaller 
than this `average' for the bottom seven tenths of the distribution. In the lowest 
decile group, BHC incomes were no higher in 1991/92 than they had been in 1979 
and AHC incomes actually fell by 17 per cent. By comparison, incomes grew by 
more than the average for the top three - tenths of the income distribution. In the 
highest decile group AHC incomes rose by 62 per cent and BHC incomes by 57 per 
cent, substantially more than for any of the lower income groups. 
Figure 6: International trends in Income Inequality 
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Figure 6 shows the annual rate of change in inequality over the most recent period 
for which a generally consistent trend can be identified in the UK and seventeen 
other countries. While the data do not make exact comparisons possible, their 
implications are clear. There has not been a universal trend towards greater 
inequality in recent years, although this has been the case in the majority of other 
countries shown. However, the speed with which inequality increased in the UK 
between 1977 and 1990 (with the index of inequality increasing at 0.75 percentage 
points each year) was faster than in any of the other countries listed with the single 
exception of New Zealand over the four years to 1989. In most of the other countries 
where inequality was increasing, it was at less than half the British rate. 
Summary - changes in substantive justice 
Not only has the extent of poverty risen over the last two decades but the degree of 
income inequality has also increased. 70 per cent of the two poorest decile groups 
comprise households with no earnings and 70 per cent of the gross income of these 
two groups comes from social security benefits. Since 1979, the substantive 
entitlements provided by social security have not kept up with the higher living 
standards enjoyed by the rest of the population and social security has provided 
increasingly less adequate protection to those who are unable to support themselves 
through employment. 
PART 3: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN THE UK SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM 
A dual system of adjudication 
Until 1980, there were two parallel systems of adjudication in social security 
(Bradley 1985; Wikeley 1994, Adler 1995). Under arrangements which can be 
traced back to the introduction of Unemployment Insurance in 1911, there was a 
three -tier system - or, more accurately, a `three -tier plus' system (Bradley 1985) - of 
adjudication for social insurance and related benefits. At the first tier, all 
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non -medical, i.e. lay, questions were dealt with by National Insurance Officers (the 
forerunners of the present Adjudication Officers) while medical questions (most of 
which arose in relation to sickness /invalidity and disability benefits) were dealt with 
by general medical practitioners. Appeals against first -tier decisions were heard by 
National Insurance Local Tribunals ( NILTs) and Medical Appeal Tribunals (MATS) 
- the former dealt with lay questions and the latter with medical questions. There 
was then a further appeal from NILTs and MATS on a point of law to the National 
Insurance Commissioners. 
Although National Insurance Officers (NIOs) were civil servants, as far as 
adjudication was concerned they were expected to act independently in applying the 
law (statute law and case law) to the facts of the case. Thus, they were not 
answerable to management or to the Minister in Parliament for their decisions. 
NILTs comprised a legally qualified chairman and two lay members (one 
representing employers and the other trade unions) while the Commissioners were all 
experienced lawyers of at least 10 years standing. Their decisions constituted a set of 
precedents which had to be followed by NILTs and NIOs. Thus, they were, in effect, 
specialised administrative law judges. Finally, since all tribunals are supervised by 
the courts, there was the possibility of a further appeal, on a point of law, from the 
Commissioners to the Court of Appeal (in England and Wales) or to the Court of 
Session (in Scotland) and ultimately to the House of Lords. 
A wholly different model of adjudication applied to social assistance benefits. Under 
arrangements which can be traced back to the introduction of Unemployment 
Assistance in 1934, there was a simpler (and more attenuated) two -tier system of 
adjudication. At the first tier, decisions were taken by Supplementary Benefit 
Officers (SBOs). There was then a right of appeal to a Supplementary Benefit 
Appeal Tribunal (SBAT) whose decisions were final. SBOs were also civil servants 
and were expected to apply statute law and Commission policy (there was very little 
case law) to the facts of the case. SBATs also comprised three members but they had 
a lay chairman and could override Commission policy by substituting their own 
discretion for that of the SBO. 
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The contrast between the two systems was striking. In the case of Supplementary 
Benefits, the law gave considerable discretion to the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission. Although Commission policy was expressed in endless rules and 
regulations, officials nevertheless had a fair amount of discretion in implementing 
policy. There were no precedents to be followed and SBATs functioned rather like 
case conferences. In national insurance, officials had much less discretion in 
applying the law, tribunals were more like courts and Commissioners' decisions 
constituted a body of case law. 
Rights (associated with a legal model of decision making) were much stronger in 
national insurance while discretion (associated, perhaps somewhat incongruously, 
with a professional model of decision making) was much greater in Supplementary 
Benefit. However, rules and regulations (associated with a bureaucratic model of 
decision making) were even more important in both cases. The fact that first - 
instance decision makers were all generalist civil servants (and, as such, were neither 
trained as lawyers nor as welfare professionals) and the limited availability of 
specialist advice and representation which are needed to enable claimants to 
challenge bureaucratic procedures guaranteed their pre - eminent position (Adler 
1997a and b). 
The emergence of a single system 
As far as Supplementary Benefit was concerned, the 1980 legislation changed the 
position completely. The model of adjudication in Supplementary Benefit was 
subjected to sustained attack by the welfare rights movement for failing to protect 
claimants' entitlement to benefit, while the Supplementary Benefits Commission, 
and subsequently the government, concluded that the model was no longer viable. 
This was partly due to changes in the size and composition of the claimant 
population and to pressure from welfare rights activists but also reflected a lack of 
trust by claimants in officials who were being asked to exercise discretionary powers 
more suited to professionals. This model of adjudication was eventually abandoned 
in favour of the national insurance model which, for some years, applied to all social 
219 
security benefits administered by central government. The status of the first -tier 
decision makers in Supplementary Benefit cases became the same as that of first -tier 
decision makers in National Insurance cases, the composition and powers of SBATs 
became the same as those of NILTs and, in 1983, the two tribunals were merged into 
Social Security Appeal Tribunals (SSATs). 
In 1984, all Adjudication Officers (AOs) were made accountable to the Chief 
Adjudication Officer whose roles include advising AOs on the performance of their 
functions, discharging certain responsibilities relating to appeals to the 
Commissioners, and monitoring standards of adjudication (Sainsbury 1989). In the 
same year, responsibility for appeal tribunals was transferred from the Department of 
Social Security to an independent statutory body (now known as the Independent 
Tribunal Service) under a President (appointed by the Lord Chancellor after 
consultation with the Lord Advocate), who is responsible for the appointment and 
training of all tribunal personnel, and all tribunal chairmen were required to be 
lawyers of five years standing. Commissioners' decisions in Supplementary Benefit 
cases constituted a body of case law with the force of precedent in exactly the same 
way as in other social security benefits (Baldwin, Wikeley and Young 1992; Adler 
1995). 
The extent of discretion available to AOs and SSATs (whose responsibilities now 
embraced all social security benefits) in Supplementary Benefit cases had clearly 
declined while that of rights had been brought into line with that in National 
Insurance and related benefits. 
The re- emergence of two systems 
In 1986, the pattern of adjudication changed again. Supplementary Benefit was 
replaced by a simplified Income Support scheme and a cash -limited, discretionary 
Social Fund. In addition to providing grants and loans as `one -off extras on a 
discretionary basis, the Social Fund is also responsible for a number of non- 
discretionary social security benefits, e.g. maternity and funeral payments. However, 
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since decisions about entitlement to these benefits are made by AOs and there is a 
right of appeal to a SSAT, there is no need to say more about that here. In the case 
of Income Support, the pattern of adjudication which had formerly applied to all 
social security benefits administered by central government continued to apply. In 
addition, a new requirement that appeals to a tribunal had to be preceded, as a first 
stage, by internal administrative review, was introduced for a number of new benefits 
(Sainsbury 1994). The effect of this was to reduce the number of decisions which 
were reversed on appeal. 
The case of the Social Fund is altogether different (Drabble and Lynes 1989). First - 
tier decisions are made by Social Fund Officers acting under the direction and 
guidance of the Minister. There is no right of appeal as such (if there had been, 
tribunals could have made decisions which would have breached the cash -limits), 
although dissatisfied claimants can obtain a review of the decision in question 
(Dailey and Berthoud 1992). This is carried out first by the official who made the 
original decision and subsequently, after an interview with the claimant, by a senior 
member of the local office. Claimants who are still dissatisfied may request a further 
review by a Social Fund Inspector whose decisions are monitored by the Social Fund 
Commissioner. Although the arrangements are rather complex, the important point 
is that there is no appeal from an initial decision to an independent appeal tribunal, or 
from there to a body like the Social Security Commissioners, no body of case law 
and no mechanism that is in any way analogous to the Chief Adjudication Officer. 
Thus the resulting balance between rules, discretion and rights is similar to that 
which applied in supplementary benefits before the 1980 reforms. The trade offs 
between bureaucratic rules, administrative discretion and procedural (welfare) rights 
in each of the periods referred to are set out in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Trade offs between bureaucratic rules, administrative discretion and 








Nat Ins very strong very weak strong 
Sup Ben very strong quite strong weak 
1980 -1986 
Nat Ins very strong very weak strong 
Sup Ben very strong weak strong 
1986- present 
Soc. Sec (inc. I S) very strong very weak quite strong 
Social Fund very strong quite strong weak 
The latest proposals 
I want now to summarise the latest proposals for `mproving' decision making and 
appeals in social security, some of which have already been implemented, and then 
to subject them to critical scrutiny. These were first put forward by the (previous) 
Conservative Government in a Consultation Paper last year (DSS 1996) and most of 
them appear again in the 1988 Social Security Bill introduced by the (present) 
Labour Government. Although few of the proposals put forward in the Consultation 
Paper received much support (Sainsbury 1997), the new government seems 
determined to press ahead with them. 
The aims of the `new' approach which are set out in the Consultation Paper are 
inoffensive enough. They were 
`[t]o improve the processes for decisions and appeals; to produce a 
less complex, more accurate and cost -effective system for making and 
changing decisions; and to preserve customers' rights to an 
independent review of decisions in appropriate cases.' (ibid., para. 
1.2) 
It is the detailed proposals which are so worrying. In regard to first -tier decision 
making, the Consultation Paper favoured the use of simpler and better -designed 
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claim forms; clearer rules and guidance about the evidence needed to support claims 
to benefit; an increased emphasis on direct contact with claimants, better 
explanations for decisions and improved computer support (ibid., para. 1.3). 
However, in light of the likely cuts in expenditure on the administration on benefits 
(which is referred to below), it is hard to see how some of these worthwhile reforms, 
in particular more direct contacts with claimants (now known as `customers'), will be 
paid for. 
The Consultation Paper also recommended that claimants who do not provide the 
evidence which can reasonably be sought from them should be penalised, e.g. by 
postponing the start of the entitlement until they produce it (ibid., para. 4.8). Such a 
measure is bound to hit the most vulnerable claimants, e.g. those with learning 
difficulties or mental health problems, those who are socially disadvantaged or have 
a poor command of English. 
In place of the dual system of accountability, the Consultation Paper proposed that 
first -tier decision makers, who are managerially accountable to the Minister and 
accountable to the Chief Adjudication Officer in respect of adjudication, should be 
accountable to the Minister alone (ibid., para. 4.9). Their status would not be 
prescribed in law and the system of dual accountability, which appears to have 
worked well since it was established in 1911, would be ended. Moreover, in 
transferring the functions of the Chief Adjudication Officer to the Chief Executive of 
the Benefits Agency, which is now responsible for the delivery of social security 
benefits (ibid., para. 4.14), all the advantages of an independent check on standards 
of adjudication would be lost. 
Finally, the Consultation Paper proposed a series of reforms to the appeals process. 
Only cases which need to proceed to appeal would do so; the appeal would cover 
only the issue in dispute rather than the whole decision, and would refer to the date 
on which the decision appealed against was made rather than the date of the appeal 
hearing as at present (ibid., para. 5.4). Cases would be sifted to decide how they 
should be handled; the range of expertise available to and the composition of 
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tribunals would not be prescribed; legal expertise would be reserved for `appropriate' 
appeals with others being heard by non -legal decision makers; single decision 
makers would hear most cases with two or more decision makers 'only as necessary' 
(ibid., para. 5.5). Finally, and this is one of the provisions which has already been 
put into effect, there would be a specific statutory provision for paper hearings, i.e. 
hearings dealt with on the papers alone, where appellants did not opt for an oral 
hearing (ibid., para. 5.6). 
The Consultation Paper ended by inviting comments on an appropriate model for 
decision making and appeals in social security for the future. The proposals, if put 
into effect, would radically alter the existing settlement, i.e. the delicate balance 
between bureaucratic, professional and legal considerations and between the interests 
of management, staff and claimants. Waiting in the wings was the alternative model 
of internal (administrative) review found in the Social Fund where there is no appeal 
to an independent appeal tribunal. This was commended for achieving 
'independence' and 'public accountability' (ibid., para. 6.14), and it is no secret that 
this was the former Secretary of State (Peter Lilley)'s preferred option for the entire 
social security system. 
The case for reform set out in the body of the Consultation Paper is not particularly 
compelling in that the arrangements which it seeks to change have existed for many 
years and have neither been regarded as problematic nor in need for reform. The real 
case is to be found in Appendix G which reproduces the speech in which the Peter 
Lilley announced the Department's `Change Programme'. Although administrative 
costs only account for some 4 -5 per cent of the total social security budget, the sums 
involved (£3 -4bn. per year) are very substantial and, in an attempt to rein them in, he 
announced measures designed to achieve administrative savings of 25 per cent over 
three years. It is said that these savings were demanded by the Treasury (the UK 
Ministry of Finance) and that even Peter Lilley, who is known to be especially 
enthusiastic about public expenditure cuts, regarded them as excessive. Standards of 
adjudication, which currently leave a great deal to be desired (the Consultation Paper 
acknowledged that 22 per cent of Income Support decisions were inaccurate in 
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1994/95), are bound to deteriorate further as the result of these `efficiency savings'. 
However, instead of recognising that this constitutes a strong argument for 
strengthening appeal procedures, the Government decided that the Independent 
Tribunal Service, which in spite of its independence from the Department of Social 
Security is financed by it, should bear its share of the cuts. 
Submissions were received from 437 individuals and organisations and subjected to a 
detailed analysis (Sainsbury 1997). Although there was general support for the 
Government's stated aims, there was considerable opposition to most of the detailed 
proposals. However, instead of producing a White Paper, which responded to and 
took account of these criticisms and would have been particularly appropriate in light 
of the change of government, the Labour Government has introduced a Bill which 
adopts nearly all the proposals put forward by the Conservatives and ignores the 
results of extensive public consultation. Thus, Part 1 of the Bill abolishes the status 
of independent adjudication officers and makes officials accountable to the Secretary 
of State for all their decisions; does away with the Central Adjudication Service and 
makes Agency Chief Executives responsible for issuing guidance, monitoring the 
quality of decisions, and reporting on standards; allows for all appeals to be sifted to 
identify the nature and type of expertise needed to deal with them; removes the 
requirement that all cases must be heard by a three -person tribunal and the 
requirement that tribunal chairs must be legally qualified. Why it has chosen to do 
so is both unclear and beyond the scope of this article. That it has chosen to do so is 
clear and beyond dispute. 
The trade offs entailed by the Government's proposals are set out in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Trade offs between bureaucratic rules, administrative discretion and 
procedural rights entailed by the previous Government's proposed reform of 









Soc. Sec (inc. IS) very strong very weak weak 
(previously quite 
strong) 
Social Fund very strong quite strong weak 
(unchanged) 
What is at risk? 
One of the major virtues of the existing arrangements for decision making and 
appeals is that the system of independent adjudication provides a measure of 
protection for those who are dependent on social security comparable to that 
provided by lawyers and the courts for private forms of property (Reich 1964, 1965). 
This is not to suggest that everything in the garden is rosy - far from it - or that there 
is no scope for improvements which would enhance the justice inherent in the 
administration of social security. However, instead of enhancing procedural fairness, 
the Government's proposals are virtually certain to diminish it, and to do so quite 
significantly. Although the influence of administrative discretion has been 'squeezed 
out' of most social security benefits, it still exists in the Social Fund. But the 
influence of claimants' rights, will if the Bill is passed and the proposals are 
implemented, be weakened across the board. 
Summary - changes in procedural fairness 
Prior to the 1980 reforms, applicants for and recipients of social assistance were 
largely dependent on the discretion of officials and received little protection from 
appeal tribunals. However, as a result of these and other reforms, Supplementary 
Benefit was brought into line with other social security benefits and the rights of 
applicants and recipients greatly enhanced through the establishment of the office of 
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Chief Adjudication Officer to monitor the standards of initial decision making and 
the strengthening of appeal tribunals which resulted from the establishment of the 
Independent Tribunal Service. Some of these gains were subsequently lost in the 
1986 reforms by the establishment of a discretionary Social Fund which discarded 
the model of independent adjudication in favour of a model of bureaucratic decision 
making in which, among other things, internal review has been emphasised at the 
expense of an appeal to an external tribunal. Similar developments in other areas of 
social security have likewise weakened the rights of claimants but are trivial in 
comparison to the proposals for `improving' decision making and appeals which 
were put forward by the British Government. These proposals would have the effect 
of abolishing the system of independent adjudication and severely curtailing the 
degree of procedural protection which appeal tribunals would be able to provide. If 
the Bill is passed and the proposals are enacted, procedural fairness will be 
substantially diminished in much the same way as substantive justice has already 
been. Until recently, it could be argued that gains in procedural fairness had 
accompanied losses in substantive justice, i.e. that claimants had secured stronger 
rights albeit to lower levels of benefit. However, this limited gain is now under 
serious threat. 
PART 4: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP 
The concept of citizenship 
T H Marshall (1963) defines citizenship as `a status which is bestowed on everyone 
who is a full member of a community' and refers to the rights (and duties) people 
have in common as citizens. Marshall argues that citizenship comprises three 
clusters of rights: civil rights, political rights and social rights. 
Civil rights refer to rights which are necessary for individual freedom 
(freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion), the right to own property and conclude valid contracts, 
the right to work and the right to justice (habeus corpus, i.e. freedom from 
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arbitrary arrest, the assumption of innocence until proven guilty, and the 
right to a fair trial). 
Political rights comprise the right to participate in the exercise of political 
power both as a voter and as a candidate. 
Social rights embrace the right to `a modicum of economic welfare and 
security and to live the life of a civilised person according to the standards of 
society' . 
The reference above, in the elucidation of social rights, to `the standards of society' 
makes it clear that the content of each of the three components of citizenship is, to a 
degree, open textured. Their meaning cannot be completely specified in advance and 
can only be determined in the light of changing circumstances. 
According to Marshall, each of the three clusters of rights is associated with a 
different set of institutions. Thus, civil rights are intimately bound up with and, in 
theory, protected by the courts, political rights are linked to parliament, while, in the 
United Kingdom, social rights are associated with what came to be known, in a 
generic sense, as the social services, i.e. with the public provision of benefits and 
services and the regulation of those that are privately provided (Cranston 1985). 
Inasmuch as citizenship refers to what people have in common as citizens, e.g. the 
right to make and enforce contracts, to vote and to receive treatment from the 
National Health Service, it is an egalitarian concept and can be contrasted with all 
those attributes and characteristics which are unequally distributed in society, e.g. 
intelligence, strength, health, income, wealth etc. 
One consequence of citizenship is that it reduces the significance of economic and 
social inequalities. This applies to each of the clusters of rights which make up 
citizenship. In the absence of civil, political and social rights, the ability to make and 
enforce contracts, to vote and to obtain health care are all distributed unequally and 
determined by the pattern of economic and social inequalities in society. But, where 
men and women have civil, political and social rights, the right to make and enforce 
contracts, vote and obtain health care are available to everyone. Although economic 
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and social inequalities still exist, they are of less significance. It is in this sense that 
we can say that citizenship ameliorates social and economic inequalities. But, it is 
also the case that it can legitimate them - because they are of less significance, they 
may be seen as more acceptable. 
However, although citizenship may be equal in form, it does not follow that it is 
equal in content. And that is why the weakening of procedural rights and substantive 
entitlements for those who are dependent on social security in the United Kingdom is 
of such great concern. Marshall defined social rights in terms of a level of economic 
welfare and security that enabled people `to live the life of a civilised person 
according to the standards of society' but, for an increasing number of poor people in 
Britain, it is not clear that they can still do so. 
Social democratic and 'new right' perspectives on social rights as a component 
of citizenship 
Social democrats like Marshall and Plant (1993) argue that social rights are an 
essential component of citizenship. This is because, in the absence of rights to 
minimum levels of income, health care, education etc., people will be unable to 
participate fully in the life of society or to exercise their civil and political rights. On 
the other hand, classical liberals like Hayek (1982) and Barry (1990) argue that 
social rights are not really a component of citizenship at all. This is both because 
social rights are positive rights and, unlike civil and political rights, which are 
negative rights and embody absolute standards, positive rights reflect normative 
judgments and because social rights can only be achieved at the expense of other 
rights. Thus, it is argued that the `right' to social security pre- supposes agreement on 
how much social security a person should receive and the existence of a social 
security system paid for out of taxation to ensure that they receive what they are 
entitled to. However, the level of social security payments necessarily reflects 
political judgments and the compulsory nature of taxation is, they argue, inconsistent 
with respect for property rights. 
229 
These robust arguments are not, in fact, as overwhelming as they may initially appear 
to be. This is because social rights cannot be distinguished from civil and political 
rights in this way. The extensiveness of civil and political rights are also matters of 
judgment and taxation is also required to finance the legal system and parliamentary 
institutions. Thus, the difference between social rights on the one hand and civil and 
political rights on the other is one of degree rather than one of kind. 
In an important article, Ignatieff (1989) contrasts a rights -based citizenship of 
entitlement (based on Marshall's conception of citizenship) with a duty -based 
citizenship of empowerment (as championed during the 1980s and 1990s in the UK 
and the USA). The former is described as passive and was formerly championed by 
governments of the centre -left (mainly by Labour governments in Britain and by 
Democratic administrations in the USA) is order to counter and compensate for 
unacceptable inequalities generated by the market, while the latter is described as 
active and has been championed more recently by governments of the right (by a 
string of radical Conservative governments in Britain and Republican administrations 
in the USA) in order to deal with the `despotism' and `dreariness' of public provision 
and the state of dependency which it is said to have generated. While governments 
of the left argued that a generous structure of universal social entitlements was a pre- 
condition for the exercise of liberty in a capitalist society and that the economy 
actually required a citizenship of entitlement for its efficient functioning, 
governments of the right claimed that this approach destroyed the liberty it was 
intended to enhance and effectively throttled the market. 
Like justice, citizenship appears to have all the characteristics of an essentially 
contested concept (Gallie op. cit.). The concept of citizenship can be defined 
relatively uncontentiously as `a status which bestows equal rights and duties on those 
who are full members of a community' but this is interpreted in very different ways 
by those with competing conceptions of what rights and duties it should entail. Thus, 
a citizenship of entitlement and a citizenship of empowerment can be understood as 
two competing conceptions of citizenship - each of them rests on a different set of 
value assumptions but each of them is coherent, attractive and compelling in its own 
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way. However, according to Ignatieff, the active (duty -based) and the passive 
(rights- based) conceptions of citizenship are not wholly independent. On the 
contrary, they are quite closely bound up with one another. Moreover, the failure of 
politicians on the right as well as the left to realise this has created serious and, at the 
time when he wrote, unresolved problems. 
The problem for governments of the centre (for `New' Labour under Tony Blair in 
the UK as much as for the second Clinton Administration in the USA) is to recognise 
that, although entitlement needs to be seen for what it is, namely a means to an end, 
and not as an end in itself, empowerment requires a basic infrastructure of 
entitlement for its own realisation. If his argument is correct, it would seem to 
follow that empowerment and entitlement are two facets of citizenship (just as 
absolute and relative deprivation are two facets of poverty). 
Social justice, citizenship and poverty in the UK 
As demonstrated above, social justice has substantive and procedural components, 
both of which are in jeopardy. Benefit levels have been allowed to fall with a result 
that there has been a substantial increase in the extent of poverty and inequality in the 
United Kingdom and the present government, acting on proposals put forward by the 
previous government, is now proposing to reduce the degree of procedural protection 
provided for those who are dependent on social security and to reverse a series of 
reforms which, over the last 20 -30 years, had considerably strengthened their 
procedural rights. Both these developments diminish the meaning and significance 
of citizenship for the poor. The reduction in the level of social security benefits has 
already reduced their social rights, had knock -on effects for civil and political rights 
and made it considerably harder for them to participate in the life of society as full 
citizens while the threatened reduction in the level of procedural protection afforded 
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CHAPTER 10 
`MESSY CONTRACTS' OR 'TRADE -OFFS' BETWEEN COMPETING 
PRINCIPLES? 
The European Journal of Social Security, of which I am one of the editors, came out for 
the first time two years ago. There have been eight issues so far and, without wanting to 
boast, I am in no doubt that we have already published some excellent articles in the 
journal. Foremost among them, and the one which, in my role as `editorial midwife', it 
has given me the greatest pleasure to `deliver', was Zsuzsa Ferge's seminal article 
entitled `In Defence of Messy or Multi -Principle Contracts' which we published in our 
fifth issue in the spring of 2000.1 
In her article, Zsuzsa distinguishes between four patterns of access to resources. Each of 
them is presented as an ideal type2 as follows: 
Charity - giving without expectation of receiving anything in return. 
Reciprocity - giving with the expectation of receiving something equivalent in 
return later on, although there is no metric for calculating the exact equivalence. 
Citizenship - enjoyment of the social rights of citizenship, i.e. the right to an 
adequate level of income, decent working conditions, health care and education, 
etc. To the extent that the realisation of these rights by those in need involves the 
provision of benefits and services that have to be paid for by others, the social 
rights of citizenship entail an element of redistribution. Under systems of 
redistribution, some people end up as net gainers while others end up as net 
losers but, although there is a metric for calculating how this should operate at 
the aggregate level, there is no metric for doing so at the individual level. 
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 Exchange - based on the market principle, in which the price mechanism ensures 
that there is an exact, albeit formal, equivalence between supply and demand, i.e. 
between what is bought and sold and what is paid for. 
According to Zsuzsa, charity, reciprocity, citizenship or redistribution, and exchange are 
all examples of contracts in that they represent promises or agreements between actors 
at the societal level. The relationships between the giver and the receiver in each of the 
models are set out in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Relationship between the Giver and the Receiver in the four Models 
Model Relationship 
charity asymmetrical 
reciprocity formally and substantively symmetrical 
redistribution indeterminate 
market formally symmetrical but substantively asymmetrical 
In the case of charity, the relationship between the giver and the receiver is one -sided or 
asymmetrical; in the case of reciprocity, it is formally and substantively symmetrical; in 
the case of redistribution, it is indeterminate in that it depends on the accountability of 
government and thus on the acceptability or legitimacy of the social partners; in the case 
of the market, due to the unequal bargaining positions of the parties, it is formally 
symmetrical but substantively asymmetrical. 
Arguing that social protection encompasses both labour law and social law, Zsuzsa then 
turns her attention (briefly) to labour contracts and (more extensively) to social 
insurance. She argues that, as `pure' labour contracts, i.e. contracts between employers 
and employees based on market principles, have become surrounded by protective 
legislation based on the principles of citizenship, they have been transformed into what 
she calls `messy' contracts, i.e. contracts that are based on more than one principle. 
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Social insurance schemes likewise reflect `messy contracts' - flat -rate and earnings - 
related benefits on the one hand, funded and pay -as- you -go modes of financing on the 
other, are based on different principles and it follows that those schemes which 
incorporate several of these different elements, as most social insurance schemes do, are 
based on a number of different principles. 
For Zsuzsa, messy contracts, involving a plurality of principles, are always preferable to 
pure contracts based on a single principle. This is because they `offer the best feasible 
solutions for societal policy' and `can serve complex social purposes combining broad 
coverage, adequacy, and the promotion of social integration'. In addition, it is because 
`they can incorporate opposed interests and can reconcile, at least to some extent, 
individualism with collective structure'.3 For this reason, she extols the virtues of social 
insurance in general, and public, earnings- related, pay -as- you -go schemes in particular 
and, by implication, asserts their superiority over other forms of social protection that 
are based on single principles, e.g. social assistance (based on charity), mutual aid 
(based on reciprocity) and private insurance (based on market principles). 
One of the great strengths of Zsuzsa's article is its acknowledgement that the principles 
underlying different forms of contract are not mutually incompatible but can be 
combined in complex social security schemes which serve a plurality of social purposes. 
Its weaknesses, if I may be so bold as to say so on an occasion like this, are that it 
oscillates between a focus on social insurance as a generic category and on a particular 
form of social insurance, i.e. on public, earnings- related, pay -as- you -go social insurance 
schemes; and that it analyses one type of social security scheme (social insurance) rather 
than the totality of the means of social protection that exists in a given country. 
Reference to GOsta Esping -Andersen's Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism4 will enable 
me to illustrate these criticisms. According to Esping -Andersen, de- commodification 
occurs when benefits or services are provided as a matter of right and when a person can 
maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market. De- commodifying welfare states 
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are relatively recent and welfare states differ in the extent to which they achieve de- 
commodification. Esping -Andersen then sets out to demonstrate that welfare states 
cluster into three groups or `regime types', which he refers to as liberal, corporatist and 
social democratic welfare states. Each of these regime types is associated with a 
different pattern of historical development (which will not be referred to here) and with 
a distinctive set of institutional arrangements (which are set out below). 
Liberal Welfare States 
Modest (flat rate) social insurance and means- tested social assistance 
predominate. 
Benefits cater to a clientele of low income, mainly working class dependents. 
The state encourages provision through the market, either passively (by 
guaranteeing a minimum) or actually (by subsidising private provision). 
Social reform is circumscribed by a strong work ethic. 
The resulting system of stratification comprises relative equality of poverty 
among largely working class welfare recipients, market differentiated welfare 
among the predominantly middle class majority, and 'class political dualism' 
between the two. 
De- commodification is minimal 
Corporatist Welfare States 
Separate (earnings- related) social insurance schemes for different occupational 
groups, e.g. for civil servants, salaried workers (middle classes) and waged 
workers (working classes) predominate. Thus, social security provision reflects 
class and status differentials. 
The market is displaced as a provider of welfare - private insurance and 
occupational provision are relatively unimportant. 
The Church exercises important influence - social security supports traditional 
family forms. 
The principle of 'subsidiarity' applies. 
The resulting system of stratification mirrors the system of stratification in 
society as a whole - class and status distinctions derived from the market are 
built into the social security system and redistribution is limited. 
De- commodification is limited. 
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Social Democratic Welfare States 
There are universal (earnings related) social insurance schemes for all 
Benefits and services reflect the highest aspirations of the (affluent) middle 
classes but the working classes have same rights as the middle classes. 
State provision crowds out the market. 
Social security is linked with the guarantee of full employment. In addition, 
social security attempts to socialise the costs of motherhood. 
The stratification associated with welfare effectively confronts and challenges 
the system of stratification derived from the market. 
De- commodification is extensive. 
Esping -Andersen's approach raises a number of problems that I do not wish to dwell on 
here.5 The points I do want to make and my reasons for citing his approach at some 
length are that it recognises the wide variety of social security schemes and that it 
considers the totality of the means of social protection, and thus the mix between 
different social security schemes (which, as Zsuzsa pointed out in her article, are based 
on different principles) that is to be found in a given country. 
At this point, I should like to make a connection between Zsuzsa's concerns in her paper 
and my own concerns in my recent work. Whereas Zsuzsa's main concern is with the 
ends of social protection, i.e. with what social protection schemes should aim to achieve, 
my main concern has been with the means by which social protection is delivered, i.e. 
with how social protection schemes should be run. My own work has been strongly 
influenced by that of the American public lawyer, Jerry Mashaw, and, in particular, by 
his pioneering study of the American Disability Insurance (DI) scheme.6 
In considering the DI scheme, Mashaw detected three broad strands of criticism leveled 
against it: the first indicted it for lacking adequate management controls and for 
producing inconsistent decisions; the second for not providing a good service and for 
failing to rehabilitate those who were dependent on it; and the third for not paying 
enough attention to 'due process' and for failing to respect and uphold the rights of those 
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dependent on it.' He argued that each strand of criticism reflected a different normative 
conception of the DI scheme, i.e. a different model of how the scheme could and should 
be run. The three models were characterised in terms of bureaucratic rationality, 
professional treatment and moral judgment, i.e. in terms of bureaucratic, professional 
and legal models of organisational decision making. 
Like Zsuzsa's characterisation of patterns of access, these normative models are also 
ideal types8. As such, they can be described in terms of their salient features and, 
drawing on Mashaw's work, I have identified four such features: the characteristic mode 
of decision making, the legitimating goal of decision making, the mode of accountability 
and the nature of the remedy available to those who are dissatisfied. It should be noted 
that each of the models places the applicant or beneficiary in a different role. 
The characteristics of the three models are set out in Table 2 below: 
Table 2: Three Normative Models of Administrative Justice (based on Mashaw) 













public service interpersonal second opinion 
or complaint to a 
professional 
body 
legality weighing -up 
arguments 
rule of law independent appeal to a court 
or tribunal 
In the bureaucratic model, the role of the applicant is largely passive. An application is 
usually submitted on a standardised application form and assessed without any further 
involvement by the applicant. Officials apply carefully formulated rules to the 
information provided on the application form. The legitimating goal of the organisation 
is to make accurate (and consistent) decisions by applying the administrative rules. 
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Accountability is hierarchical, and officials are accountable to their superiors. Those 
who are dissatisfied can appeal against the decision and these appeals are dealt by means 
of an (internal) administrative review of the original decision. 
In organisations characterised by aprofessional model, professionally trained staff make 
administrative decisions by applying their knowledge and expertise to the specific 
circumstances of the applicant's case. Accordingly, applicants may play a more 
interactive role in their dealings with the organisation, although they are still subordinate 
to the professional experts. The legitimating goal of the organisation is to promote the 
interests or well -being of the applicant or beneficiary. Accountability is interpersonal 
and staff are accountable to their professional peers. Those who are dissatisfied can ask 
for a second opinion or complain to the relevant professional body or association. 
In the legal model of organisation, applicants (or their representatives) take a more 
active role in asserting their rights and arguing the merits of their case. Decisions are 
made by independent decision -makers who weigh up the arguments of the parties. The 
legitimating goal of the organisation is fairness, and accountability is to an independent 
adjudicator located outwith the organisation. Those who are unhappy with the decision 
in their case may appeal to a court or tribunal. 
Table 2 refers to the models as models of administrative justice and this calls for some 
explanation. In the discussion above, I have referred to normative models of decision 
making and it is clear that each of the models refers to a different way of making and 
challenging decisions. However, the fact that the models are ideal types rather than 
empirical generalisations means that the various components of the model function as 
standards for assessing the decisions that are actually taken. As such, they not only 
describe how decisions should be made and may be challenged but also how individuals 
should be treated. It is in this sense that they constitute models of procedural justice.9 
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In the post -war period, many (perhaps most) public welfare services were shaped by the 
three models outlined above although their importance varied from one policy domain 
and one country to another. However, by the mid- 1980s, welfare organisations had 
come under attack in many countries.10 As a result, the bureaucratic, professional and 
legal models have, in many countries, been challenged by other models of decision 
making, in particular by a managerial model associated with the rise of new public 
management,11 by a consumerist model which focuses on the increased participation of 
consumers in decision making,12 and a market model which emphasises competition and 
choice.13 Three additional models can be added to the three models outlined above. The 
characteristics of the six models are set out in Table 3 below. 
Six Normative Models of Procedural Justice 




















or complaint to a 
professional 
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legality weighing -up 
arguments 
















`voice' and /or 
compensation 
through Charter 
markets matching supply 
and demand 
profit making to owners or 
shareholders 
`exit' and /or 
court action 
(private law) 
In the managerial model, which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, beneficiaries (or 
users) do not play an important role. The legitimating goal of this model is efficiency 
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and is premised on managerial autonomy, i.e. on allowing managers the freedom to 
manage. Accountability is achieved through the use of performance indicators. The 
only recourse available to those who are dissatisfied is to complain to management or a 
regulatory body that can then impose sanctions for not meeting performance 
requirements. 
In contrast to the absence of the beneficiary or user in the managerial model, in the 
consumerist model, which also emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, the user is at the 
centre of the organisation. Here the aim is to ensure consumer satisfaction. In reaching 
decisions, there is active engagement or consultation with the user. Customer charters 
define consumer rights, levels of service to be expected and grievance processes. 
Remedies for grievances are the right to be heard, with the effect that ensuring that 
action is taken to remedy the problem and that compensation is granted according to the 
organisation's customer charter. 
Finally, in the market model, decision making involves the matching of supply and 
demand and is made with reference to the price mechanism. The legitimating goal is 
profit making, while the prevailing mode of accountability is to the owners or 
shareholders. In contrast to consumerism, where the individual can use `voice' as a 
remedy and can obtain compensation through the consumer charters if the specified 
standards have not been met, markets provide the possibility of `exit'.14 In addition, an 
aggrieved individual may seek compensation for breach of contract where he or she 
suffers some measurable loss from the action or inaction of the administration. Internal 
or quasi- markets15 have some but not all of the characteristics of the market model just 
outlined.. 
Following Mashaw, I contend that these models are competitive, rather than mutually 
exclusive.16 It follows that, although they are not all necessarily in evidence in any 
particular context, they can and do coexist with each other in public welfare 
organisations and, thus, in social security institutions. Just as social security institutions 
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reflect `messy contracts' at one level, so they reflect trade -offs between competing 
models of administrative justice at another level. And, just as messy contracts, 
involving a plurality of principles, are preferable to pure contracts based on a single 
principle, so a composite model of administrative justice, which combines appropriate 
features of particular models, can have many advantages over any single model. 
The approach I have outlined enables us to see both what `trade -offs' are made between 
them in particular cases and what different, and possibly more desirable, trade -offs 
might be made. It is a pluralistic approach that recognises a plurality of normative 
positions, making any given trade -off attractive for some people and unattractive for 
others. 
The actual and potential trade -offs I have referred to reflect the concerns and the 
bargaining strengths and bargaining strategies of the institutional actors who have an 
interest in promoting the different models. These are summarised in Table 4. 
Table 4: Institutional Actors associated with different Models of Decision -Making 
Model Institutional Actors 
Bureaucratic civil servants and officials 
Professional professionals and `street level bureaucrats' 
Legal lawyers, court and tribunal personnel 
Managerial managers 
Consumerist consumers 
Market `rational economic actors' and private, profit -making 
organisations 
They are typically civil servants and officials in case of the bureaucratic model; 
professionals and `street level bureaucrats "7 in the case of the professional model; 
lawyers, court and tribunal personnel and groups representing clients in the case of the 
legal model; managers in the case of the managerial model; consumers in the 
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consumerist model; and `rational economic actors' and private, profit -making 
organisations in the case of the market model. Trade -offs vary between different 
organisations in the same country, between the same (or similar) organisations in 
different countries. They also vary within a given organisation, between the different 
policies delivered by that organisation and between the different stages of policy 
implementation. But, other things being equal, the more evidence there is of one model, 
the less will there be of the others.'$ 
In some ongoing research, Paul Henman and I set out to describe the trade -offs between 
the six normative models of administrative justice which have been achieved in 
organisations responsible for the delivery of social security in 14 countries, and to 
examine the impact of information technology on these trade offs.19 Data were 
generated by means of a structured questionnaire which was completed by two expert 
informants in each country, one of whom was, wherever possible, an `insider' working 
for the government or a social security institution while the other was an `outsider', 
usually an independent researcher or consultant. In nearly every case, the expert 
informants responded by e -mail, enabling us to seek clarification where the two 
informants from a given country gave different answers to the same question or where 
their responses were incomplete or internally inconsistent. 
I have only time to give a very brief summary of our findings. With two exceptions, it is 
clear that bureaucracy is still the dominant model of procedural justice in social security 
in the ten countries for which data was available at the time,20 and computerisation 
appears to have reinforced this dominance Computerisation also appears to have had a 
very significant effect in promoting the managerial model, which in many countries is 
now second in importance. In contrast to this, professionalism is little in evidence and 
there appears to have been a tendency for computerisation to reduce its importance. 
There is also little evidence that the market model has had much of an impact. The two 
exceptions here are Belgium and Finland - in the former, employers and employees can 
choose which social security fund delivers social security benefits. Despite its rather 
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low profile, the market model appears to have been somewhat strengthened by 
computerisation. While the importance of the legal model of procedural justice appears 
to be stronger in some respects than in others, computerisation appears to have had a 
minimal effect on it. Finally, the importance of consumerism differs from country to 
country and computerisation has had been a mixed response on it. 
I offer this account of some of my recent work to you Zsuzsa as an example of another 
pluralistic approach to social security which recognises that institutions that reflect a 
number of competing principles are preferable to those that are based on a single 
principle. However, just as I have ventured a few criticisms of your work, so, I am sure, 
you will be critical of mine. You may think that my concern with procedural fairness, 
with how people are treated, is less important than a concern with substantive justice, 
with what people contribute and receive, and you may well be right. You may criticise 
me for, at least implicitly, accepting John Rawls' claim that `justice is the first virtue of 
social institutions'21, on the grounds that the sociological issues you tackle in your paper, 
in particular your concerns with the relations between those who give and those who 
receive, and with the problem of social integration, are of even greater importance. You 
may likewise be somewhat impatient with the relativity of my approach, with my claim 
that the trade -offs between different normative models which are made, and likewise 
those which could be made, reflect the bargaining strengths and bargaining strategies of 
the institutional actors who have an interest in promoting them, and my observation that 
trade -offs which are attractive for some people will be unattractive for others, and you 
may urge me to be more engaged and less even -handed in my approach. 
It is a great honour to be here and an even greater honour to have been invited to speak 
today. As usual, I await your comments on my contribution with some trepidation. 
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